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EDITOR'S NOTE
It is my pleasure to present to you the first issue of Volume 21 of the Water Law Review. It is my
hope that Volume 21 will continue the Water Law Review's longstanding place serving as a
catalyst for broader discussions in water law. Water law occupies an incredibly important place in
local, national, and international discussions as it is both contentious subject and a-pacifier. The
Water Law Review strives to find its role in this ongoing discussion through providing information
that will foster a focus for the legal issues that plague the political, economic, and environmental
landscapes of water law. As many who have studied and practiced water law know, water is not
merely a thing, but a cultural milieu.
Once again, and with the assistance from the water law community, Volume 21 strives to facilitate
the forum on important water law issues. The Water Law Review has a strong tradition of
publishing progressive content meant to elicit further discussion. I invite you to read the four
articles published in this issue as well as the timely content of water cases, conferences, legislation,
and ideas our staff tirelessly collects.
In our first article, History of the Referee, Division Engineer, State Engineer, and Water Court
Consultation Process Under the Water Rights Determinationand Administration Act of 1969, Greg
Hobbs, Christopher Hudson, and Hannah Oakes provide an overview of the portion of the 1969 Act
that considered the need for an integrated administration of diversions within the state. The authors
give a brief history of the 1969 Act itself while providing a more in-depth look at the recognition of
the many parties and processes involved in diversions. As Colorado quickly approaches the 50th
anniversary of the 1969 Act, it is important to remember the work of the many people who
contributed to it. The authors provide insightful history into some of these key players and their
contributions.
Next, authors Benjamin Bryce and Robert Skousen examine the toxic algal bloom problem in
Bloomin Disaster:Externalities, Commons Tragedies, and the Algal Bloom Problem. Mr. Bryce
and Mr. Skousen argue that algae-causing nutrient pollution and effective non-regulation is causing
serious risks to human health, the environment, and the economy. Throughout the article, Mr.
Bryce and Mr. Skousen examine federal and state regulation voids that lead to algal blooms in
interstate watersheds. The authors examine the policies and challenges associated with preventing
algal blooms while offering specific proposals to overcome the challenges of regulating interstate
waterways. Mr. Bryce and Mr. Skousen assesses the algal bloom problem through the familiar
idea of commons tragedies. Ultimately, the authors argue that there is a need for stronger federal
regulation of agricultural nonpoint source nutrient pollution in larger interstate watersheds.
We are pleased to also publish Mr. M. Reed Hopper's article, Running Down the Controlling
Opinion in Rapanos v. United States. Mr. Hopper, a Senior Attorney with the Pacific Legal
Foundation who represented John Rapanos in Rapanos v. United States, argues that the Supreme
Court's split vote in Rapanos leaves a range of ambiguity in which lower courts must decide the
controlling opinion defining the scope of the Clean Water Act. Mr. Hopper argues that the
standarded for interpreting fractured decisions set forth in Marks v. United States is readily
adaptable to the Rapanos decision thus making the Scalia plurality controlling. Mr. Hopper

outlines the various approaches circuit courts have taken and argues that they have misconstrued
Marks or misinterpreted Rapanos.
Rounding out our featured articles is Water Transfers Litigation and EPA's Water Transfers Rule
by Peter D. Nichols. The article seeks to make sense of the EPA's Water Transfers Rule after a
series of cases challenged its application to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
permitting. Mr. Nichols argues that the blanket NDPES permitting of water transfers may be at an
end, but with the series of cases coming out of the circuits, there may still be questions in the
future. With a petition for certioraribefore the Supreme Court, Mr. Nichols argues that this issue
is certainly not at a close.
Finally, we hope you find useful our student writings on recent cases, legislation, conferences,
literature, and developments from around the country. The Water Law Review strives to provide
timely content to our readers while also giving our staff the opportunity to explore water law
through various lenses. Our print content, combined with our robust online content, keeps our
readers well informed of the various water issues and policy around the nation and world.
With that said, I would like to give a special thank you to the dedicated staff of the Water Law
Review. You need only to look at each one of their individual focuses in law school to realize how
many areas of law water truly touches. As always, thank you for your continuing patronage to the
Water Law Review. We hope that our 21st volume continues to strive for excellence, quality, and
value to the water law community.
Sarah A. Rice
Editor-in-Chief
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COLORADO RE-FORGES ITS PIONEERING ADJUDICATION CODE

Under Colorado's 1876 Constitution, the public owns the waters of the natural stream and its use is dedicated to the people.' The natural stream includes
surface water and tributary groundwater connected to it.4 First, to place prior
appropriation and beneficial use water law into its constitution, Colorado
promptly followed on statehood with its first water right determination act in

1. Reproduced by permission of the Colorado Bar Association CLE from Gregory J.
Hobbs, Jr. et al., History of the Referee, Division Engineer, State Engineer, Water Court Consultation Process Under the Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969, in
STATE ENGINEER'S EVOLVING ROLE: WATER COURT AND CONSULTATION PROCESS 1, 1-14
(Continuing Legal Educ. in Colo., Inc. 2017), all rights reserved.
2. GregoryJ. Hobbs,Jr., Justice, Colorado Supreme Court (Ret.); Senior WaterJudge, Colorado Courts; Co-Director Environmental and Natural Resources Program, University of Denver
College of Law. Christopher Hudson, Deputy Colorado Supreme Court Law Librarian. Hannah
Oakes, University of Colorado Law Student.
3. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
4. Water Rights Determination.and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, § 148-21-3(3),
1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200, 1201 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(13)
(2016)).

1
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1879.5 Ninety years later, the 1969 session of the General Assembly created
seven water courts to exercise special statutory jurisdiction over water matters
encompassing major watersheds within the state.'
The need to integrate groundwater and surface water rights into the prior
appropriation use and enforcement system precipitated the 1969 Water Rights
Determination and Administration Act.' Horrendous droughts in the 1930s
and 1950s, rural electrification, and invention of the high-capacity irrigation
pump produced multiple junior water rights that relied on wells to extract tributary groundwater from the aquifers of the South Platte, Arkansas, and Rio
Grande. Each of these aquifers was hydraulically connected to the surface
streams upon which senior water rights depended.
In 1967, the General Assembly, through Senate Bill 407, commissioned a
water study for the purpose of determining the "need for and content of legislation that would provide for integrated administration of all diversions and uses
of water within the state, protect all vested water rights, conserve water for maximum beneficial use, and pennit full utilization of all water in the state."'
Judicial necessity promptly followed the legislature's call for re-engineering
legislation. The Colorado Supreme Court in 1968 issued its Fellhauerdecision
pulling back the curtain on groundwater/surface water conflicts in.need of resolute administration promoting integrated use of the waters.' Up stepped the
"lawyers committee" of distinguished water attorneys to help craft the legislation
and shepherd its enactment."
In the first volume of the Universitv ofDenver Water Law Jeview, chair of
the lawyers committee, Robert Welborn, describes the extraordinary significance the General Assembly placed on this legislation:
ITlo show the tremendous importance that the Lcgislature placed on the matter, the entire membership of the State Senate was constituted as a water conmittee with hearings to commencc at the very start of the 1969 legislative sesSion.

Although there were significant changes, Senate Bill 81 finally passed (basically
intact), requiring adjudication and administration of tributary wells in the priority system. Possibly the most significant impact of the 1969 Act was a change
in the procedure for the adjudication of water rights from one in which there
were periodic general adjudication proceedings in the various water districts
(proceedings which could last for years as the court permitted statements of

5. Act of Feb. 19, 1879, § 24, 1879 Colo. Scss. Laws 94, 102 (rcgulating the use of water for
irrigation and settling of prioritics); see Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Plumbing the Dimensions of the
Colorado Doctrinc ofPriorAppropriation, I COLO. WATER LAw BENCHBOOK §§ 1.5, 1.8 (Carric L. Ciliberto & TimothyJ. Flanagan eds., Continuing Legal Educ. in Colo., tnc., 2d ed. 2016).
6. Water Rights Dctermination and Administration Act of 1969 § 148-21-10(1) (codified as
amended at COLO. RFv. STAT. § 37-92-203(1) (2016)).
7. Id. § 2(1) (codified as amended at COLo. REv.STAT. § 3 7 - 9 2 -10 2 (1)(a) (2016)).
8. Act of Apr. 19, 1967, ch. 175, § 1(b), 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 249, 249 (providing for a
study of water resources, uses, and administration of applicable water laws).
9. See Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
10. Scc William A. I lillhouse 11, IntcgrathngGround and Sulhcc Water Use in an Appropriation State, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 691, 700 (1975).
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claims to be fied), to one of individual adjudication which could be accomplished on each claim that was made."
This paper examines how the referee, water judge, and division and state
engineers' consultation process with the parties to a water case became an integral part of this comprehensive legislative reform of the adjudication code.

THREE COMPETING BILLS, 1969 SESSION: S.B. 81, H.B. 1307, H.B. 1295
The 1969 Act emerged out of a number of competing bills the General
Assembly considered in its 1969 session. Three bills in particular-Senate Bill

81 ("S.B. 81")," House Bill 1307 ("H.B. 1307")," and House Bill 1295 ("H.B.
1295")"-appear to have been the front-runners. S.B. 81 became the primary
vehicle for a series of amendments resulting in the 1969 Act." The two other
bills died in committee at the end of that session. As introduced, each of these
bills proposed to have either a commission or the division engineer make the
initial ruling on a water right application instead of a district judge or referee of
the court, in contrast to previous adjudication acts dating back to the first adjudication act of 1879." As introduced into the 1969 session, none of these three
bills contained any reference to a referee."
S.B. 81 (Senators Gill and Denny) (the "lawyers committee bill"), as introduced, proposed to have the division engineer, with approval by the state engineer, rule upon water right applications. The division engineer would "make
such investigation as is necessary to determine whether or not the statements in
the applications and statements of opposition are true." The "state engineer
and the division engineers may consult with the Colorado water conservation
board and other state agencies as appropriate."" The water judge for the division would hear and rule de novo on any protested rulings." The division engineer would be required to appear in support of that ruling." The water judge
for the water division would issue all judgments and decrees, and the division
and state engineers would regulate the distribution of water in accordance with
the decrees."
H.B. 1307 (Representative McCormick) (the "Sparks bill"), as introduced,
proposed to create water rights commissions in each of the water divisions for

11.

Robert F. Welborn, Commentary: Two Colorado Water Cises, 1 U. DENV. WATER L.

REV. 307, 310 (1998).
12.
13.

S.B. 81, 47th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1969) (as introduced, Jan. 27, 1969).
H.B. 1307, 47th Gen. Assermb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1969) (as introduced, Mar. 10,
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15. See H.JouRNAL 47-113, 1st Reg. Sess., at 1297 (Colo. 1969).
16. See id. at 1519.
17. See H.B. 1307 §§ 148-2-5(1)(a)-(h); H.B. 1295 § 7; S.B. 81 § 148-21-17; see also Act of
Feb. 19, 1879 §§ 19, 20.
18. See I.B. 1307; II.B. 1295; S.B. 81.
19. S.B. 81 § 148-21-17(2).
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21.
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hearing and determining water right applications." The executive director of
the department of natural resources would appoint the members of each commission, which would consist of "not less than three nor more than five members." The commissions would "conduct appropriate hearings."' The state
engineer, or appointed agent, would be a "necessary party" to all proceedings
of the commissions and would be subject to examination and cross-examination
by the parties. The commissions would rule on all applications." On appeal,
the water judge for the water division would review the commission's ruling and
decree de novo and issue the resulting decree." If no appeal was filed, the water
judge would issue the commission's ruling and decree.'
H.B. 1295 (Representative Jackson), as introduced, proposed to create an
elected board of water users in each division, composed of three "agricultural
purpose" water users, three "municipal purpose" water users, and three "industrial purpose" water users." Water rights owners would comprise the eligible
electors for election of the board members." The board in each division would
select and hire a division engineer.' The water judge for each division would
have "exclusive review jurisdiction of all water matters" in each division." The
division engineer would rule initially on each application and establish a volumetric limit for each water right.' The board of water users for the division
would have to give majority approval to any changes of water right the division
engineer approved.'
REFEREF/DIVISION ENGINEER CONSULTATION PROVISION IS AMENDED
INTO S.B.-81 ON THIRD READING BEFORE THIS BILL GOES TO THE HOUSE
On second reading in the Senate, S.B. 81 provided in section 148-21-17(2):
ITIhe division engineer in each division shall in the first instance have the authority and duty to rule upon determination of water rights and conditional
water rights and the amount thereof, determinations with respect to changes
of water rights, plans for augmentation, approvals of reasonable diligence in
the development of appropriations under conditional water rights, and determinations of abandonment of water rights or conditional water rights.'
Section 148-21-18(4) provided that the division engineer:
IS]hall nake such investigation as may be necessary in his opinion so that he
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

II.B. 1307 §§ 148-2-5(1)(a)-(h).
Id. § 5(2).
Id.
29(1).
Id. § 9(2).
Id. § 9(1).
Id. § 12(6).
II.B. 1307 § 148-2-12(5).
11. B. 1295 §§ 3 (1), (2).
Id. S3(4)..
Id. 4(1).
Id. 5(1).
Id. §§ 7(1), (10).
Id. § 9(3).
S.B. 81 §147-21-17(2) (as engrossed Mar. 14, 1969).
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will be fully advised with respect to the subject matter of the application and
statements of opposition. The state engineer and division engineers may consult with the Colorado water conservation board and other state agencies as
may be appropriate."
A third reading amendment by Senator Fred Anderson to S.B. 81 assigned
the initial investigation and ruling on applications to a water court referee, instead of the division engineer, and required the referee to consult with the division engineer in the course of the referee's investigation and ruling." The
House approved this provision, along with other adjustments, as part of the

1969 Acto and killed H.B. 1307 and H.B. 1295 in committee at the end of the
1969 session."
On final consideration in the House on April 30, 1969, section 148-21-

17(2) provided:
ITihe referee in each division shall in the first instance have the authority and
duty to rule upon determinations of water rights and conditional water rights
and the amount and priority thereof, determinations with respect to changes
of water rights, plans for augmentation, approvals of reasonable diligence in
the development of appropriations under conditional water rights, and deter2
minations of abandonment of water rights or conditional water rights.1

Section 148-21-18(4) provided that:
The referee without conducting a formal hearing shall make such investigations as are necessary to determine whether or not the statements in the application and statements of opposition are true and to become fully advised with
respect to the subject matter of the applications and statements of opposition.
The referee shall consult with the appropriate division engineer and may consult with the state engineer, the Colorado water conservation board, and other
state agencies."
As adopted by the General Assembly in that year, the 1969 Act did not
contain any explicit reference to the division or state engineer becoming a party
to a water case in proceedings before the referee or the water judge." Section
148-21-18(1) generally provided that "[any person who wishes to oppose the
application" shall file a statement of opposition by the last day of the second
month following the month in which the application is filed." Section 148-2120(2) provided that "any person who wishes to protest a ruling of the referee"
shall file the protest with the water clerk and the referee within twenty days of
the referee's ruling." Section 148-21-20(3) provided for the water judge to hear
the protest de novo in accordance with trial practice and procedure, without
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. § 18(4).
S.JOURNAL 47-72,LIst Reg. Sess., at 474-75 (Colo. 1969).
H.JOURNAL 47-113, 1st Reg. Sess., at 1297 (Colo. 1969).
II.JOURNAL47-119, Ist Reg. Sess., at 1519 (Colo. 1969).
S.B. 81 § 147-21-17(2) (as re-revised Apr. 30, 1969).
Id. § 18(4).
Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969 § 148-21-10.

45. Id. § 18(1).
46. Id. S 20(2).
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being bound by the referee's findings." This section further provided that the
"division engineer shall appear to furnish pertinent information and may be
examined by any party, and if requested by the division engineer, the attorney
general shall represent the division engineer."' In section 148-21-3(2), the 1969
Act, as adopted, defined "Person" to include "the state of Colorado ... or any
other legal entity, public or private."
The consultation process between the referee and the division and/or state
engineer is sui geners to the 1969 Act. In order to take advantage of the engineers' expertise in water matters posed by individual cases without requiring
them to become parties, the following may have prompted the legislators to
include the engineers within the canopy of the referee's investigation: the complexities of ground water /surface water priority integration, the amelioration of
augmentation plans to allow out of priority diversions, and the increasing pressure of water right changes due to growing municipal demands. All prior adjudication acts included provisions for a referee to conduct formal proceedings
on behalf of the district court.
ALL PRIOR ADJUDICATION ACTS PROVIDED FOR REFERENCE TO A
REFEREE

Under the 1879 Act, the adjudication of irrigation water right priorities began with a district judge's order appointing a referee to conduct hearings, take
evidence, issue subpoenas, order the production of documents, allow for the
exanination and cross-examination of witnesses, note objections, and certify the
record to the court." The referee then filed a report, abstract of testimony, and
the record with the court." The district judge examined the testimony for the
purpose of entering a "decree determining the several priorities of the several
ditches and reservoirs ... according to the date of the construction and enlargement thereof, with the amount of water which it shall be held to have appropriated by said construction and enlargement . . . ."' The clerk of court issued a
certificate evidencing the decree by which the local water commissioner distributed water to the use rights. 3
In correcting the 1879 Act's lack of a service of process procedure to bring
claimants before the court, the 1881 Adjudication Act provided for a general
adjudication proceeding to decree irrigation ditch and reservoir priorities." The
district judge-could take the evidence, consider the evidence taken by a referee
under the 1879 Act, or appoint the same or a different referee to take evidence
for the court." The referee taking the evidence filed a report and record with
the court, together with an abstract of testimony, findings, and proposed decree

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. § 20(3).
Id.

51.
52.

Id. 27.
Id. § 30.

Id. § 3(2).
Act of Feb. 19, 1879 §§ 20-24.

53. Id.
54. Act of Feb. 23, 1881, § 4, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142, 144-45 (settling the priority of
rights to the use of water for irrigation).
55. Id. §§ 4, 10.
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for the irrigation priorities in the water district.3' After giving notice of the day
and time for hearing, the district judge considered any exceptions to the referee's report, findings, or proposed decree, which would be either approved or
modified.7 All appeals went directly to the Colorado Supreme Court." A separate 1881 act created the office of State Hydraulic Engineer."
The 1903, 1919, and 1943 Acts provided for general and supplementary
adjudications of priorities for all claimed beneficial uses in the same manner as
for irrigation priorities, including through the appointment of referees to take
evidence and file a report, findings, and proposed decree to the court for adjudication.'
As of 1905 the General Assembly had created seventy water districts." In
1929, it added a seventh irrigation division." Thus, on the eve of the 1969 Act,
there existed seven irrigation divisions, each with a division irrigation engineer
reporting to the State Engineer, and water commissioners distributing the water
of the seventy districts in accordance with district court decrees.' The system
of general and supplementary adjudications by district judges for local water
districts, and not the larger watersheds, proved to be prolonged and unwieldy.'
In establishing case by case adjudication of applications, the 1969 Act created
seven water divisions in place of the seventy local districts, with provisions for a
water judge, an alternate water judge, a water clerk, a referee, and an engineer
in each of the divisions, plus the resume notice system for summarizing applications.
In a University of Denver Water Law Review interview, former American
military Brigadier General, long-time Director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, and former Colorado Supreme Court Justice, Felix Sparks, proclaimed himself satisfied with the outcome of S.B. 81, though he had promoted
a competing bill, H.B. 1307, that would have established water commissions in
each division to rule on water applications.
I had a lot of input. I monitored that all the time, constantly. There were some
things I wanted to go further than what they finally did but we got it set up
finally where there was one system. It was a lot of work for the State Engineer's
office. Years and years of work of revising the whole system so today he knows

56.

Id. § 20.

57. Id. 21.
58. Id. § 27.
59. Act of Mar. 5, 1881, § 6, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 119, 119 (providing for the appointment
of a State Engineer).
60. Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 3, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 615 (granting the court
authority to appoint a referee to take evidence and submit proposed findings and decrees); Act
of Apr. 9, 1919, ch. 147, §§ 3, 7, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 487, 489, 493 (settling priority of rights);
Act of Apr. 11, 1903, ch. 130, § 1, 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 297, 297 (expanding the concept of
beneficial use to include uses outside of irrigation).
61. Act of Apr. 10, 1905, ch. 111, § 2, 1905 Colo. Sess. Laws 243, 243 (concerning water
districts).
62. Act of May 7, 1929, ch. 114, §1, 1929 Colo. Sess. Laws 410, 410 (creating irrigation
division no. 7).
63. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 148-12-1 to -5 (1963) (repealed 1969).
64. SecJustice Gregory j. Hobbs,Jr., Colomdo's 1969 Adjudication and Administation Act:
Settling In, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1999).
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where the Number One decree on the Colorado River is, or the South Platte.3
General Sparks could be salty. In the same interview, he called the prior
adjudication system "a mess of fraud." "I knew all the holes in our water law
and the problems we'd had with it over the years and the whole adjudication
procedure was a mess of fraud . .. Anybody could be a referee-you could just
appoint some guy who could be anybody.'
CURRENT CONSULTATION ROLES, RESPONSIBILYTIES, AND AUTHORITIES
OF THE REFEREE AND ENGINEERS UNDER THE 1969 ACT AND WATER
COURT RULES
Under section 37-92-302(1) (b) & (c): "Any person, including the state engineer, who wishes to oppose the application" may do so by the last day of the
second month following the month the application was filed. 7
Under section 37-92-302 (4), C.R.S. (2016), the referee, without conducting
a formal hearing, makes "such investigations as are necessary to determine
whether or not the statements in the application and statemenLs of opposition
are true."' These investigations focus on the referee becoming "fully advised
with respect to the subject matter of the applications and statements of opposition."' The referee "shall consult with the appropriate division engineer or the
state engineer or both."7 ' The consulted engineer files a written report in the
proceedings, with a copy to the applicant who must provide it to all parties of
record." If the application is re-referred to the water judge prior to consultation,
the division engineer files a written recommendation with the court within thirtyfive days of the re-referral.7 ' The water judge may also request the state engineer
to file a written report.
Section 37-92-304(2) provides that " . . . any person, including the state
engineer, who wishes to protest or support a ruling of the referee" may do so
by filing a written pleading with the water clerk within twenty-one days of the
mailing of the ruling." Under section 37-92-304(3), the "division engineer shall
appear to furnish pertinent inforiation and may be examined by any party,
and, if requested by the division engineer, the attorney general shall represent
the division engineer."7
Under section 37-92-303(2), before the referee's hearing, any applicant or
opposer may require re-referral of the application to the water judge."
Uniform Water Court Rule 6 provides further definition of the referee's
65.

Interview of Felix Sparks, PractitioncerkPerspecive, 3

109 (1999).
66. Id.
67.
68.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(b)-(c) (2016).
Id. § 302(4).

69.
70.

Id.
Id.

71.

Id.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(4) (2016).
Id. § 304(2).
Id. § 304(3).
Id. § 303(2).
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duties and responsibilities. They include "working with the division engineer
and the parties to obtain additional information that will assist in narrowing the
issues and obtaining agreements," and the referee's issuance of a ruling and
proposed decree with appropriate findings and conditions preventing injunious
effect to other water rights.
The referee must consult with the division engineer and the engineer must
file a written summary report of the consultation." The referee may require the
applicant to file a response to the division engineer's written summary report of
the consultation.7 For all applications in which a statement of opposition is
filed, the referee must hold a status conference and invite or require the division
engineer to appear at this conference." The referee must "enter minute orders
summarizing all conferences with the parities or the division or state engineers.""
The rule encourages Applicants to file a proposed ruling and decree before
the status conference to assist discussion." At the status conference the parties
shall discuss whether expert investigations are needed.' "In consultation with
the parties, the referee shall establish a case management plan for obtaining the
necessary information and preparing a proposed ruling and a proposed decree.
The referee may require the applicant to supply further information reasonably necessary for the disposition of the application, and may ask the division engineer for additional information as part of the referee's ongoing informal investigation." The referee must discontinue making such requests if the
state or division engineer has become a party to the case.' The division engineer may file a written report in response to new information in any proposed
ruling or expert report that the applicant files, and the referee may require the
applicant to file a written response." The Applicant has the burden of sustaining
the application.' If adjudications of fact and rulings of law must be made, these
belong to the water judge upon re-referral."
Committee Comment to the water court Rule 6 states intent "to ensure that
the participation by the division engineer is clear, meaningful, transparent, and
timely" and "provide a more clear record of consultations between the referee
and the division engineer."" The "primary purpose of the referee's role in water
court proceedings" is to "fashion a proposed decree that, with water judge approval, can be entered as a final decree if no protest to the referee's ruling is
'

Water Ct. R. 6(b); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3)(a) (2016).
78. Water Ct. R. 6(e).
79. Id.
77.

80.
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filed with the water court within the time the statute specifies."" To forward this
end, "the General Assembly has authorized the referee to consult with the division engineer without the state or division engineer having to file a statement of
opposition to the application."'
OBSERVATIONS ON THE LEGISIATURE'S CHOICES IN THE 1969 ACT
During its 1969 session, the General Assembly considered but did not
adopt provisions that would have authorized the division engineer, or a board
or commission, to conduct the initial investigation and make a ruling on a water
right application.
Since 1879, the General Assembly has consistently provided for a referee
to gather evidence and fashion a proposed ruling and decree for a District Court
Judge's review and determination.
The 1969 Act establishes exclusive jurisdiction over water matters in the
seven water divisions.
The 1969 Act authorizes the referee to conduct investigations into applications and statements of opposition, without a requirement to conduct a formal
hearing.
The 1969 Act requires the referee to consult with the division or state engineer, or both. The engineers must respond with a written report of the consultation in the proceedings. Under the Water Court Rules the referee must document through minute orders all conferences with the parties or the division or
state engineers.
The 1969 Act does not restrict the issues the division or state engineer may
raise in a written consultation report. These issues may include any matter
identified in section 37-92-305 regarding standards for referee and water court
rulings and decisions.
The division engineer must appear in proceedings before the water judge.
The state engineer may become a party to a case before the referee by filing
a statement of opposition or by way of protesting the referee's ruling.
The state engineer has discretion whether or not to become a party to a
water court case.
CONCLUSION
Because the public owns the water and the people make use of it through
adjudicated enforceable water rights that are continuously inter-related with
each other, the Colorado General Assembly starting in 1879 established a corps
of expert water officials-state and division engineers and water commissionersto ensure the ongoing value of beneficial use rights throughout the state. The
consultation provisions of the 1969 Act bring this expertise to bear as the referee
works with the parties to fashion, if possible, a consent decree the water judge
may review and approve without trial, if no protest is filed. Any party who desires a trial of disputed issues of fact or law may trigger re-referral of the case to
the water judge.

91.
92.

Id.
Id.

BLOOMIN' DISASTER: EXTERNALITIES,
COMMONS TRAGEDIES, AND THE ALGAL BLOOM
PROBLEM
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ABSTRACT
Toxic algal blooms are appeaing with increasing frequency across the
counnby. These blooms, fueled by risingglobal temperaturesand nutrientpollution, pose seriousrisks to human health, the environment, andthe economy.
Although the federalgovernment effectively regudates some sources of algaecausingnutrientpollution,exemptions under the Clean Water Acthinitfederal
restrictions on nonpoint source nutrientpollution from agriculturalactivities.
State governments' efforts to Jill this regulatoiy void are often capable of addressingalgalbloom risks within state-containedwatersheds. However, relying
upon state-levelagriculturalnutrientpollution regulationto prevent algalbloom
problems tends to be less successful when interstate watersheds are involved.
This Article analyzes the pocy challenges associated with preventing algal
blooms and offers specific proposalslor overcoming these challenges. By analyzingalgalbloom problems through GarrettHardin'sfamiliarcommons framework and integratingthe insights of Elior Ostrom and others about how to
address various types of commons tragedies, this Article exposes the shortcomings ofexistingpolicyapproachesto algalbloom prevention and highhghtssome
innovative alernative strategiesfor addressingthe problem. This Article ultimately argues that algal bloom risks arisingwithin larger interstate watersheds
involve broadernegative extemalLy problems than state regulatorsare capable
of efectively addressing, justifying saonger federal regulation of agricultural
nonpoint source nutient pollution in those contexts. One potential federallevel approach to the problem suggested in the Article is to allow states whose
waterresources arepolluted by upstream states to enforce interstate Total Maximum DailyLoads ("TMD1s') againstpolluangstates. By applying well-establshedlegalacademicconcepts to an emergingpoEcy challenge, this articleseeks
to influence how scholars andregulatorsapproach algal bloom prevention policy in the years to come.
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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2014, a small, but concentrated, algal bloom appeared in
Lake Erie's Maumee Bay.' The bloom manifested as a thick green sludge that
contained microcystin, a toxin that "can cause nausea, vomiting, and liver damage if ingested."' Nearby City of Toledo intake pipes sucked up the toxic water
and introduced it to the municipal water supply.! Officials soon determined
that their city water contained dangerous levels of the toxin and issued this dire
warning: "DO NOT DRINK THE WATER," and "DO NOT BOIL THE
WATER."2
Toledo's municipal water not only became unsafe to drink, it had developed toxicity that actually became worse when boiled.! Soon, over 400,000
people in the Toledo area lacked clean drinking water. Many panicked.
Stores quickly ran out of bottled water.! Restaurants, libraries, and schools
closed.! Residents traveled to nearby towns, and some even left the state in
search of potable water.o Ohio's Governor declared a state of emergency."
1. Codi Kozacek, Toledo Issues Emergency 'Do Not Drnk Water' Warng to Residents,
CIRCLE OF BLUE (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.circleofblue.org/2014/world/toledo-issues-emergency-warning-residents-drink-water/.

2.
3.

Id.
Id.

4. 'Donot drink, do not boi' water: Crisis closes out second day with little information,
WTOL 11 NEws (2014), http://www.wtol.com/story/26178506/do-not-drink-do-not-boil-wateradvisory-issued-for-issued-for-lucas-county-surrounding-area.

5.

Id.

6. Kozacek, supra note 1.
7. See Taylor Dungicn & David Patch, Toledo-area water advisory expected to contiue
through Sundayas leadersawait tests; water stationsto remain open, THE TOLEDO BLADE (Aug.
2, 2014), http://www.toledoblade.conmlocal/2014/08/02/City-of-Toledo-issues-do-no-drink-water-advisery.html.

8.

Id.

9. Kozacek, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Tap Water Ban for Toledo Residents, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/us/toledo-faces-second-day-of-water-ban.h
tml; see also Kozacek, supra note 1.
11. Kozacek, supra note 1.
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Nearby, unaffected municipalities offered water to residents of Toledo for free."
The Red Cross and other charitable organizations created water distribution
centers and delivery systems for those unable to leave their homes. The National Guard delivered bottled water and military rations to homeless shelters
and to other at-risk people who could not cook with their water." After two
excruciating days, city officials finally lifted the advisory; but City officials
warned residents to flush their household water lines. Toledo's experience
was a short-lived but vivid reminder to conmunities across the country of the
potential dangers that toxic algal blooms create.
Toledo water treatment plants were unprepared for the 2014 algal bloom,
despite the city's expenditure of millions of dollars on special water-treatment
equipment during the previous year to protect against water toxins. 7 Treatments of bloom-contaminated water are expensive, and concerns about algal
blooms have driven up spending on requisite equipment in recent years." In
the words of Adam Rissien, Director of Agricultural and Water Policy at the
Ohio Environmental Council,
I have every conlidence in the water treatment plant to figure out how to make
the drinking water safe. Unfortunately, the options available to them are costly
and that means a rate increase-there's no way around it. Until we reduce
choSDhorus and address harmful alral blooms, I'n afraid it's going to come
on the ratepayers' backs. And that's not fair.
The bacteria that cause algal blooms are common throughout freshwater
and marine ecosystems." However, algal blooms are likely to occur at increasing rates and become more severe in many regions of the country in the coming
years.2 In 2016, major algal blooms appeared in Lake Erie;` the Gulf of

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kozacek, supia note 1.
Id.
Id.

20. WORLD HEAL-rH ORCANIZATION, Toxic CYANOBACFERIA IN WATER: A GUIDE TO
THEIR PUBLIC HEALrH CONSEQUENCES, MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT § 1.1 (Ingrid Cho-

rus & Jamic Bartram cds., 1999), http://www.who.inVwatcrsanitationh_leldcsourceslitydit/t
oxcVanbegin.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Pam F. Gorder, Number ofsevere algalbloomsin LIke Eric to
double, forecast sa zs: Climate change 'supchames' algae, making it harder to prcent, THE
OHIO STATE UNIV. (Dec. 16, 2015), https://ncws.osu.edu/news/2015/12/16/eriecentury/.
22. Robert Ferris, Wi are there so many toxic blooms this year?, CNBC NEws (Jul. 26,
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/26/why-arc-there-so-maiw-toxic-algae-blooms-tiis-vear.ht
ml.
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Maine"; Utah Lake, Utah;` Lake Okeechobee, Florida;' Pyramid Lake, California;" Shasta Lake, California;" and elsewhere in more than twenty states." In
2016, California alone posted algal bloom danger advisories for at least thirty
lakes and reservoirs." Although blooms sometimes happen naturally, many
times they are caused by human-caused nutrient pollution," which can come
from urban storm runoff, wastewater treatment, fossil fuels, agricultural runoff,
and household products." In particular, runoff from commercial agriculture
can be a significant contributor to algal bloom problems and is regulated less
stringently than other sources of nutrient pollution." Although some states have
taken steps to regulate agricultural nutrient pollution within their own borders,
these states cannot lower nutrient pollution from other states." Therefore, the
problem of interstate nutrient pollution is unlikely to be solved without additional federal regulation.
Without question, algal blooms are a worsening problem within the United
States.' Growing nutrient loads in lakes and streams increase the incidences of
algal blooms.' Current federal and state regulations have failed to sufficiently
reduce nutrient loads, and severe algal blooms have become more common.

23. Id. (stating that the algal blooms in the Gulf of Maine "are almost entirely natural. However, in some cases, particularly in some freshwater blooms, humans are playing a part.").
24. Courtney Tanner, Utah Lake closed due to health concerns from large algal bloom, SALT
LAKE TRIBUNE (Jul. 15, 2016), http://www.sltrib.conVnews/4119973-155/utah-lake-closed-dueto-health.
25. Ferris, supra note 22.
26. Joseph Serna, Summer conditions growing toxic algal blooms in two California lakes,
L.A. TIMEs (Jul. 14, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-pyranmid-lake-algaebloom-20160714-snap-story.html.
27. Id.
28. Lesley McClurg, Poisonous Algal Blooms Threaten People, Ecosystems Across U.S.,
NPR NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/29/491831451/poisonous-algae-bloom
s-threaten-people-ecosystems-across-u-s.
29. Id.
30. WHO, supra note 20, at § 1.1.
31. Sources and Solutions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENcY (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/sources-and-solutions.
32. See Mary J. Angelo & Jon Morris, Maintaininga Healthy Water Supply While Growing
a Healthy Food Supply: Legal Tools for Cleaning Up Agricultural Water Pollution,62 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1003, 1003-04 (2014) (noting that despite agriculture producing a significant percentage
of nutrient pollution, the Clean Water Act's failure to regulate nonpoint source pollution through
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") has left agricultural run-off
largely unregulated).
33. See Robin K. Craig & Anna M. Roberts, When Will Governments Regulate Nonpoint
Source Pollution?A ComparativePerspective, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 12 (2015).
34. SceJ. Heisler et al., Eutrophicationand Harmful Algal Blooms: A Scientific Consensus,
8 HARMFUL ALGAE 3, 4 (2008) ("It is generally recognized that there have been more coastal algal
blooms, often of greater geographic extent and/or longer duration, with more toxic species observed, more fisheries affected, and higher associated costs from algal blooms in the past decade
than in previous decades."); see also C.B. Lopez et al., SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF FRESHWATER
HARMFUL ALGAL BLOOMs 9 (2008) (acknowledging that algal blooms have increased within
freshwater systems).
35. Heisler et al., supra note 34, at 4.
36. Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail:Structuringa Regulatory Response to AgrculturalNonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U.J. L. & POL'Y 21,
23-25 (2002).
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Fortunately, Garrett Hardin's familiar "commons" framework and basic economics principles related to negative externalities help to highlight some of the
factors contributing to this regulatory failure. Among other things, viewing algal
bloom challenges through these frameworks reveals the need for stronger federal government involvement in certain settings and a greater emphasis on curbing agricultural runoff pollution to slow the increase of algal blooms and their
costly consequences.
Part I of this Article explains how nutrient pollution and climate change
have fueled increases in algal blooms in recent years and details how current
laws have failed to address this trend. Part II frames certain specific instances
of algal blooms as commons tragedies and others as interstate negative externality problems. Part III applies the principles associated with these frameworks
to emphasize the unique regulatory challenges that algal blooms create within
interstate watersheds, and to argue that a stronger federal approach is needed
to stop algal blooms in those settings. Part IV describes specific federal government approaches capable of better addressing the nation's algal bloom risks.
Among other things, Part IV advocates for laws that would empower states,
whose algal blooms are occurring within interstate watersheds, to hold polluting
states responsible for agricultural nonpoint source nutrient pollution that contributes to the problem.
I. THE GROWING ALGAL BLOOM PROBLEM AND ITS CAUSES

Algal blooms impose significant costs on local communities and greater society." Unfortunately, for the reasons discussed below, they are likely to become even more commonplace and severe in the coming years. A major contributor to algal blooms is the introduction of excessive nutrients into water
bodies.' One significant source of this nutrient pollution is agricultural nutrient
pollution, which is not heavily regulated under the Clean Water Act and remains prevalent despite state-level regulatory efforts." Accordingly, new laws
that reduce agricultural nutrient pollution levels could be among the most costeffective and promising means of reversing the nation's trend toward more frequent and severe algal blooms.
A. ALGAL BLOOMS CAUSE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE

Toxic blooms, often referred to as harmful algal blooms,"0 are an exceptionally pernicious problem that can pose significant threats to human and animal
health. The recent water crisis in Toledo was not the first time this hazardous
type of algal bloom has imposed substantial adverse impacts on a local economy." The dangers of algal blooms have been known for over 100 years, with

&

37. See inli note 52.
38. Heisler ct al., supma note 34, at 4.
39. Angelo & Morris, supwa note 32, at 1004-05.
40. HarnidI Algal Blooms: Tinr' Organimis iith a To)xic Punch, NAT'L OCEANIC
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanscivice.noaa.gov/hazards/hab/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
41. See Dilwyn .1. Grifliths & Martin L. Saker, 77e Pahn Isand Miusten' Disease 20 Years
On: A Reiiew of Rcseach on Cranotoxin CS'lindispemnopsin, 18 ENrtL. ToxicoOcY 78,
78-79 (2003) (explaining how, in 1979, a bloom in Australia released toxins into the local water
supply that caused an outbreak of severe "hepatitis-like" illness. The illness was labeled the Pain
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extreme cases causing thousands of animal deaths from ingestion of algae-poisoned water." In some cases, large animals have died within minutes of exposure to cyanotoxins produced by algal blooms.
In addition to threatening humans and animals, algal blooms also pose serious risks to the environment Hypoxia refers to a state of oxygen depletion in
a waterbody." Hypoxic conditions can create a "dead zone" where plants, fish,
and other animals cannot survive.' Hypoxic conditions occur as algal blooms
exhaust nutrient supplies and die.' The decomposition process uses the available oxygen in the water, leaving nothing for other animals and plants." In the
northern portion of the Gulf of Mexico, a 10,250 square mile dead zone covers
where the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers enter the gulf.' Although this is
the largest dead zone in the United States, others exist elsewhere, such as in the
Chesapeake Bay and the Florida Everglades. Algal blooms also block sunlight
from entering the water column and thereby danage the ecology of the water
body." This lack of sunlight kills aquatic plants, which also consume oxygen as
they decompose."
For obvious reasons, algal blooms can likewise harm local and state economies.5 Blooms can be very expensive to treat and prevent. One conservative
estimate puts the cost of algal blooms in the United States at over $2.2 billion
annually. 3 Algal blooms can diminish property values, necessitate additional
'

Island Mystery Disease and hospitalized over 100 children, making it one of the more serious

cases of human cyanobacterial poisoning in history).
42. Ian Stewart et al., Recreationaland OccupationalField Exposure to FreshwaterCyanobacteria - A Review ofAnecdotaland CaseReports, EpidemiologicalStudies and the Challenges
lbrEpidemiologicAssessment, ENVrL. HEALTH, Mar. 24, 2006, at 1, 2-4 (detailing the potential
for algal blooms to cause death, including an anecdotal account that blamed an HAB for the
death of a teenage boy. The coroner who reviewed the case found that the boy died from accidental ingestion of neurotoxic cyanotoxin. This is the first recorded human death from recreational cyanobacterial exposure in the United States, though there are some questions about the
reliability of the coroner's interpretation).

43. Id.
44. Angelo & Morris, supra note 32, at 1008.
45. Id,
46. Linda Brcggin & D. Bruce Myers Jr., Subsidies with Responsibities:PlacigStewardship
and Disclosure Conditions on Government Payments to Laige-Scale Commody Crop Opera-

tions, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 487, 496 (2013).
47. Id.
48.

Angelo & Morris, supra note 32, at 1008-09.

49.

Id.

50. Breggin & Myers Jr., supranote 46, at 496.
51. John Manuel, Nutrient Pollution: A Persistent Threat to Waterways, 122 ENVrL.
HFALTH PERSPECTIVES, no. 11, Nov. 2014, at A304, A305 (2014).
52. See Walter K. Dodds et al., Eutroplicationof US Freshwaters:Analysis of Potential
EconomicDamages, 43 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 12,16-18 (2009); see also Matilde Mereghetti, Chile
Drafts Emergency Plan for Future Algal blooms, UNDERCURRENT NEWS, (Dec. 8, 2016, 4:32
PM), https://www.undercurrentnews.com/2016/12/08/chile-drafts-emergency-plan-for-future-alg
ae-blooms/ (describing an algal bloom in the Los Lagos region of South America in the Spring of
2016 that destroyed approximately 40,000 metric tons of salmon, costing the salmon industry
nearly $600 million).
53. H. Kenneth Hudnell, The State of US. FreshwaterHarmful Algal Blooms Assessments,
Policyand Legislation, 55 ToxicoN 1024, 1024 (2010) (cstimating the cost of harmful algal blooms in the U.S. to be somewhere between $2.2 billion and $4 billion).
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funding to protect endangered species, threaten drinking water supplies, interfere with commercial fishing operations, limit local recreation and tourism, and
cause a myriad of other problems."
B. ALGAL BLOOMS OCCUR WITH GROWING FREQUENCY
Algal blooms become more frequent as temperatures rise and more nutrients enter water systems.5 Cyanobacteria, or blue-green algae, can expand to
massive proportions' and are found in oceans, lakes, the tropics, and in the
Earth's poles." These bacterial blooms appear as scum on the water's surface."
Algal blooms require warm water5" and abundant nutrients to grow." As such,
global warming and growing levels of added nutrients in water systems create
increasingly optimal conditions for algal blooms to occur." For example, scientists project that the number of blooms in Lake Erie alone will double over the
next 100 years."
1. Climate Change Exacerbates the Problem of Algal Blooms
Global warming has.the potential to encourage algal bloom proliferation in
many regions because cyanobacteria reproduction generally occurs best at relatively high temperatures.' As the Earth's oldest known oxygen-producing organisms, cyanobacteria are particularly well adapted to survive environmental
variations.' Additionally, rising water temperatures make it easier for cyanobacteria to accumulate at water's surface throughout the water column, facilitating dense, highly toxic blooms that appear earlier and stay longer.'
Carbon dioxide ("CO,") emissions-a primary contributor to human-induced climate change"-further encourage algal blooms because higher rates of
CO in the air help blooms reproduce at greater rates.1 Cyanobacteria require
CO, to support photosynthesis, and surface blooms can absorb COdirectly
54. Dodds et al., supa note 52, at 12-18.
55. Hnnful Algal Bloom (HAB)-Assoeiated Illess, CTRS. FOR DIsEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/habs/index.htl (last updated June 1, 2017).
56. Hudnell, supra note 53, at 1024.
57. Hans W. Paerl & Jef Huisman, Clmhate Change: A Catalst for Global Evpansion of
Hannfd CianobacteialBkoms, 1 ENvrL. MICROBIOLOGY REP. 27, 32-33 (2009).
58. HarmfulAlgad Bloom (HAB)-AssociatedIllness, supra note 55.

59. See id.
60.
61.

Manuel, supia note 51, at A305.
Gorder, supla note 21.

62. Id.
63.

Paerl & Huisman, supma note 57, at 29-30.

64. Id. at 27.
65. Id. at 29-30 (explaining that water density changes with temperature, with water becoming
denser as it becomes colder. Warmer water is less dense and allows dispersed cyanobacteria to
float upwards and concentrate on the surIace of the water. This process is called vertical stratification. Though vertical sratilication in a water body may be a normal part of that ecosystem,
warming global temperatures can cause a water body to stratify earlier in the spring, maintain that
stratification through the summer, and de-stratitNj later in the fall. These concentrations of bacteria create blooms that a-c orders of magnitude more toxic than the surrounding water).
66.
W41hyr does C02getmost of the atention mihen ihere are many' other heal-uappinggases.,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTIsrs, http://'www.uesusa.org/global warming/science and _unpacts/science/C02-and-global-warming-faq.html#.Wa2OiTO-L-Y (last updated Aug. 3, 2017).
67. Paerl & Huisman, supia note 57, at 30.
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from the atnosphere." The growing proportion of CO, in the atmosphere provides algal blooms with an increasing supply of CO 2 that competing subsurface
plankton species cannot access.6
To make matters worse, climate change further stimulates algal blooms by
contributing to increased salinity levels in major water bodies." Increased
drought, rising seas, and increased use of freshwater for agricultural irrigation
have raised salinity levels in numerous water bodies." Higher salinity levels
benefit buoyant cyanobacteria by enabling them to more easily rise to the surface." Some species of cyanobacteria are much more tolerant of high salt levels
than competing phytoplankton species, giving them an advantage when competing for resources."
Climate change can even promote algal blooms by causing hydrologic and
weather changes within watersheds." For example, droughts punctuated by increasingly large storms wash large amounts of nutrients into watersheds, leaving
water bodies nutrient rich and relatively undisturbed. This can create the perfect conditions for algal blooms." Accordingly, as climate change worsens, these
impacts will continue to exacerbate the problem of increasing algal blooms.
2. Human Nutrient Pollution Provides the Conditions that Algal Blooms
Need
As stated above, algal blooms are thriving because of additional nutrients
that human activities have introduced into watersheds." Many. nutrients, such
as phosphorus and nitrogen, are normally found in water and soil, but human
activities have significantly increased the levels of these nutrients in lakes and
rivers." For example, stormwater runoff from cities and towns carries nutrients
into water bodies;" treated wastewater from sewers and septic systems causes
the addition of nutrients into water bodies;" fossil fuels introduce nitrogen into

68. Id.
69. Id.
70.

Id. at 31.

71.

Id.

72. See id. at 29-31 (explaining how higher salinity levels create what is called vertical density
stratification. Buoyant cyanobacteria rise to the top of the water column which leads to more toxic
blooms).
73. Pacrl & Huisman, supra note 57, at 31-32.
74. Id. at 32.
75. Id. (explaining that larger storms create greater surface run-off which carriers more nutrients into the waterbody than smaller storms otherwise might. Furthermore, smaller, more frequent storms flush a water system, which makes cyanobacterial reproduction more difficult.
However, long periods of drought interrupt these flushing cycles, leaving a nutrient-rich water
body primed for cyanobacterial blooms); see also Ben Guarino, 'We've pnmedthe system' Why
disgustngtoxic blue-grecen algae blooms seem increasinglycommon, THE WASH. POsT (Jul. 25,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/25/weve-primed-the-sy
stem-why-toxic-blue-green-adga-blooms-secm-increasingly-common/Putm-term-.ddfbf9cffl6d
(explaining that sevcrc storms can dredge up nutrients that have been trapped in sediment at the
bottom of a water body and release them into the water column).
76. Manuel, supra note 51, atA305-06.
77. Sources andSolutions, supia note 31.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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the air, which can make its way into a water body;" and household products
such as detergent, pet waste, and yard fertilizer also contain nitrogen and phosphorus, which eventually make their way into local water systems." However,
enormous quantities of manure, fertilizer-laden runoff, and soil erosion make
agricultural pollution one of the most significant sources of nutrient pollution
in the United States and "one of the greatest environmental challenges of our
time."82
The EPA has estimated that 28 percent of the nation's rivers and streams
have elevated levels of nitrogen and 40 percent have elevated levels of phosphorus.' For the same reasons that these nutrients make effective fertilizers for
crops, they also promote the growth of aquatic algal blooms." In fact, aquatic
plants like algae need far fewer nutrients to grow than terrestrial plants, by a
"magnitude of thousands."' For example, a single pound of phosphorus can
provide enough nutrients to produce up to 700 pounds of algae.' While a
comprehensive solution to the algal bloom problem would necessarily include
steps to curb climate change, reducing nutrient pollution represents a significant
step towards preventing future blooms.
C. WHY Focus ON AGRIcuuFURAL NUTRIENT POLLUTION TO ADDRESS
ALGAL BLOOMS
Although various forms of human nutrient pollution and climate change
contribute to the increased incidence of algal blooms in the United States, targeting agricultural nutrient pollution is arguably the most cost-justifiable means
of addressing this problem in the short term. For one thing, reducing nutrient
pollution within a single United States watershed is simpler than addressing
global warning because no international coordination is required." The efforts
of a single state or country to reduce CO, emissions are valuable but insufficient
to fully tackle the inherently global problem of climate change. In contrast, the
causes and impacts of agricultural nutrient pollution within many watersheds in
the United States are confined almost exclusively within the country's borders.
Accordingly, short-term domestic strategies aimed at reducing nutrient pollution are more likely to successfully reduce algal blooms when compared to the
unquestionably important challenge of curbing global greenhouse gas emissions.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Angelo & Morris, supia note 32, at 1003-04.
Manuel, supan note 51, at A306.
Id. at A305.

85. Oliver A. Houck, Cooperatic Fedclinm, Nutjients, and the C/ean Wiaer Act: iree
Cases Rerisited, 44 ENvrL. LAW REP. NEWs & ANALYSIS 10426, 10430 (2014).

86.

Id.

87. See Gordcer, supranote 21 (suggesting that nutrient reductions may not be enough to stop
algal blooms while climate change continues, but that any algal bloom mitigation strategy should
include nutrient pollution reductions).
88. See, c.g., Sewell Chan, KeyrPoints ofthe P;uis Clinate Pact, N.Y. TIMEs, (Dec. 12, 2015)
http://www.nytiimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/key-points-ofthe-final-pims-climate-draft (explaining the complex process that lead to the Paris Climate Accord).
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For at least two reasons, new restrictions on agricultural nutrient pollution
have greater potential to reduce algal blooms in many regions of the country
than regulations of other sources of nutrient pollution. First, among sources of
human nutrient pollution, agricultural nutrient pollution is the single greatest
contributor of nitrogen and phosphorus into the nation's water bodies." Second, other contributing sources of nutrient pollution are already significantly
regulated under existing laws, whereas sources of agricultural nutrient pollution
often are not."
1. Agriculture is a Significant Contributor to Nutrient Pollution
As previously stated, agricultural operations are one of the leading sources
of nutrient pollution in the United States." Agricultural nutrient pollution has
become commonplace throughout the country in part because of the "Green
Revolution" of the 1960's.' High-yielding varieties of grains like corn, wheat,
and rice allowed farmers to produce greater quantities of food as the global
population increased." Scientists selectively bred plants to create more efficient,
hybridized varieties that matured quicker and could adapt to year-round growing seasons.4 These crops soon became standard throughout U.S. agriculture."
Unfortunately, hybrid crops only produce their famously high yields when
farmers supply them with large amounts of water and fertilizer.' The ever increasing amounts of nutrients farmers have provided their crops over time has
led to U.S. farms shifting from "nutrient sinks" to "nutrient sources."" While
it is true that these hybrid grains and fertilization practices resulted in a 150
percent increase in crop production in the past 60 years, they have also introduced enormous amounts of nutrients into water systems, placing serious strains
on water quality." Plants only absorb a small percentage of nutrients applied to
a field, leaving the rest to make its way into water systems."' For example, in the
last 50 years, 600 tons of phosphorus were applied to agricultural lands globally,

89.
90.
91.

Seeinfa§I(C)(1).
See infna SI(C)(2).
See Angelo & Morris, supra note 32, at 1005; Williams, supra note 36, at 22.

92. William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing EnvironmentalDegradationand
PoorPublicHealth with Our Nation's Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 213, 251 (2009); see
also Angelo & Morris, supra note 32, at 1005-06 (building upon Eubank's research into the
Green Revolution).
93. Eubanks, supranote 92, at 256.

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 252.
97. Angelo & Morris, supia note 32, at 1005-06 (explaining how before the Green Revolution, a farm provided the nutrients needed on that farm through fertilizers that were produced
on that farm. These included animal manure and "green manure," which were crops that were
planted and tilled under to replenish depleted soil. After the advent of the Green Revolution,
farmers applied greater amounts of fertilizer to their fields than their farms could produce, making those farms nutrient sources. "What had been a mutually beneficial system in which animal
wastes fertilized the crops that fed the animals in a relatively 'closed loop' system, with minimal
pollution, became a serious environmental problem").

98.
99.

Id. at 1006-07.
See id. at 1005-07.
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while only 250 tons of that phosphorus were actually used by the plants." Similarly, agriculture is believed to produce approximately 66 percent of the nitrogen flowing out of the Mississippi River into the Gulf of Mexico's hypoxic dead
zone.o' Fertilizer and animal waste from farms generally contribute more nutrient pollution into United States water systems than other nonpoint sources."o
2. Other Significant Sources of Nutrient Pollution are More Heavily
Regulated than Agricultural Nutrient Pollution
Moreover, although many sources of human nutrient pollution, such as
wastewater treatment plants and stormwater runoff, are federally regulated, agricultural nutrient pollution largely is not." Differing legal approaches to the
categorization of nutrient pollution is at least partially to blame for persistently
high levels of agricultural nutrient pollution in water bodies throughout the
United States.
Sources of nutrient pollution are typically categorized as either point
sources or nonpoint sources. A point source is a single identifiable source of
pollution, such as contaminated water flowing through a pipe, ditch, ship, or
factory."' In contrast, nonpoint sources of pollution are dispersed and not easily
attributable to a single individual or location." Point sources are regulated under the Clean Water Act, which makes it illegal to discharge a pollutant from a
point source into waters of the United States without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit." In contrast, nonpoint sources
of pollution, such as run-off from farms, are not included under the NPDES
regulatory structure.' As such, agricultural nonpoint sources of pollution, like
agricultural stormwater discharges and irrigation return flows, are specifically
exempted from NPDES regulations."
The NPDES system is responsible for successfully reducing nutrient pollution from point sources such as stormwater discharge, wastewater treatment
plants, and factories.'" However, nonpoint source nutrient pollution continues
to be the leading impairment of rivers and lakes.'0 In fact, some prominent
water law scholars consider nonpoint source pollution to be one of the last major water quality problems in the United States."'
Expanding regulation to encompass agricultural nutrient pollution is likely
100. Id. at 1006.
101. Id. at 1008.
102.

Manuel, supa note 51, at A306.

103. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
104. CategoriesofPollution: PojitSouicc, NAT'L OCEANIc & ATMOSPHERIc ADMIN., http://o
ccanservice.noaa.gov/cducation/kits/pollution/03pointsource.hlnl (last updated July 6, 2017).
105. Categoties of Pollution: Nonpoint Souice, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://oceanscrvice.noaa.gov/educaion/kits/pollution/04nonpointsource.html (last updated July

6, 2017).
106. Sec 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (explaining that as a default rule all discharges from point sources
require an NPDES permit; only those specifically designated by the Administrator are exempt
from this requirement).
107. Id. (regulating point source pollution, but not pollution from nonpoint sources).
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
109. Angelo & Morris, supma note 32, at 1004.
110. Id. at 1009.
111. Craig & Roberts, supra note 33, at 10.
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to be a more cost-effective policy strategy for reducing algal blooms than is intensifying restrictions on other already heavily regulated pollution sources."'
Over the years, certain nonpoint sources have come under the regulation of the
NPDES program through congressional reclassification."' The most significant
of which is the reclassification of captured and channeled stormwater that is
then channeled or piped as a point source."' Industrial and municipal stormwater discharges are now regulated as point sources."' Regulatory changes that
similarly reclassified at least some types of agricultural nonpoint source pollution are arguably a mere continuation of this trend.
Moreover, because agriculture generally produces more nutrient pollution
than other nonpoint sources,"6 more stringent regulation could significantly reduce the number and severity of algal blooms."' Some water quality programs
have already tried to offset agricultural nutrient pollution by increasing the regulatory burden on other sources, but such programs will ultimately fail to successfully address algal bloom problems."' Expanding regulation to cover agnicultural nutrient pollution would be a more appropriate and promising way of
responding to these challenges."'
Of course, any new pollution restrictions affecting the United States agricultural industry should be tailored so as not to unjustifiably injure this important
and vulnerable sector of the nation's economy. Farmers face difficult choices
when determining how much fertilizer to apply to a field. In many instances,
uncertain soil and weather conditions can affect crop yields. Adding too much
nitrogen to soil increases the likelihood that nitrogen will escape into the environment. However, under-fertilizing can cut into crop yields, tempting some
farmers to over-fertilize to protect against their own downside risks.'" These
downside risks are significant for many farmers. Under the standard of a farm's
Operating Price Margin, a farm is within the high-risk "critical zone" when its
operating profits comprise less than ten percent of its gross cash income."' In
112. See e.g., RENA STEINZOR & EVAN ISAACSON, COUNTDOWN TO 2017: FIVE YEARS IN,
CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL AT RISK WITHOUT EPA ENFORCEMENT 25-27 (Ctr. for Progressive
Reform 2016) (http://progressivereform.org/articles/Chesbay2O17Countdownl601.pdf) (explaining how, in the context of the Chesapeake Bay, states have relied on greater reductions in nutrient
pollution from point sources like wastewater treatment plants. Because of this, the Chesapeake
Bay watershed boasts some of the largest and most advanced wastewater treatment plants in the
country. However, the watershed faces a problem of decreasing returns. Technological improvements will ultimately be unable to compensate for the impact of unregulated sources of nutrient
pollution).
113. Craig& Roberts, supra note 33, at 10-11.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 11.
116. Manuel, supra note 51, at A306.
117. See e.g., STEINZOR & ISAACSON, supra note 112, at 6-7 (illustrating this idea within the
context of the Chesapeake Bay).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 4 (referring to agricultural nutrient pollution within one watershed as the "largest
pollution source and the most promising and cost-effective sector for future reductions").
120. See MARC RIBAUDO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ERS No. 127, NITROGEN IN
AGRICUL- TURAL SYsTEMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSERVATION POLICY 4 (2011) (explaining

problems specific to nitrogen pollution, but which may be extrapolated to nutrient pollution in
general).
121. Robert Hoppe, ProlitMargins Increase with Eum She, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. (Feb. 2,
2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2015/januaryfebruary/profit-margin-increases-with
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2013, sixty-nine percent of U.S. farms were in this critical zone." Many only
remain profitable by relying on other income to support the farm. 2
Given that so many farmers operate under razor-thin margins, imposing
substantial new costs on farmers through nutrient pollution regulations could
place a significant burden on an already fragile industry. It is worth remembering that most agricultural emitters are not amoral polluters, but are merely rational actors in an imperfect system. Although additional regulation of agriculture may be justifiable to reduce the incidence and severity of algal blooms, a
heavy-handed and punishing approach that puts many farmers out of business
would be far less defensible. Any new laws aimed at curbing agricultural nutrient pollution would thus need to adequately account for their potential impacts
on farmers and farming communities.
D. CURRENT FEDERAL NUTRIENT POLLUTION REGULATION IS
INADEQUATE

Without question, federal regulations under the Clean Water Act fail to
adequately address agricultural sources of algae-causing nutrient pollution. Although the NPDES program does not regulate agricultural nutrient pollution,
the Clean Water Act does provide a kind of proxy nonpoint source regulation
through Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") requirements.'' Under the
Clean Water Act, states must set water quality standards for water bodies such
as rivers, lakes, and streams to serve as a check on point source NPDES permits." If a state fails to set an acceptable standard, the EPA is authorized to set
the standard for the state.'" In setting water quality standards, a state determines
the designated uses of a waterbody, like fishing, industry, or agriculture, and
then determines the level of pollutants it can sustain without damaging those
uses.'" If point source permits are insufficient to maintain the water body's
water quality standards, the state will define the waterbody as impaired.'" The
state must then set a TMDL for each pollutant that impairs the water body.'" A
TMDL is the total maximum daily load of a pollutant that a water body can
support and still meet its water quality standards."
Although the federal government can compel states to create TMDLs, it
cannot dictate how a state actually enforces those limits."' Instead, the state is
free to determine how its TMDL limits are distributed among point source and
nonpoint source polluters.' 2 In Pjonsoh7o v Nastn, the Ninth Circuit specifically held that TMDLs do not create a federal mechanism to control nonpoint
-fumn-size/.
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source pollution." Rather, the federal government uses the "threat and promise of federal grants to the states to accomplish this task."" In City ofArcadha
v. US. En vironmentalProtectionAgency, the court similarly held that a TMDL
"does not, by itself, prohibit any conduct or require any actions," and "each
TMDL represents a goal that may be implemented by adjusting pollutant discharge requirements in individual NPDES permits or establishing nonpoint
source controls.""
E. STATE REGULATION OF NONPOINT SOURCE NUTRIENT POLLUTION IS
INCONSISTENT AND HAS NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM

Because the Clean Water Act largely leaves agricultural nutrient pollution
regulation to the states, and since not all states regulate agricultural nutrient pollution, this pollution source continues to contribute to the nation's growing algal
bloom problemi. Regulation of nonpoint source pollution remains the prerogative of the states."' Within the U.S., each state has developed its own nonpoint source regulatory scheme, resulting in fifty different nonpoint source management programs.
Indeed, states often elect not to regulate nonpoint
sources." Despite years of state regulation of nonpoint source pollution, agricultural nonpoint source pollution continues to be a major barrier to achieving
state and national water quality goals."
II. FINDING A SOLUTION TO ALGAL BLOOMS USING ECONOMIC
THEORIES

Framing some algal blooms and excessive agricultural nutrient pollution as
commons tragedies can provide insight into how to prevent future algal blooms.
This Part II frames some types of algal blooms as commons tragedies when the
actions of agricultural producers harm all water users within a given water basin,
including the agricultural producers themselves. Section D of this Part II then
draws an important distinction between algal blooms that fit nicely into a tragedy
of the commons framework and those that are more accurately framed as general interstate negative externality problems. This distinction between these two
classes of algal blooms, which is based primarily on the type of water basin in
which the bloom occurs, is crucial to tailoring effective policy strategies for each
class.
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THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

When there is open access to a scarce and rival resource, individual resource users are often incentivized to overuse the resource rather than protect
it for the benefit of all users."' This familiar set of incentives can ultimately lead
to the destruction or degradation of the shared resource, along with significant
associated social costs."' Garrett Hardin famously highlighted this phenomenon in his seminal 1968 article, The Tragedy ofthe Connons.'" In his article,
Hardin described an example of a commonly-held field used by several herdsmen for grazing."' The herdsmen individually internalized the benefits of letting
their animals graze on the field, while distributing the costs of overgrazing
among all members of the group. " Hardin observed that overgrazing would
ultimately lead to a ruined field that could not support any of the herdsmen's
cattle."' Hardin noted that the herdsmen, as rational actors, were nonetheless
"locked into a system" compelling them to add cattle to their herd until they
destroyed the resource."' Each rational, self-interested herdsman in this example did not factor in the costs of overgrazing on the field when choosing how
many animals to graze because this cost was borne collectively by the group."
In these situations, Hardin famously noted, "[fireedom in a commons brings
ruin to all."".
Hardin's metaphor is cited widely in efforts to justify environmental regulation." Hardin refers to his herdsman story as a tragedy because the consequence of rational, self-interested action in these scenarios is collective ruin.
Commonly shared resources are similarly said to present what are often referred to as collective action problems:"' individual parties generally do not engage in behavior aimed at preserving a common resource if they believe all other
parties will continue to destroy it.'
B. ALGAL BLOOMS AS A RESULT OF COMMONS TRAGEDIES

In watersheds confined within a single state, some algal blooms occur, in
part, from patterns of behavior among agricultural producers that mirror the
behavior of herdsmen from Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. Farmers who
141. Carol M. Rose, Rcthinking Enidoninentid Conols: Management Suatcgies for Conmon Resowrces, DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1991).
142. Id.
143. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedi ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id..
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Hardin, supia note 135, at 1244.
150. EiLINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITt'TIONS FOR
Coi.rcnvE AcTION 9 (1990) (Ostrom cites multiple authors including Heilbroner, Ehrenleld,
Carruthers, and Stoner who opined that some external control is necessary to avoid destruction
of natural resources).
151. Barton H. Thompson, 7)agicalkDiflicuht: The Obstaces to Goveming the Commons,
30 ENvTL. L. 241, 244 (2000).
152. Rose, supja note 141, at 3 (describing the conundrum Facing a fisherman who wants to
preserve a hatchery because the benefiLts of restocking the hatchery or abstaining from taking
more fish wvill mostly go to the other fishermen).
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over-fertilize and allow excess nutrients to flow into the watershed are acting in
their own best interest; they reap the benefits from adding more fertilizer to
their crops, but do not bear the whole cost of polluting the common resource,
the watershed.'
When an algal bloom occurs downstream from the farmers
overloading the watershed with nutrients, they assume the injury along with the
rest of the citizens of the state. These harms include the human health, environmental, and economic harms borne by the state. Such cases present ajustification for state regulation of the farmers because they should mutually agree
to the "mutual coercion" that protects their interests.' Because these algal
blooms in state contained watersheds fit within a tragedy of the commons framework, tried and tested solutions to similar commons problems could potentially
prevent future algal blooms.
C. OVERCOMING INTRASTATE COMMONS PROBLEMS INVOLVING
AGRICULTURAL NUTRIENT POLLUTION
Established principles for responding to commons problems can be helpful
in evaluating potential means of reducing agricultural nutrient pollution and algal blooms within state-contained watersheds. Hardin suggested that it is generally possible to overcome the tragedy of the commons only through (1) privatization of the resource or (2) strong governmental regulation of the
resource. 5 Elinor Ostrom opined that the optimal policy approach often varies
depending on the situation, but sometimes local regulation by the resource users themselves is the best solution.'" These proposed solutions are analyzed
below in the context of nutrient pollution. It is worth noting that the solutions
considered in this section apply only to those algal blooms occurring fully within
intrastate watersheds and thus fit more squarely within the tragedy of the commons paradigm.
1. Hardin's Recommended Solutions
In cases of consumptive resource use, such as the field in Hardin's metaphor, privatization is often the best method to protect the resource.'" Privatization places the costs of overexploitation on the resource users, ideally causing
them to act to ensure the resource is not depleted.'" One often-overlooked
aspect of the privatization solution is the necessary administrative cost of dividing up a common resource."' Division of a natural resource inevitably leads to
inequitable wealth distributions and high decision-making and enforcement
costs." Moreover, privatization is not a practicable means of reducing nutrient
pollution because the waters receiving pollution in a watershed cannot be realistically privatized.
In the context of pollution, some scholars suggest that the only method of
153.
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overcoming the tragedy of the commons is through coercive laws or taxes."' For
example, Hardin suggested taxation can encourage resource users to stop destructive behavior.'" Due to the high complexity of measuring agricultural nonpoint source pollution and the unpredictable biology of algal blooms, such command and control regulations are costly. For example, the agency assigned to
set limits on nutrient pollution must determine the water body's assimilative
capacity, or the amount of pollution a water body can naturally assimilate without haring the water body.'" These determinations can be costly.'" Furthermore, agencies can only effectively regulate when they are sufficiently staffed
and have the ability to efficiently enforce agency rules.'
Of the two solutions suggested by Hardin, government regulation is more
likely to prevent algal blooms than privatization."' Regulation of nutrient pollution could happen in several ways, including taxes on nutrient inputs and requiring best management practices.
Hardin's work suggests that actors caught within the tragedy of the commons are locked within a vicious, inevitable cycle." Traditionally proposed
solutions suggest that strong centralized government or privatization of the resource are absolutely necessary to overcome the tragedy of the commons."
However, some scholars believe a third option exists."' Based on research of
small communities that have successfully managed common resources,' scholars, such as Elinor Ostrom, believe that some local resource users can overcome the tragedy of the commons through local, self-regulation."
2. Ostrom's Insights on Overcoming Commons Problems in Smaller,
Contained Systems
In some locations in which small communities share a scarce conunon resource, individual resource users have successfully overcome commons problems and preserved commonly-held resources."' In her book, Governingthe
Conmons, Elinor Ostrom recognized some of the important, common characteristics that these small communities share."' For a local community to efficiently govern its common resource, the community is generally small, stable,
161.
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has well-delineated resource boundaries, enjoys relatively small negative externalities, and the dynamics of the resource are well understood."'
Recent scholarship has expanded on this research, highlighting two essential elements."' First, successful group management requires a high perception
of risk associated with unified management of the resource."' For example,
when a group does not perceive that a lack of cooperation among group members will harm members of that group, even initial restraint by some group
members will ultimately fail to preserve the resource."'
Second, successful
group management is inhibited as group size increases."' Thus, a community
is most likely to successfully regulate the cormnonly-held resource when the
group size is small and the perception of risk is high.
Although self-regulation by resource users presents the most efficient
method to overcoming a tragedy of the commons, it is likely not feasible on the
scale of most algal blooms. This article has referenced algal blooms that occur
in watersheds contained within one state and blooms. that occur in interstate
watersheds.' The tragedy of the commons problem only exists for state-contained watersheds.' In most watersheds, there are too many resource users for
effective regulation of nutrient pollution by resource users without government
intervention. Additionally, the perception of risk is unlikely to be high enough
among agricultural nutrient polluters unless they are near the algal bloom.
3. Watersheds Contained within One State Fit a Tragedy of the Commons
Framework
Hardin's proposed regulatory approaches have the potential to effectively
reduce intrastate algal blooms because the scenarios under which the blooms
occur fit within a tragedy of the commons framework. The perverse incentives
of Hardin's tragedy exist within intrastate watersheds because the costs of pollution are internalized within the state.' Contrast this with an interstate watershed where an upstream state externalizes the costs of pollution to a downstream state and is ultimately unharmed by the downstream state's actions.'
175. NIVEs DoLsAK & EUNOR OSTROM, THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATION 12-13 (2003).
176. Francisco C. Santos & Jorge M. Pacheco, Risk of Collective FailureProvides an Escape
from the Tragedy of the Commons, 108 PROC. FROM THE NAT'L AcAD. OF SC. 10421, 1042110425 (2011).
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(The key to Hardin's tragedy is that all herdsmen were harmed by their communal actions. But
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free to continue polluting. Furthermore, even if the smelter's fumes do not kill his neighbor's
herds, his smelting operation is not hurt in the slightest by overgrazing. The relationship between
the smelter and the herdsmen is not a tragedy of the commons, but a negative externality problem,
as is pollution in an interstate watershed. But, in cases where a watershed is entirely contained
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States with water basins contained entirely within that state have more success
controlling algal blooms caused by nutrient pollution.' This is because a watershed contained within one state is under its singular sovereign authority. The
state is incentivized to regulate nutrient pollution because the costs of algal
blooms are borne within that state. Furthermore, the state has regulatory control over polluters within its borders, which provides for complete and comprehensive control of nutrient pollution within the state.
In summary, commons scholarship is a useful lens for viewing algal bloom
problems because it illuminates shortcomings in current nutrient pollution regulation and outlines the need for federal regulation in certain contexts. When
a conmmons problem is fully contained within one state, successful reduction of
algal blooms can occur through state regulation of nutrient pollution. However,
state regulation is less likely to successfully regulate nutrient pollution in interstate watersheds.
D. SOME ALGAL BLOOMS Do NOT FIT WITHIN THE TRAGEDY OF THE
COMMONS PARADIGM
In contrast, nutrient pollution in interstate watersheds does not present a
neatly-contained tragedy of the commons problem. Interstate nutrient pollution does not harm all resource users equally. A negative externality is created
when downstream water. users bear the cost of the upstream pollution while
upstream users remain unaffected." A market failure exists when society subsidizes a cost that is not borne by the upstream polluter.' For agricultural producers, the costs to one that over-fertilizes his field are low, but the costs to the
downstream user who must deal with the algal bloom are much higher."' In the
absence of some deterrent for the upstream agricultural producer, they will continue to pollute above the socially optimal level." Because interstate water basins extend beyond state borders, state regulators who declare waters within
their state impaired do not have the authority to reach some of the polluters,
making state regulation insufficient."' This negative externality problem requires federal intervention.
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1. How Interstate Algal Blooms Present Negative Externality Problems
State regulation is unlikely to reduce algal blooms occurring from negative
externality problems in interstate watersheds because states lack the authority to
govern out-of-state polluters. Water bodies in the United States are considered
common resources because citizens have open access to their use.'" In a hypothetical stream within an interstate water basin, a person could pollute the
stream with algae causing nutrients, but be so far from the scene of an algal
bloom that she would never bear the cost of her actions. All the nonpoint
source polluters contribute to an impaired water, but the effects of the impaired
water are disproportionately felt by downstream states. Downstream states can
set TMDLs for impaired waters within their borders, but they lack authority to
enforce these limits against upstream polluters in other states.
Nonpoint source nutrient pollution shifts the cost of pollution to downstream water users in the form of a toxic algal bloom. The paradigm of a negative externality is a better framework for analyzing nutrient pollution in interstate
watersheds, because often the polluters in interstate watersheds do not bear the
cost of overloading the watershed with nutrients. Rational action does not lead
to common ruin;. instead, it contributes to ruin for downstream users. Because
not all polluters are located where an algal bloom occurs, federal regulators are
better situated than state regulators to reduce algal blooms in interstate watersheds.
2. General Strategies for Overcoming Negative Externality Problems
Regulators generally attempt to address negative externality problems either
by: (1) proscribing certain behaviors; or (2) using market forces to influence
behavior.9 The first method is commonly referred to as command and control
regulation. This form of regulation reacts to negative externalities by punishing
actions that create them.'" In the case of algal blooms, regulators could attempt
to stop the problem by prohibiting the discharge of nutrient pollution into waterbodies. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to completely prohibit all
pollution." Therefore, regulators can choose between limited proscription of
destructive behavior or market manipulation. For example, regulators can force
actors to internalize the cost of externalities by taxing activities that create negative externalities.
Regulation of negative externality-causing actions relies on the theory that
such regulation will correct a market failure and provide the best outcome for
society. " The optimal level of nutrient pollution will not lead to algal blooms,
because algal blooms impose a high cost on society.' In the context of the
2
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tragedy of the commons, in theory the resource users should agree to be governed because their actions create algal blooms that harm the resource users."
In interstate water basins, the resource users would not similarly agree to such
governance, because others bear the costs of their pollution. The solutions to
negative externalities attempt to shift the cost of pollution back on to the polluters. In the context of interstate water basins, only the federal government has
the authority to regulate polluters in interstate water basins.

III. CRAFING FEDERAL REGULATION TO REDUCE INTERSTATE ALGAL
BLOOMS
In cases where watersheds are completely contained within a state, the cooperative federalism approach of the Clean Water Act may be sufficient to address the problem of algal blooms. In states where the costs that algal blooms
impose within a state are high, those costs are likely to lead the state to regulate
nutrient pollution within its borders. However, interstate watersheds require
more federal regulation than currently exists. Because the costs and benefits of
nutrient pollution within interstate watersheds are not borne equally among
states, polluting states that do not bear those costs are unlikely to regulate nutrient pollution. Until ellective federal regulations govern interstate watersheds,
the increased incidence of algal blooms is likely to continue.
A. THE COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM APPROACH OF THE CLEAN WATER

ACT CAN WORK IN STATE-CONTAINED WATERSHEDS
Some states have begun to combat the problem of algal blooms by regulating nonpoint source nutrient pollution.' Since 1972 when Congress made a
deliberate decision to leave regulation of nonpomit source nutrient pollution to
the states, the U.S. has seen decades of state-based attempts to solve this problem." Encouragingly, some states have taken significant steps to regulate nonpoint source nutrient pollution."' A survey conducted by the Environmental
Defense Fund found that nineteen states impose mandatory, enforceable requirements on agricultural nonpoint source pollution. 2 In these nineteen
states, the problem of agricultural nonpoint source nutrient pollution is being
solved through state regulation, albeit slowly. But why? And can this same
progress be expected in the remaining thirty-one states?
States that regulate agricultural nonpoint source pollution do so because
algal blooms pose a risk to their individual state economies."' However, it is
unlikely that risk is felt universally among states. States that regulate nonpoint
source nutrient pollution have "significant and politically salient non-agricultural
interests in water quality."" These interests are particularly important because
198.
199.
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they allow the state to overcome opposition to agricultural nonpomit source regulation that comes from entrenched agricultural interests.2'
In cases where a watershed is entirely contained within a single state, the
costs of algal blooms are primarily felt within that state. As such, in-state disbursement of costs should sufficiently promote effective nutrient pollution regulation. For example, Florida is a major agricultural state, ranking seventh
among agricultural exporting states in 2011 .' In that year, agricultural exports
from Florida valued above $4 billion."' However, Florida's tourism industry is
valued at $76 billion dollars, a significant portion of which is tied to freshwater
recreation, such as sport-fishing and other tourism.a" The state government implemented significant regulation after determining that agricultural nonpoint
source pollution posed a threat to those interests." Factoring in the broader
impacts of the pollution borne within the state, regulators seemingly concluded
it worthwhile to regulate pollution sources rather than clean up watersheds after
the fact.2 Other states that regulate agricultural nonpoint source pollution are
similarly situated; they bear most of the broader costs of nutrient pollution
within their own state boundaries."'
B. THE COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT HAS
FAILED INTERSTATE WATERSHEDS
In contrast, some polluting states may not have the incentives needed for
cooperative federalism to effectively reduce nutrient pollution in interstate watersheds if the costs of algal blooms are not borne by them. Interstate nutrient
pollution problems allow for actors in some states to shift the cost of their actions on to other states. Federal regulation is necessary to solve this negative
externality problem. Otherwise, algal blooms will continue to appear in interstate watersheds.
States that do not bear most of the costs of the algal blooms they cause lack
incentives to regulate nutrient pollution. Providing us with a salient example is
the Gulf of Mexico's hypoxic dead zone.' While dead-zone border states like
Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi could strengthen nutrient pollution regulations as the problem worsens, other upriver, agricultural states like Iowa will not
perceive the risks from algal blooms and hypoxia in the same way. Such is the

actively regulate agricultural nonpoint source pollution: (1) each state regulates nutrient pollution
that is exempt from the national NPDES system; (2) agriculture is a significant element of the
state economy; (3) each program seeks to solve problems outlined in the CWA; (4) each state
has significant non-agricultural interests in water quality; (5) each program has been identified as
at least partially effective; and (6) each state approaches regulation in its own unique way).
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weakness of the Clean Water Act's cooperative federalism approach. By leaving regulation of nonpoint source nutrient pollution to the states, the Clean Water Act sets interstate watersheds up to fail.
To solve the problem of algal blooms in interstate watersheds, the federal
government must either regulate nutrient pollution directly or somehow shift
the costs of pollution back onto the agricultural nonpoint sources in polluting
states. Only through that approach can nutrient pollution be curtailed at the
source. Agricultural nonpoint sources that pollute interstate watersheds will
bear the cost of pollution, regardless of their proximity to the resulting algal
bloom.
IV. SPECIFIC POLICY STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING NEGATIVE
EXTERNALITIES IN INTERSTATE NUTRIENT POLLUTION

Although the peculiarities of waterbodies would tend to favor local and state
control of watershed management over federal control, state regulation does
not adequately address the interstate externality problems associated with agricultural nonpoint source nutrient pollution. The lack of federal nonpoint
source regulation allows actors in some states to shift the costs of their actions
onto actors in other states, creating negative externalities that are difricult for
states to address. However, creating a workable federal-level response to this
problem is deceptively difficult. Merely expanding the reach of the Clean Water Act's NPDES program is unlikely to be successful, and enacting national
programs that mirror successful state programs ignores the unique nature of
individual watersheds. States can effectively regulate intrastate water basins. An
ideal approach to interstate water basins will allow for state control as much as
possible, yet allow for federal intervention when more localized governance
fails."'
A. CHIPPING AWAY AT THE AGRICiLTURAL LOOPHOLE IN THE CLEAN
WATER ACT's NPDES PROGRAM

One of the most initially attractive solutions to the problem of interstate
agricultural nutrient pollution and algal blooms is to remove the exemption of
agricultural discharges from the Clean Water Act. Increased federal control of
point source pollution through NPDES regulation has produced results."
However, bringing nonpoint source pollution within regulation of the NPDES
program could be problematic. Agricultural nonpoint source pollution is difficult to measure." The amount of nutrient pollution that leaves a field varies
with the weather, soil conditions, geology, etc.' This is fundamentally different
from the measurement of point source pollution, where measurement occurs

213. Sc Rose, supla note 141, at 12-14.
214. Angelo & Monis, supna note 32, at 1004.
215. See MARC. 0. RIBAUDO ET AL., U.S. )EP'r OF AGRIc., ERS No. 782, EcoNOMICs oF
WATER QUALITY PROTEcTION FROM NONPOINT SOURCES 21 (1999) (explaining that nonpoint
source pollution is prohibitively expensive to measure because the "amount and quality of runo T
leaving a field depend not only on factors that can be measured, such as the technology used and
the use of variable inputs, but also on factors such as rainfall that vary daily and are dilicult to
predict").
216. Id.
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at the point of discharge."' In addition to nonpomit source pollution, agricultural operations produce point source nutrient pollution that is exempt from
regulation under the Clean Water Act."' These include agricultural return
flows,m agricultural stormwater discharges," and polentially drainage tiles,
ditches, and pipes." These sources of nutrient pollution do not share the same
measurement difficulties as nonpoint sources, and thus, could fit under NPDES
program regulation as point sources. 222
The definition of a point source has been extended in thd past to cover
previously unregulated sources of pollution.2 22 The most significant of which
was the reclassification of municipal or industrial stormwater discharges as point
sources."' This brought municipal and industrial stormwater discharges under
the regulation of the NPDES program.' In theory, current unregulated point
sources like agricultural return flows, agricultural stormwater drainage, and
other drainage could fit under the NPDES program in the same way. However,
an examination of each should occur to protect against an unintentional increase of nutrient pollution.
1. Regulating Agricultural Stormwater Discharges under the NPDES Program
Previous expansions of the NPDES program took care to avoid creating
perverse incentives for those operating under them." In 1987, Congress's
Stonrwater Amendments to the program recognized that channeled, piped, or
captured stormwater should be regulated as a point source under the Clean
Water Act.2 7 These amendments contained a few important exceptions. For
example, under the Stormwater Amendments, NPDES permits are not required for stormwater that is diverted around mines or oil and gas operations
that does not contact wastes from those operations." This keeps these mining
and fossil fuel operations from becoming regulated as point sources of pollution." If stormwater diversions were regulated as point sources while runoff
was not, a mining operation would be incentivized to avoid any regulatory burden by allowing undiverted runoff to carry pollutants from the operation into a

217. Id.
218. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (excepting agricultural return flows and stormwater drainage from
the definition of regulated point sources under the Clean Water Act).

219. Id.
220. Id
221. See Complaint at ff 1, 10, Bd. of Water Works Tr. v. Sacramento City Bd. of Supervisors, No. 5:15-cv-04020 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 16, 2015) (pending litigation alleging that drainage systems that remove nitrogen from soil and introduce it into a river are required, inter alia, to obtain
an NPDES permit under the Clean Water Act).
222. See RIBAUDO, supra note 215, at 21 (similar to traditional point source discharge, the
nutrients from these sources can be measured at the point of discharge).
223. Craig & Roberts, supra note 33, at 10.
224. Id. at 10-11 (explaining how piped, channeled, or captured stormwater, when discharged,
is now classified as a point source falling under regulation under the NPDES program).
225. Id.
226. Craig, supra note 137, at 191-92.
227. Craig & Roberts, supra note 33, at 10.
228. Craig, supra note 137, at 191-92.
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water body.' The pollution in this situation would be worse than any incidental
nutrients picked up through a diversion. This same rationale applies to agricultural stormwater discharges.
Regulating agricultural stormwater discharges under the NPDES program
would unfortunately be likely to create perverse incentives. Under the Stormwater Amendments, agricultural stormwater discharges are also exempt from
NPDES regulation." Removing this exemption could create the same problems that would come from stormwater regulation of a mine. Instead of diverting stormwater away from farm fields, farmers would be incentivized to allow
runoff to flow through fields. Undiverted stormwater would then pick up fertilizers and nutrients along the way. Thus, even though NPDES regulation of
agricultural stormwater discharges would seem to make sense, it ultimately
could make the problem of agricultural nutrient pollution worse.
2. Regulating Agricultural Return Flows under the NPDES Program
As stated above, regulating agricultural return flows under the NPDES system could reduce agricultural nutrient pollution, but it is undesirable because it
could create incentives for inefficient water use. The return flow exemption
was created primarily to protect farmers in western states who rely on irrigation
for their water needs." Farmers claimed that NPDES penmits for return flows
discriminated against farmers in arid western states where water scarcity made
ditches and drains vital.' Indeed, requiring NPI)ES permits for return flows
could create perverse incentives for farmers in a similar way to agricultural
stormwater regulation. In western states, water shortages are a real danger."'
However, requiring NPDES permits for return flows could create disincentives
for farmers to return unused and sorely needed water back to the system.' Unless the federal government were to regulate both agricultural point sources and
agricultural nonpoint sources, it would be almost impossible to craft regulation
to avoid this problem. Thus, regulation of agricultural return flows is better left
to the states to ensure that a comprehensive approach is taken.
B. MANDATORY BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Mandating best management practices ("BMPs") to reduce agricultural runoff nutrient pollution is unlikely to reduce nutrient levels enough to stop algal
blooms. BMPs can have a surprisingly large influence on common behavior.'

230.

Id.

231.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(I)(1).

232. Andrew C. Hanson & David C. Bcnder, IrragationReturn Flow or Disci -etcDischaige?
Wf' Water Pollution fron (rnibern Bogs Shoudd Eill Withi the Clean Water Act's NPDES
ProgaI, 37 ENvt. L. 339, 352 (2007).

233.

Id.

234. Brian C. Howard, Worst Droughtin 1,000 Yars PreclietcdlbrAincican West, NA-r'L
GEioGRAPHIC (Feb. 12, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/02/150212-mcgadrought-southwest-water-climatc-environiment/ (citing studies that predict an over 80% chance of
a "mcgadrought" in the American West by 2100. This drought would be expected to last 35
years or longer).
235. Hanson & Bender, supra note 232, at 352.
236. See David Zaring, Bcst'racices,81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 323-24 (2006).

Issue 1I

BLOOMIN'DISASTER

37

The major drawback to BMPs, however, is that they encourage common practices instead of the most effective practice." Federal statutes direct agencies to
consider best practices in many different areas of regulation.' Despite this
drawback to BMPs, they are still used by many agencies because they have relatively low administrative costs and they successfully influence behavior. The
EPA currently seeks to incentivize the use of best management practices to limit
nonpoint source pollution."'
1. Success of BMPs for State-Contained Water Basins
BMPs have been successful at reducing nutrient pollution at the state level
when the target water body is contained entirely within a state. Success can be
attributed to the small number of users who can recognize the importance of
protecting the resource."' The most common BMPs for reducing phosphorous
from agricultural runoff are buffer zones, which involves the application of fertilizer below the soil and utilization of cover crops."' Although best management practices can be useful for reducing nitrogen pollution from agricultural
runoff for waterbodies contained within a single state, the program is less effective at the federal level.
2. Failure of BMPs in Interstate Water Basins
Although BMPs have changed the behavior of farmers at the state level,
they are unlikely to have a similar impact at the federal level. Under section
1329 of the Clean Water Act, states are required to create an assessment report
for navigable waters within their jurisdiction that will not meet water quality
standards due to nonpoint source pollution."' States must also create management programs that must identify the BMP the nonpoint sources will employ
and the method the state will use to ensure nonpoint sources adopt these
BMPs." This is the current strategy that the Clean Water Act uses to reduce
nonpoint source pollution before the state declares a water to be impaired. The
advantages to BMPs are flexibility and lower administrative costs for the government and agencies.2" Despite the perceived advantages of BMPs for reducIng nonpoint source nutrient pollution, algal blooms cortinue to appear with
237.

Id. at 298.

238. See id. at 296 (citing multiple statutes that direct agencies to consider best practices, including 7 U.S.C. § 6711(c) (2012) for agricultural programs); see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A
Century ofAir Pollution ControlLaw: What's Worked; Whats Failed; What Might Work, 21
ENvTL. L. 1549, 1597-98 (1999) (describing how the EPA created guidelines in 1976 to lower
greenhouse gas emissions that allowed factories to build tall smokestacks to meet emissions requirements in lieu of emission limitations. Ultimately, the guidelines led to a massive increase in
the number of tall smokestacks but no reduction in greenhouse gas emissions because factories
chose to build taller smokestacks, rather than pay for more expensive, but also more effective
pollution controls).

239.

33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(A)-(B).

240. See DOLSAK& OisTROM, supranote 175, at 12-13.
241. Marion Renault, Ohio State researcheisteam up to fight algae blooms, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Dec. 18, 2016), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/12/18/ohio-state
-researchers-team-up-to-fight-algae-blooms.html.
242. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(A).
243. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(A)-(B).
244. Zaring, supra note 236, at 299.
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growing frequency, an indication that nutrient pollution remains a problem for
navigable waters that are required to implement BMPs.
Because the adoption of BMPs is voluntary in most states, BMPs do not
present a realistic solution to curbing the proliferation of algal blooms. Under
the CWA, the adoption of BMPs is voluntary, which leads to inconsistent results." Recognizing that there might be little incentive for some states to require
BMPs from non-point sources, the EPA currently offers funds for the continuation of best management programs when states can show that the BMPs used
are effective at meeting the state's water quality goals." Although the BMPs that
have been adopted appear to be effective at reducing nutrient pollution," they
are generally too expensive for most farmers and not enough farmers utilize the
practices." Farmers are reluctant to adopt expensive practices, especially when
there is often no guarantee that the BMPs will lead to a reduced risk of algal
blooms."'
Ultimately, BMPs are not the best solution for reducing nutrient pollution
in interstate water basins. Although some of these solutions have been effective
at reducing nutrient levels in agricultural runoff, BMPs alone do not address the
issue of the assimilative capacity of the water body. If nutrient pollution reductions are not targeted at meeting the assimilative capacity of the water body, then
algal blooms could continue to proliferate despite reductions of nutrient polluLion. The practices are meant to reduce nutrient pollution, but even if all farmers adopt the best common practices for reducing nutrient pollution, that might
not be enough to reduce nutrient loads enough to stop algal blooms.
C. TAxEs AND INCENTIVES
Taxes could influence farmers to reduce nutrient application to their fields,
leading to less nutrient pollution and fewer algal blooms. If the cost of fertilizers
containing nitrogen and phosphorous were raised by a tax, farmers would be
induced to purchase and use less fertilizer. This form of market correcting tax
is commonly known as a Pigouvian tax, drawing its name from Arthur Pigou.2
An input Pigouvian tax artificially raises the cost of the nutrients, forcing the
producer to internalize the cost."' Input Pigouvian taxes present the only feasi-

245.

Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Pocr of the Clean Water Act Section 401, 23

ECOLOGY

L.Q. 201, 284 (1996).

246. Zaring, supia note 236, at 329 (citing to 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)).
EconoimicinpactsofJeducig
247. See Hector Gernan Rodiiguez et al., Eiioninentidand
Total Phosphorous Runoflin an Agicultral Watershed, 104 AGRIC. Sys. 623, 627 (2011) (linding that all ten of the best management practices tested in the Lincoln Lake basin in Arkansas
were effective in reducing phosphorous from agnicultural runofl); but see gencral;ly Emily DcMarco, Mcasuring 'Best' Plactices to Curb Kun Pollution, INsIDE SCIENCE (Sep. 23, 2016),
lttps://www.insidescience.org/news/measuing-best-practices-curb-fni-pollution (analyzing the
elfectiveness of best management practices Utilized in the Chesapeake Bay watershed).
248. See Renault, supma note 241.
249. Glenn Sherill, /Eicient 14astc? WAFi 'rumers Over-Appl Nutrients and the lnpikations lbr Pohy Design, 27 REV. ACRIc. EcON. 542, 550 (2005).
250. MANKIw, supm note 183, at 203.
251. See Robert E. Martin, EternalityRegulation and the Monopo Firnj. PIB. EcON. 347,
360-61 (1986); see also Punam Parikh et al., Application olMarketMcchanisins and Icentives
to Reduce Stomniater Runoli An hAqgTated Hvdilogiti Economic and Legal Approach, 8

Issue 1I

BLOOMIN' DISASTER

39

ble method of shifting the cost of nutrient pollution back onto the polluter, because pollution from nonpoint sources is difficult to measure and track." Because the cost shifting for nutrient pollution is difficult to track in agricultural
runoff, the only way to raise the cost of pollution for the agricultural producer
is by increasing the cost of the nutrient inputs.
1. Potential for Pigouvian Success
Pigouvian taxes can incentivize famers to fertilize at the optimal level for
society." One of the benefits of a nutrient input tax over command and control
regulation is the ability to shift the cost of pollution back on to the polluter at a
relatively low cost to the government while avoiding the difficult issue of identifying and quantifying pollution from nonpoint sources." If the regulator could
set the cost of the tax at the level of the external cost of the pollution, then the
farmers would pollute at the socially optimal level.' In addition, a Pigouvian
tax would have the added benefit of raising revenue that either could be used
to lower other taxes or to clean up existing algal blooms.
A tax on nutrient inputs can be compared to the carbon tax, which is one
of the most popular solutions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions among
economists." In the absence of a deterrent tax, people have no incentive to
reduce carbon emissions because the cost of carbon emissions are borne by
society, creating a negative externality problem." Increasing a tax on carbon
emissions would encourage the development of cleaner energy and less consumption of fossil fuels. Similarly, a tax on nutrients should encourage fanrers
to develop alternative methods of fertilizing crops because the cost of fertilizing
at the same level will be too expensive.
2. Inevitable Failure of Pigouvian Taxes in Reducing Algal Blooms
However, farming operations are so diverse and complex that a universal
Pigouvian tax on nutrient inputs is unlikely to effectively reduce algal blooms
without causing unintended consequences. One of the major deficiencies of a
nutrient input tax is that it universally raises the cost of nutrient fertilizer on all
farmers. Therefore, all farmers must spend more to fertilize their crops, regardless of how much algae-causing nutrient pollution they discharge. Some
crops will require far less nitrogen and phosphorous than other crops. Additionally, some farms are in locations where natural buffer zones or low water
tables lead to less nutrients in agricultural runoff. Targeting a tax so that it only
applies to polluting actors, would significantly raise the administrative cost of

ENVTL. ScL. & POL'Y 133,138 (2005) (explaining how behavior can be influenced in a cost-effective manner by setting the storrnwater charge at the marginal aggregate cost to the watershed).
252. Sheriff, supra note 249, at 547-48.
253. MANKiw, supra note 183, at 203.
254. See Mankiw, supranote 188, at 16-17; see also Sheriff, supra note 249, at 550.
255. MANKIw, supra note 183, at 203-04.
256. See Brian Andrew, Market Failure, Government Failure and Externaibies i Chimate
Change Migation: The Case for a Carbon Tax, 28 PUB. ADMIN. & DEv. 393, 393-94 (2008).
257. Mankiw, supra note 188, at 16.
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the tax.' Allowing the tax to apply universally would be unfair and could encourage less than optimal fertilization by farmers.
Additionally, determining the appropriate price of a Pigouvian tax is difficult. Ideally, the cost of the increase in nutrient inputs should equal the cost
borne by society." This is difficult to measure. Finally, many fanners operating
under tight margins would be unable to afford the higher cost of fertilizers. Due
to this increased cost of setting the appropriate price for the tax and the inability
of the tax to target polluting nonpoint sources, the Pigouvian tax is not the best
solution for reducing nutrient pollution from agricultural producers.
D. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
Because it is possible that some farmers simply do not know that overloading of nutrients in waterbodies can lead to algal blooms, another potential means
of combating the growing incidence of algal blooms is to implement more educational programs concerning nutrient pollution for farmers. Educational prograns can inform farmers about a potentially unknown externality, which could
cause farmers to factor the cost of pollution into their decision-making.' Educating farmers about the negative effects of their actions will also have the elfect
of increasing their perception of risk to the common resource. An increased
perception of risk could encourage more responsible behavior to protect the
common resource. When the perception of risk is high and there is a small
number of resource users, it is possible for the common resource to be preserved by local self-regulation.
Educational programs can be an attractive method to encourage better nutrient management because the administrative costs are low and no action is
compelled from farmers 2 Although there are theories that suggest that educational programs can be an effective method for overcoming negative externalities, these programs by themselves will not be enough to stop nutrient pollution
and the resulting algal blooms.
1. Existing Theory Supporting the Use of Educational Programs
Under the theory regarding self-regulation of common resources, a common resource can be protected by the resource users if there are a small number of resource users and the perception of risk to the resource is high among
resource users.' An educational program describing the dangers of nutrient
pollution raises the perception of risk for farmers because it explains how nutrient pollution causes algal blooms. Despite the raised perception of risk, it is
unlikely that polluters will perceive the risk to them as high enough for them to
stop polluting. There is also empirical evidence that suggests that educational

258. Id. at 20 (describing how a gasoline tax is not a perfect Pigouvian response for driving
congestion because somc roads are more congested than others, but the tax increases the cost of
gasoline for all drivers).
259. MANKw, supna note 183, at 203.
260. Marc A. Ribaudo & Richard D. Horan, The Role of Educatio in Nonpoint Source Pollution ControlPobicj;21 Rrv. AGRIC. ECON. 331, 335 (1999).
261. Santos & Pacheco, supla note 176, at 10421-23.
262. Ribaudo, supra note 260, at 332, 340.
263. Santos & Pacheco, supm note 176, at 10421-23.

Issue 1I

BLOOMIN'DISASTER

41

programs, coupled with other management strategies, can effectively encourage
the adoption of environmentally friendly practices.' However, these educational programs are generally only effective when the reduction in nutrient loading also leads to increased profitability for the farmers.'
2. Why Educational Programs for Nutrient Management Fail at Correcting
Negative Externalities in Nutrient Pollution
Unfortunately, educational programs alone are not likely to sufficiently alter
farmrers' nutrient loading practices to prevent major algal blooms. Particularly
for interstate waterways that span many states, it is possible for nonpoint source
polluters to be so far removed from resulting algal blooms that it is unlikely that
farmers will change polluting behavior even if they know that it could be causing
problems downstream. Due to the complexity of nutrient pollution and the
number of potential nonpoint source polluters, it is difficult to prove which
farmers contribute to nutrient pollution and algal blooms.' For similar reasons,
an educational program in California aimed at influencing farmers to adopt
more efficient nitrate management practices has not been effective despite four
years of efforts."' In general, educational programs only have the desired effect
of influencing behavior to adopt better management practices if the new practice
will also be more profitable for the farmer or if the information indicates to the
farmer that water quality is impaired on his property." Because the success of
educational programs is dependent on how farmers will react to them, educational programs are not a good solution to slow the growing incidence of algal
blooms.
E. FORCING POLLUTING STATES TO BEAR THE COST OF NUTRIENT
POLLUTION

Even interstate, basin-wide TMDLs will not stop algal blooms in interstate
waters until affected states or the EPA are empowered to compel polluting states
to curb nutrient pollution. State-led, nonpoint source regulation is not stopping
algal blooms in interstate watersheds." Many water basins cover multiple states,
which means that pollution in one state obviously has adverse impacts on downstream states. Consequently, many state-based programs for the regulation of
nutrient pollution have failed. Basin-wide TMDLs could internalize the externalities created by this market failure. However, TMDLs need a mechanism
to allow the federal government to force polluting states to comply with the
TMDL requirements." Until states or the EPA have enforcement power over

264. Ribaudo, supra note 260, at 332 (citing to Darrell J. Bosch et al., Vohumtay Vcrsus MandatoryAgiculturalPociesto Protect Water Qualy Adoption ofNirogen Testmingin Nebraska,
17 REv. AGRIc. EcoN. 13, 15 (1995)).
265. RIBAUDO, supranote 120, at25-26; see also Ribaudo, supra note 260, at 336.
266. Ribaudo, supra notc 260, at 338.

267. Id. at 337-38.
268. Id. at 340.
269. See, e.g., STEINZOR & ISAACSON, supra note 112, at 4 (where the Chesapeake Bay's interstate TMDL has still not ended nutrient pollution because of a lack of enforcement).
270. Id. at 2.
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TMDLs, even interstate TMDLs cannot stop algal bloom-causing nutrient pollution.
1. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL and the Weaknesses of Interstate TMDLs
under Current Law

"

As the interstate TMDL for the East Coast's Chesapeake Bay shows, such
interstate TMDL policies are only effective if sufficient enforcement mechanisms and powers are in place. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL is an ambitious
attempt at basin-wide pollution control, but thus far it has not been as effective
as hoped. The creation of an interstate TMDL in the Chesapeake Bay watershed and certain other watersheds is an important step in combating nutrient
pollution and algal blooms. However, unenforced interstate TMDLs are still
lacking necessary enforcement power and are thus limited in their effectiveness. 271
The Chesapeake Bay watershed is so massive that effective regulation of
nutrient pollution necessitates an interstate approach."' The bay spans over
64,000 miles and is one of the most productive water bodies in the world.
Five major rivers and over 100,000 streams drain into the bay from a watershed
that spans six states.' The Chesapeake Bay is both gigantic and shallow, which
allows for the incredible diversity of life that exists in the bay.7 But shallow
water also keeps nutrients, pollution, and heat from flushing out to sea.2 "' Not
surprisingly, the Chesapeake Bay is vulnerable to algal blooms and hypoxia.
The health of the Bay became such a dire problem that in 2010, the EPA
worked with states within the watershed to create an interstate TMDL."
The Chesapeake Bay TMDL is the largest water restoration project in the
world2 and was created to regulate pollution levels for the District of Colombia
and the six states found within its water basin."o This TMDL was created
through the joint efforts of the EPA and the states within the water basin."'
Spanning seven major jurisdictions, it is the most complex TMDL in the country."' The TMDL sets nitrogen and phosphorous pollution allocations for the
1

271. Id. at 2-3 (asserting that the Chesapeake Bay TMDL is destined to fail without EPA
enforcement).
272. See Houck, supra note 85, at 10426 (explaining how the EPA determined that the TMDL
needed to be set for the water basin based on 25 years of failed efforts to clean up the bay through
the normal process of allowing the six states within the watershed to set TMDLs).
273. Ocean Facts: Where js the Largest Es/uai in the U.S. NAT'L OcEANic & ATrmoSPHERIC ADMIN., htp://oceanservice.noaa.gov/fats/chesapeake.htl
(last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
274. Shana C. Jones, Making Regional and Local TMDLs Work: The Chesapeake BaY
7MDL and Lessons Iroin the Lynnhaven Rive; 38 WM. & MARY, ENVTL,. L. & Po'Y REV. 277,
281 (2014).
275. Id. at 281-82.
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water basin states and requires the EPA to work with the states to develop watershed implementation plans." These plans were originally developed by the
states and approved or modified by the EPA." The watershed implementation
plans describe which technologies the states have committed to implement to
meet the pollution allocations for the watershed."
The Chesapeake Bay TMDL is an example of how interstate cooperation
is needed to set realistic pollution reduction goals. The interstate TMDL in the
Chesapeake Bay sets an impressive standard for interstate TMDLs because it
engaged individual actors, such as nonpoint source polluters, and states in the
effort to create a basin-wide TMDL.` The Chesapeake Bay TMDL can serve
as a model of federal and state collaboration for other interstate water basins.
It is only through this goal setting and planning process that interstate water
bodies will set meaningful goals for reducing nutrient pollution and preventing
future algal blooms. The more difficult aspect of using interstate TMDLs to
reduce nutrient pollution will be the issue of enforcing state compliance with
these goals.
Despite the creation of an ambitious interstate TMDL for the Chesapeake
Bay, states within the watershed will probably not meet their 2017 interim goals
without enforcement of the standards set by the TMDL.m1 7 Some states within
the watershed have made progress by further reducing nutrient pollution from
already regulated sources."" However, increased reductions of point sources
will ultimately be insufficient to meet the goals of the TMDL, and unregulated
nonpoint source pollution will still need to be curtailed to meet them."' For
example, Virginia and the District of Columbia relied heavily on state-of-the-art
wastewater treatment plant pollution control but have not regulated any other
sources of nutrient pollution.' Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, the agricultural
sector alone contributes over twenty-five percent of the nitrogen pollution in the
watershed, which is more than all other pollution sectors in the state of Virginia."' Without an enforcement mechanism to compel states like Pennsylvania
to act, the Chesapeake Bay TMDL will be unable prevent future algal blooms
in the once pristine Chesapeake Bay.'
2. Empowering Affected States to Compel Polluting States' TMDL
Compliance
Strengthening the TMDL program to allow the EPA or affected states to
compel action by polluting states could be one means of providing the additional power needed to reduce future algal blooms in interstate water basins.
283. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supranote 281, at ES-1.
284. Idat ES-2.
285. Idat ES-1.
286.

287.
288.
289.
290.

Jones, supm note 274, at 315.
STEINZOR & ISAACSON, supra note 112, at 1-2.

Id. at 3.
Id
Id.

291. Id. at 2.
292. See STEVER, supra note 131, at § 13:75 (explaining that enforcement of nonpoint source
compliance with TMDL limits is left to the states); sec also STEINZOR & ISAACSON, supm note
112, at 2-3.
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Because TMDLs are watershed-based, they are better tailored to address the
negative externality problems that contribute to algal blooms in these settings by
holding all actors within a watershed accountable. TMDLs are created in collaboration with states, which gives voice to state interests and concerns. However, a state's failure to meet its target goals should result in federal enforcement
of those goals. Alternatively, states could be empowered to compel action by
bringing claims against polluting states that have agreed to TMDL levels set
through an agreement between the states. This would provide a means for affected states to shift the externalities created by upstream, pollution states back
onto those actors.
Creating an interstate TMDL enforcement mechanism would reduce algal
bloom-causing nutrient pollution in interstate watersheds to more cost-justifiable levels. For the same reasons that states attempt to balance their own costs
and benefits when regulating nutrient pollution within their borders, strengthening interstate TMDL enforcement could promote more cost-effective and
optimal regulation when interstate watersheds are involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nutrient pollution from agricultural nonpoint sources is contributing to a
growing algal bloom problem in the United States. In recent years, inadequate
regulation of nonpoint sources has been a major factor that has led to an increased quantity and severity of algal blooms. This growing nutrient pollution
problem is largely attributable to conditions creating what legal scholars often
refer to as commons tragedies, general externality, and collective action problems. Because agricultural nonpoint sources lack sufficient incentives to curb
algae-causing pollution, stronger government intervention is necessary to address this issue and reduce future algal blooms.
The distinction between algal blooms that occur in interstate watersheds
and those that occur within state-contained watersheds is important in addressing these challenges. Among other things this distinction helps to explain why
some states have been successful at regulating nutrient pollution whereas others
have not. Algal blooms in state-contained watersheds can often be framed as
connons tragedies, where all those who contribute to the problem also directly
suffer its consequences. In these settings, it should generally be possible for
state level pollution regulation to emerge that is capable of addressing the issue
because the harms of the pollution are contained within the state. In contrast,
algal blooms that occur in interstate watersheds represent a broader negative
externality problem. State governments are often not as motivated to effectively
regulate in these instances because many of the harms resulting from the pollution are suffered outside the state where the pollution occurs. Accordingly, federal government regulation is necessary to regulate nutrient pollution in these
watersheds.
One potential means for more effective regulation of nutrient pollution in
interstate watersheds would be to increase the federal government's authority to
enforce interstate TMDLs. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL illustrates why such
an approach is necessary in these circumstances. Other interstate watersheds
could benefit from utilizing a similar cooperative approach for setting interstate
TMDLs that also empowered individual states to bring actions against out-of-
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state actors when interstate pollution is a material contributor to algal blooms.
Through thoughtfully-designed policies tailored to algal blooms' unique characteristics, policymakers can hopefully curb the growth of these blooms and
protect our precious waterways and water bodies for many generations to come.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Rapanos v. UnitedStates, the Supreme Court sought to define the scope
of the Clean Water Act.' The Court split on a 4-1-4 vote.' Consequently, the
lower courts must decide the controlling opinion. In putative reliance on the
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting fractured decisions, set forth in
Marks v. UnitedStates,'the circuit courts have either adopted the lone Kennedy
concurrence or rejected Marks as unworkable in favor of an either/or test allowing the government to establish federal jurisdiction under either the Kennedy concurrence or the Scalia plurality in Rapanos. In each case, the circuit
court either misconstrued Marks or misinterpreted Rapanos. This article
makes the case that Marks is readily adaptable to the Rapanosdecision and the
Scalia plurality is controlling.

I. BACKGROUND
The Clean Water ActV prohibits the discharge of pollutants, including
dredged and fill material, into "navigable waters" without a federal permit' and

1.

M. Reed Hopper is a Senior Attorney with the Pacific Legal Foundation who represented

John Rapanos in Rapanos v. United States.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 730-32 (2006).
Id. at 718.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1275 (2012).
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
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defines the term "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States."' In Rapanos v. United States, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") claimed the
Clean Water Act covered the shallow wetlands on John Rapanos's Michigan
lots.' When he graded the lots for construction, Corps officials cited Mr. Rapanos for filling "navigable waters" without a permit in violation of the Clean
Water Act.' The district court found Mr. Rapanos liable because the wetlands
on his property bordered a manmade drainage ditch that flowed intermittently
through a series of conduits to a navigable-in-fact watercourse miles away.o The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court on the theory that any
hydrological connection with a traditional navigable water was sufficient for federal jurisdiction, no matter how slight." The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit, however, invalidating this expansive interpretation of the Clean
Water Act'
Five of the nine Justices ruled the Corps had gone too far and could not
regulate all waters based solely on a hydrological connection to a downstream
navigable-in-fact waterway. ChiefJustice Roberts observed:
Rather than refining its view of its authority in light of our decision in
SWANCC,'" and providing guidance rneriting deference under our generous
standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of the
scope of its power. The upshot today is another defeat for the agency."
Writing for a four-member plurality, Justice Scalia agreed:
In applying the definition to "ephemeral streams," "wet meadows," storm sewers and culverts, "directional sheet flow during storm events," drain tiles, manmade drainage ditches, and dry arroyos in the middle of the desert, the Corps
has stretched the term "waters of the United States" beyond parody. The plain
language of the statute simply does not authorize this "Land Is Waters" approach to federal jurisdiction.
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts, determined the language, structure, and purpose of the Clean Water Act limited federal authority to "relatively
permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water" commonly recognized as "streans, oceans, rivers and lakes" connected to traditional navigable
waters.". The Scalia plurality would also authorize federal regulation of wetlands
physically abutting these water bodies, but only if they have a continuous surface

7. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012).
8. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719, 729-30 (2006).
9. Id.
10. SeeUnited States v. Rapanos, 190 F.Supp. 2d 1011, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
11. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cii. 2004). See id. at 639.
12. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757.
13. Sec Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Anny Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
168 (2001) ("SWANCl1.
14. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758.
15. Id. at 734.
16. Id. at 716, 739.
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water connection whereby the wetland and water body are literally "indistinguishable.""
AlthoughJustice Kennedy joined the plurality in the result, providing a fivemember majority in favor of Mr. Rapanos, he proposed a different standard for
determining "waters of the United States" subject to federal control under the
Clean Water Act. Under a "significant nexus" test, the federal government
could regulate a wetland if it significantly affects a navigable-in-fact waterway."
This excludes from federal regulation remote drains, ditches, and streams with
insubstantial flows and only speculative evidence of a "significant nexus."'
The four Justices in the dissent (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
took the view that the Corps could regulate essentially any feature that advanced
the statutory goal of maintaining the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters."" In effect, the dissent would authorize federal regulation of the entire hydrological chain on the premise that virtually all waters are
interconnected and therefore affect the integrity of the Nation's waters.
The Court's split decision derives from a difference in judicial philosophy.
The dissent, authored by Justice Stevens, would uphold any regulatory interpretation of the Clean Water Act that furthers the perceived purpose of the act,
whereas the Scalia plurality believes implementation of the Clean Water Act
must fit the statutory language. The problem with the dissent's view is that it
"substitute[s] the purpose of the statute for its text."' The Scalia plurality
harshly condemned this interpretive philosophy:
And as for advancing "the purposes of the Act": We have often criticized that

last resort of extravagant interpretation, noting that no law pursues its purpose
at all costs, and that the textual limitations upon a law's scope are no less a part
of its "purpose" than its substantive authorizations.
The Court's reference to a "textual limitation" in the Clean Water Act is
the term "navigable waters." The plurality believed the term must mean something. So, too, did justice Kennedy, who reproached the dissent for reading the
term right out of the statute."

The plurality's unwillingness to give the federal government carte blanche
to regulate virtually all waters in the United States recognizes that unfettered
regulation is incompatible with the rule of law. The rule of law imposes limits
on federal authority as a fundamental safeguard against arbitrary government.
It ensures that the means of accomplishing the desired ends (no matter how
laudable) are fair, consistent, predictable, and orderly-protections currently
lacking under the government's ever-expanding interpretation of its authority
under the Clean Water Act.
Moreover, the Clean Water Act has more than one purpose. While the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 755.
Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 780.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779-81.
Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 755.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 778.
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dissent focused exclusively on the stated objective "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nations' waters,"' the plurality
emphasized the equally clear objective "to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation,
and enhancement) of land and water resources . . . ."2
In view of these considerations, Justice Stevens's accusation that the Scalia
plurality is simply anti-environment2 ' seems petulant. One wonders if Justice Stevens would advocate such broad agency deference if the Corps had
stood by its original interpretation of the Clean Water Act in 1974 that the
agency could only regulate traditional navigable waters."
Although Rapanos provided a clear majority as to the result, the decision
rested on a 4-1-4 split as to rationale. The question now is which opinion is
controlling?

III. DETERMINING THE CONTROLLING OPINION
A. MARKs V. UNI1ED STA TES

In Marks v. United States the Supreme Court held:
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."
While this rule has been difficult to apply in some cases, it is the only rule sanctioned by the Supreme Court for interpreting its split decisions.'
The language of Marks was not unique to the case. It derived from the
Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Geoigia.` In Gregg, the Court examined
Furmian v. Geoigiawhich involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a Georgia death penalty statute. " In Furinan,as in Rapanos, five Justices agreed in the
judgments, but the Court split on the legal standard that should be applied to
death penalty cases.' Two concurring Justices felt that capital punishment was
unconstitutional in all cases, whereas the other three Justices believed that capital punishment was unconstitutional only in the circumstances presented in
Fum-nan.` Thus in Gregg the Court held that the plurality controls: "Since five
Justices wrote separately in support of the judgments in Furian,the holding of

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
proved
31.
32.
33.
34.

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2017).
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2017).
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 798 n.8.
Sec SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 at 168.
Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
See In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) ("The only approach apby the Supreme Court is the 'narrowest grounds' approach.").
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976).
Id. at 162-63; see genciaiv Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
See Fuman, 408 U.S. at 257, 314.
See id. at 240, 306, 310.
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the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds
In Marks, the Supreme Court determined the standard for regulating obscene material.' To answer that question, the Court turned to Memoirs v. Attorney Generalof the Connnonwealth ofMassachusettsin which a majority of
the Supreme Court held a lower court incorrectly concluded a book was obscene and did not have First Amendment protection." Three Justices in the
plurality decided the book was protected from government regulation if it was
otherwise "obscene" but had some social redeeming value." Two otherJustices
concurred in the judgment relying on what the Court called "broader grounds"
that the First Amendment provided an absolute shield against government action to suppress obscenity." A sixth Justice concurred in the judgement based
on his view that only "hardcore pornography may be suppressed."" As a logical
subset of the other concurring opinions, the Court concluded in Marks the
three-justice plurality was the "narrowest grounds" for the judgment and the
controlling opinion in the case." Put another way:
The Justices supporting the broader legal rule must necessarily recognize the
validity of the narrower legal rule. That is, if a statute is found to be constitutionally permissible pursuant to a strict scrutiny standard of review, then it is
necessarily permissible pursuant to a rational basis standard of review. From
the text of the alternative concurning opinions, it is possible to determine that
if all of the Justices apply the narrower rule, the outcome would have been the
same.
Under Marks, therefore, the "narrowest grounds" means the opinion which
is "a logical subset of other, broader opinions."" Application of this rule to
Rapanosshould be straightforward. The Scalia plurality appears more narrowly
drawn as a logical subset of the Kennedy test. Even the dissent thought so: "m
the unlkely event that the pluralty test is met but Justice Kennedy's is no4
courts should ... uphold the Corps' jurisdiction."
However, many of the lower courts that have applied Marks to Rapanos
found the rule unworkable. But that is because these courts misconstrued
Marks and misrepresented the Rapanos decision.
B. NORTHERN

CALIFORNL4 RIVER WATCH V. CITY OFHEALDsBURG

The Ninth Circuit was the first Circuit Court to apply Marks to the Rapanos
decision. In Northern CahTorniaRiver Watch v. Healdsburg(River Watch I),
35.
36.
37.
Mass.,
38.
39.

Gregg 428 U.S. at 169 n.15.
Marks, 430 U.S. at 188-90.
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of
383 U.S. 413, 419, 421 (1966).
Id. at 419, 443.
Id. at 421, 424.

40. Id. at 421.
41. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
42.

Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77

L. REv. 1593, 1603-04 (1992).
See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 n.14 (emphasis added).
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the court summarily concluded the Kennedy concurrence was controlling' without further discussion:
Justice Kennedy, constituting the fifth vote for reversal, concurred only in the
judgment and, therefore, provides the controlling rule of law. See Mwks v.
UnitedStates, 430 IJ.S. 188 (1977) (citation omitted) (explaining that "[wlhen
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the
.

narrowest grounds")

This summary disposition adds nothing to an understanding of the Mdrs
analysis. It is unclear why the Ninth Circuit concluded the Kennedy concurrence is controlling, and this conclusion has been drawn into question by more
recent Ninth Circuit precedent, discussed later.
C. UNITED STA

TS V. GERKE

UnitedStates v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. was the next appellate case to apply
Maks to the Rapanos decision." Gerke was charged with filling "waters of the
United States" without a federal pennit under the Clean Water Act." Gerke
challenged the government's jurisdiction in the case and petitioned the Suprerne Court after losing in the Seventh Circuit." The High Court granted certiorari and remanded the case in light of Rapanos." On remand, the Seventh
Circuit held in a per cuiun decision thatJustice Kennedy's concurring opinion
was controlling because: (1) that opinion was the narrowest opinion (i.e., least
restrictive of government authority); and (2) when joined with the four dissenters, Justice Kennedy's opinion made up a majority on the court.51 However, the
court's first mistake was to misstate the Marks test. According to Gerke,
When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a case
and not on the ground for that outcome, lower court judges are to follow the
narrowest grounds to which a majority of the Justices would have assented if
forced to choose.
This misstatement of Maiks allowed the Seventh Circuit to aggregate the Kennedy concurrence with the four dissenting Justices to reach a majority. But
Marks does not allow consideration of the dissenting opinions in a fractured
decision like Rapanos.
Properly stated, Maks holds that when the Supreme Court issues a divided
opinion with no single opinion conunanding a majority, the holding of the case
"may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurredinthe

45.
46.
47.
48.
. 49.
50.
51.
52.

N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Hcaldsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1029.
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 723.
Id. at 723-24.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 724-25.
Id. at 724 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
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judgments on the narrowest grounds."' Therefore, the dissent is off-limits in a
Marks analysis.
In Gibson v. American Cyanamid. Co., the Seventh Circuit revisited its
Gerke decision, holding it had been wrong to count the Rapanos dissent in ruling on the controlling opinion.' Gibson explained that it makes sense to exclude dissenting opinions because "by definition, the dissenters have disagreed
with both the plurality and any concurring Justice" as to the outcome as well as
how the governing standard should apply.5 It is very likely, the court said, that
if the dissenters disagree (and are cited) then the lower courts and litigants "will
not have a clear idea on the contours of the standard and how to apply it in
future cases."" "This is not the way to make binding precedent.""
Accordingly, in Gibson the Seventh Circuit concluded its reliance on the
Rapanos dissent in Gerke was dicta and not necessary to the decision." Nevertheless, Gibson affirmed Gerke's conclusion that Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rapanoswas the "narrowest grounds" and therefore controlling." This
was the court's second mistake.
Gerke equates "narrowest grounds" with the opinion least restrictive of government authority: "[Justice Kennedy's] test is narrower (so far as reigning in
federal authority is concerned) than the plurality in most cases . . ." and therefore controlling. ' But Gerke cites no authority for that proposition. Marks
does not declare that "narrowest grounds" means least restrictive of government
authority. Nor could that standard apply universally because not all split decisions involve the government. If the court had been true to Mauks and discounted the dissent, it could have found a majority by looking to the Rapnaos
plurality as the "narrowest grounds." Whenever the plurality would find a jurisdictional water, Justice Kennedy would agree because the plurality test is a
logical subset ofjustice Kennedy's broader "significant nexus" test. Together,
the four Justices in the plurality and Justice Kennedy constitute a five-member
majority-without distorting Marks.
In Rapanos, the plurality thought justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" approach was not much narrower than the outsized reading the Corps (and the
dissent) gave the Act. "Justice Kennedy tips a wink at the agency, inviting it to
try its same expansive reading again."" And, as noted above, the dissent opined
that "Justice Kennedy's approach ... treats more of the Nation's waters as
within the Corps' jurisdiction" and it would be a rare case when the plurality test
is met and the Kennedy test is not."
The plurality sought to restrict federal authority to those wetlands that: (1)
53. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
54. Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 760 F.3d 600, 621 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Of course, Marks
itself is binding on us, and instructs that only those positions of the Justices concurring in the
outcome count in the analysis.").

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 621.
Sce id.

60.

Gerke Excavatig, Inc., 464 F.3d at 724-25.

61. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 756 n.15.
62. Id. at 754 n.14.
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are physically adjacent to "a relatively permanent body of water connected to
traditional interstate navigable waters;" and (2) have a continuous surface connection with that water, making it diflicult to determine where the "water" ends
and the "land" begins.' In other words, the plurality opinion limits federal jurisdiction to wetlands that actually abut a significant tributary, such as a relatively
permanent river, lake or stream, connected to a traditional navigable water, and
which is "indistinguishable" from that tributary, such as the wetlands in Unmited
States v. Riverside Bayvie w Homes, Inc."
In Riverside Bayview the Supreme Court allowed federal regulation of an
abutting marshland characterized by saturated soil conditions and weland vegetation that literally extended from the marshland to the waterway.' In contrast,
Justice Kennedy would allow federal regulation of any wetland alone or in combination with other similar wetlands that (in the aggregate) have a significant
nexus with a downstream navigable water, even if no physical hydrological connection exists." It is axiomatic that a wetland that is hydrologically "indistinguishable" from a relatively permanent tributary to a traditional navigable water
would satisfy justice Kennedy's significant nexus test. The plurality test is therefore a narrower subset of the broader Kennedy test.
In Gibson, the Seventh Circuit took "narrowest grounds" to mean "that
Maks applies only when one opinion is the logical subset of other, broader
opinions."" Under this standard, the Seventh Circuit should have found the
plurality controlling in Rapanos. Instead, the circuit distorted Marks to maximize government control over navigable waters. Gerke, and to a lesser extent
Gibson, has all the hallmarks of a result-oriented opinion. Gerke finds no support in Marks. Rather than providing a citable interpretation of how to find the
controlling opinion in Japanos, the case should serve as a caution for other
courts.
D. UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

In [United States v. Johnson, the government cited landowners under the
Clean Water Act converting wetlands to cranberry bogs without a federal permit.' In defense, the landowners challenged the government's statutory jurisdiction." A split panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld federal
jurisdiction citing a "hydrological connection" to navigable waters."o Shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court invalidated that basis for jurisdiction in Rapanos.
On remand to the district court, the First Circuit rejected Gerke's interpretation
of Maks and declared the trial court could establish federal jurisdiction under
either the Scalia plurality test or the Kennedy "significant nexus" test.'

But this

63. Id at 742.
64. See id. at 755; scc also United States v. Riversidc Bavview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
134 (1985).
65. Riecjside Baysicn; 474 U.S. at 131.
66.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779.

67. Gibson, 760 F.3d at 619 (citing King, 950 F.2d at 781).
68. 467 F.3d 56,58 (1st Cir. 2006).
69. Id.
70. Id
71. Id. at 66.
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just exacerbated the confusion over how to read Marks and Rapanos.
The First Circuit thought it curious that Gerke equated "narrowest
grounds" with the opinion least restrictive of federal authority. "Such an equation," the court stated, "leaves unanswered the question of how one would determine which opinion is controlling in a case where the government is not a
party."" The court found it "just as plausible to conclude that the narrowest
ground of decision in Rapanos is the ground most restrictive of government
authority (the position of the plurality)," because, the court concluded, "that
ground avoids the constitutional issue of how far Congress can go in asserting
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.""
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit's reading of Marks in Gerke, the First
Circuit suggested the "narrowest grounds" might sensibly be interpreted to
mean the "less far-reaching-common ground,"" or the opinion "most clearly
tailored to the specific fact situation before the Court and thus applicable to the
fewest cases."" Relying on Ing v. Palmer," the First Circuit noted the D.C.
Circuit found "Marks is workable-one opinion can be meaningfully regarded
as narrower' than another-only when one opinion is a logical subset of other,
broader opinions."" "In other words," the First Circuit explained, "the 'narrowest grounds' approach makes the most sense when two opinions reach the same
result in a given case, but one opinion reaches that result for less sweeping reasons than the other."" According to the First Circuit, Marks followed this approach.
For examples, the court cited Furman7 and Memoir&s upon which Marks
was based. In Furman, the First Circuit observed, "the Justices who concluded
that capital punishment was per se unconstitutional would always strike down
future death penalty sentences" but the Justices who found the death penalty
unconstitutional only as administered in Furman"would only strike down capital sentences in a subset of future capital cases."' Likewise, in Memobrs, "two
Justices would always require a ruling in favor of protecting speech, but the view
of three other Justices that only non-obscene speech is protected would extend
FirstAmendnentprotection only to a subset of such cases."" The First Circuit
therefore concluded the "less sweeping opinion in each case [i.e. the opinions
that are the logical subset of the other per se opinions] represents the 'narrowest
grounds' for the decision.""
Having concluded that Marks applies where one opinion is the subset of

72.
73.
74.
1234,

Id. at 63.
Id. (emphasis added).
Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63 (quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d
1247 (11th Cir. 2001)).

75. Mark Alan Thurmon, Note- When the Court Divides: Reconsideringthe Pecedenta
Value of Supieme CoultPlalityDecisions,42 DuKE LJ. 419, 420-21 (1992).

76. 950 F.2d at 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
77. johnson, 467 F.3d at 63.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 64.
See generally Furnan, 408 U.S. 238.
See generally Memohis, 383 U.S. 413.

81. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
82. Id. (emphasis in original).
83. Id.
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another concurring opinion, the First Circuit then held the understanding of
"narrowest grounds" does not translate easily to the present situation: "The
cases in which Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction are not a subset
of the cases in which the plurality would limit jurisdiction."" For this reason,
the court rejected Gerke's conclusion that, under Marks, Justice Kennedy's
lone concurrence is controlling in Rapanos. Instead, the First Circuit held the
"federal government can establish jurisdiction over the target sites if it can meet
either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's standard as laid out in Rapanos."
Yet this raises the following question: why didn't the First Circuit reach the
obvious, perhaps inescapable, conclusion that the plurality test is a "logical subset" of the Kennedy test and therefore a perfect translation to the present situation? The answer lies in the Court's acceptance of the claim, cited in Gerke,
that "in cases where there is a small surface water connection to a stream or
brook, the plurality's.jurisdictional test would be satisfied," but Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test would not." This, however, is a fallacy that derives from Justice Kennedy's hyperbolic characterization of the plurality opinion. According to Justice Kennedy,

IBly saying the Act covers wetlands (however remote) possessing a surfacewater connection with a continuously flowing stream (however small), the plurality's reading would permit applications of the statute as far from traditional
federal authority as are the waters it deems beyond the statute's reach."
Nowhere does the plurality state or imply such a standard. Justice Kennedy
cited no language from the plurality opinion in support of this characterization
of the plurality position because he cannot. Neither did the Gerke orJohnson
courts. To the contrary, the plurality expressly rejected this reading of the Act:
Therefore, only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies
that are "waters of the United States" in their own right, so that there is no
clear demarcation between "waters" and wetlands, are "adjacent to" such waters and covered by the Act. Wetlands with only an intermittent, physically
remote hydrologic connection to "waters of the United States" do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview, and thus lack the
necessary connection to covered waters that we described as a "significant
nexus" in SWANCC. Thus, establishing that wetlands such as those at the
Rapanos and Carabell sites are covered by the Act requires two findings: first,
that the adjacent channel contains a "watelrl of the United States," (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable
waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with
that water, makin it difficult to determine where the "water" ends and the
"wetland" begins.
This is the precise holding of the plurality opinion. The plurality test in
Rapanos requires jurisdictional wetlands to be so bound up with covered waters

84.

Id.

85. Id. at 66.
86.
87.
88.

Id at 64.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 776-77 (KenncdvJ., concurring).
Id. at 742 (internal citations omitted).
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that the two become indistinguishable, like the marshland in RiversideBayview,
that literally merged with the adjacent creek so that one could not tell where the
"water" ends and the "wetland" begins. This is a far cry from the wetland test
ascribed to the plurality by justice Kennedy and accepted at face value by Gerke
and Johnson.
In addition to being gulled by Justice Kennedy's mischaracterization of the
plurality opinion, the First Circuit was taken in by the Rapanos dissent that dissenting votes should be counted in determining the controlling opinion in split
Supreme Court decisions.
The First Circuit cites, with approval, that a number of Circuits have abandoned the Marks approach to split opinions or applied Marks selectively." Instead, they have sought to divine the controlling opinion in the Supreme Court's
fragmented decisions, like Rapanos, by adopting a "pragmatic" approach to the
situation." This approach involves assessing which grounds would "command
a majority of the Court"" In Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., for example, the
Second Circuit concluded: "In essence, what we must do is find common
ground shared by five or more justices." Similarly, in United States v. Wlhams, the Ninth Circuit held,
We need not find a legal opinion which a majority joined, but merely "a legal
standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce results with which a
majority of the Court from that case would agree.""

The First Circuit in Johnson used similar logic to justify its determination
that federal jurisdiction over wetlands could be established under either the plurality test in Rapanosor the Kennedy test: "IfJustice Kennedy's test is satisfied,
then at leastJustice Kennedy plus the four dissenters would supportjurisdiction.
If the plurality's test is satisfied, then at least the four plurality members plus the
four dissenters would support jurisdiction."" The court is oblivious to the fact
that under a proper application of Marks, where the plurality test is viewed as a
subset of the Kennedy test, a finding of jurisdiction under the plurality test
would always result in the support of all nine Justices.
The First Circuit also relies on Student Pubhlic InterestResearch Group of
New Jersey, Inc. v. A T& T Bell Labs," wherein the Third Circuit examined
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Councilfor Clean An' to determine
the controlling opinion. In Pennsylvamia, the Supreme Court was asked to address the availability of contingency fees under federal fee-shifting statutes."
The court split along the lines of Rapanoswith four Justices in the plurality, four

89. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
90. Id.
9 1. Id.
92. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1992).
93. United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991)).
94. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
95. 842 F.2d 1436, 1438-39 (3d Cir. 1988).
96. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
97. See id. at 714.
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Justices in the dissent, and Justice O'Connor's lone concurrence in the judgments." The Third Circuit thus determined that "[b]ecause the four dissenters
would allow contingency multipliers in all cases in which Justice O'Connor
would allow them, her position commands a majority of the Court" and is controlling.'
0
In King v. Palmei;'
o however, the D.C. Circuit took a different approach.
The D.C. Circuit refused to examine the points of commonality among Justice
O'Connor's opinion and that of the dissent, relying mainly on a literal reading
of Marks that the holding is the position of the Justices "who concured in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.""' The D.C. Circuit also relied on the
fact that the Supreme Court had not explicitly applied Marks in a way that would
combine concurring and dissenting votes.'" In as much as Marks is the only
approach expressly authorized by the Supreme Court for interpreting split decisions," the First Circuit should have followed the DC Circuit rather than the
other circuits that have abandoned Marks in favor or a more "pragmatic" approach.
E. UNITED STA TES v ROBISON
In United States v. Robison, a pipe manufacturer was convicted for discharging wastewater into a nearby waterway in violation of its Clean Water Act
discharge permit."'
On appeal, the defendants argued the jury should have
been instructed that the government must establish jurisdiction based solely on
the Rapanos plurality and not on the Kennedy concurrence." The Eleventh
Circuit rejected Johnson's either/or approach and adopted the Gerke holding
that the Kennedy opinion was the "narrowest grounds" and controlling under
Marks because it was the least restrictive of federal authority." The court's
Marks analysis is instructive, albeit flawed.
First, the court observed it would be a rare case in which the plurality test is
met and the Kennedy test is not.11 And, "as practical matter" such rare cases
can be dismissed."' This concession supports the argument that when it comes
to detennining jurisdictional waters, the plurality test is a subset of the Kennedy
test. Therefore, under Maks, the plurality test should control. But the Eleventh Circuit bought into the Seventh Circuit's canard that the "narrowest
grounds" is the opinion least restrictive of federal authority.'" The Eleventh
Circuit did not address how that rule. would apply when the govermnent is not
a party and cited no authority for that interpretation other than Gerke, which

See id. at 731.
Student Pub., 842 F.2d at 1451.
950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 783 (emphasis in oiiginal).
Id.
See In rc Cook, 322 B.R. at 34 1
United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1221-22.
See id. at 1220.
Id.
Id.
.
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99.
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101.
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103.
104.
105.
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assumed, without explanation, that the "narrowest grounds" is the least restrictive of govermnent authority.
Second, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the First Circuit's reliance on the dissent inJohnson."o After stating that Marks applies only to "those Members who
concurred in the judgements," the court acknowledged, "[we simply cannot
avoid the command of Marks.""' Moreover, the court held that dissenters, by
definition, have notjoined in the judgment."' Therefore, " i] n [the court's] view,
Marks does not direct lower courts interpreting fractured Supreme Court decisions to consider the positions of those who dissented."" The court took this
one step further citing the D.C. Circuit in Kig v. Palmer "We do not think we
are free to combine a dissent with a concurrence to form a Marks majority.""
"It would be inconsistent with Marks," the Eleventh Circuit continued, "to allow
the dissenting RapanosJusticesto carry the day and impose an 'either/or' test,
whereby the CWA jurisdiction would exist when either Justice Scalia's test or
Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied."" The court simply deemed the votes of the
dissenters as "of no moment under Marks.""'
Aside from the fact that counting dissenting votes conflicts with the Supreme Court's directive in Marks, which is bididing on the lower courts, the
either/or test creates uncertainty among the regulated public and legal practitioners. It also allows the government to play legal games with alleged violators
of the Clean Water Act In the recent case of Hawkes v. United States," the
Army Corps of Engineers issued a Jurisdictional Determination asserting federal jurisdiction based on the Scalia plurality test" When the landowners challenged the determination in an administrative setting, the Corps changed tactics
asserting for the first time that the wetlands at issue were subject to federal control under the Kennedy "significant nexus" test, which burdened the landowners with unnecessary delay and expense."' It is also bizarre that a circuit court
would apply two conflicting legal standards that, if raised in separate circuits,
would justify Supreme Court review to resolve the circuit conflict Marks avoids
these pitfalls by directing lower courts to find a single controlling opinion in split
Supreme Court decisions.
F. UNITED STA

TES V CUNDIFF

UnitedStates v. Cundijinvolved landowners who were held to be in violation of the Clean Water Act for dredging and filling wetlands without a permit'L"
The trial court imposed an injunction against the Cundiffs to restore the property and assessed a civil fine.' The Cundiffs challenged federal jurisdiction on
110.
111.
112.
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115.
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117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See Robison, 505 F.3d at 1220-21.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in orignal).
Id. (citng King, 950 F.2d at 783).
Id.
Robison, 505 F.3d. at 1221.
Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Mim. 2013).
Id. at 871.
Id.
555 F.3d 200, 204-05 (6thCir. 2009).
Id. at 205.
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appeal arguing the plurality decision is controlling because it is the most restrictive of government authority."
The Sixth Circuit rejected the Cundiffs argument stating "Maks does not
imply that the 'narrowest' Rapanos opinion is whichever one restricts jurisdiction the most."" The court also rejected the least restrictive approach favored
in Gerke, Healdsbwg, and Robison.' Properly read, the Sixth Circuit held,
the "'narrowest' opinion refers to the one which relies on the least doctrinally
'far-reaching-common ground' among the Justices in the majority: it is the concumng opinion that offers the least change to the law."" However, the court
did not apply this test to the Rapanosdecision.
According to the Sixth Circuit, the controlling opinions in Memobrs and
Funman were "less doctrinally sweeping" than the other concurring opinions as
adduced by the fact that, in Memobrs, the controlling opinion disagreed that
obscenity laws per se violate the Constitution while, in Furman, the controlling
opinion disagreed that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional." Because
of this, the Sixth Circuit concluded Memoirs and Funnan were an easy fit for
Mais.m7 However, the .court asserted Marks is problematic if one opinion does
not fit within the broader circle drawn by others."
The Sixth Circuit declared Maiks did not fit Rapanos because "there is
quite little common ground between justice Kennedy's and the plurality's conception of jurisdiction under the Act, and both flatly reject the other's views.""
Therefore, the court abandoned Marks and adopted the view of the First Circuit
in Johnson that there is no controlling opinion in Rapanosand the government
can establish jurisdiction under either the plurality test or the Kennedy test."
Nonetheless, every court to consider the controlling opinion in Rapanos
has held the Kennedy test covers more waters than the plurality test and is the
least restrictive of federal authority. The "common ground" between the two is
that when the plurality test is satisfied the Kennedy test is also satisfied-always.
The plurality test falls entirely within the broader circle drawn by justice Kennedy. The fact that the plurality and justice Kennedy reject the other's views is
immaterial. In Memobrs and unnan the controlling opinion necessarily rejected the views of the other concurring opinions. By definition, disagreement
is a repudiation of another's views."' But this is no basis to reject the Marks
standard. The controlling opinion in Rapanosis just as apparent as the controlling opinions in Memobrs and Funnan. The plurality opinion is less doctrinally
sweeping than the Kennedy opinion. Like the per se opinions in Memoirs and
Funan, the Kennedy test is so broad that it takes in almost all waters. As the

122.
123.

Scc id. at 209.
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124. Id. ("[It] makes little sense for the 'narrowest' opinion to be the one that restricts jurisdiction the least .. ").
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plurality notes, "Justice Kennedy tips a wink at the agency, inviting it to try its
same expansive reading again," and, under the Kennedy test, jurisdiction is so
broad that all waters affecting waters are waters.
G. OTHER CASES
Other circuit courts have addressed the controlling opinion in Rapanos, yet
these cases simply adopt the reasoning of other courts without adding anything
to the Marks analysis. The Ninth Circuit decision in Norther-n CaliforniaRiver
Watch v. City of Healdsburg(River Watch II) affirms its decision in River
Watch Ithat the Kennedy test is controlling because it is the least restrictive of
federal authority.
The Eighth Circuit in US. v. Baiej)' and the Third Circuit
in US. v. Donovan" both adhere to the conclusion and reasoning of the First
Circuit in Johnson that Marks cannot be applied to Rapanos because neither
opinion is a subset of the other; therefore jurisdiction can be established under
the either/or test.
1. United States v. Davis
The final case that deserves discussion is the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Davis."' Although the case does not address Rapanos, this en
banc decision provides a uuique perspective on Marks, which could be applied
to the Rapanos decision. In'Davis, the court examined a 4-1-4 split decision of
the Supreme Court in Ieeman v. UnitedStates.' Freemandiscussed whether
a defendant, who entered into a plea agreement, could take advantage of a sentence reduction under the federal Sentencing Guidelines." FourJustices in the
plurality held the defendant could always take advantage of the sentence reduc4
tion.o
One Justice held the defendant could only take advantage of the sentence reduction under certain circumstances."' And fourJustices in the dissent
held a defendant relying on a plea agreement could never take advantage of the
sentence reduction under the Guidelines.'
To determine the controlling opinion, the Ninth Circuit started with the
statement in Marks*
1

When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be

132. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 754-57.
133. See N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007) (River
Watch II); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029-31 (9th Cir. 2006)
(River Watch I); but see N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 781 (9th Cir. 2010)
(stating River Watch Ildid not foreclose the possibility of establishing jurisdiction under the plurality decision as well as the Kennedy concurrence).
134. United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009).
135. United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 181 (3rd Cir. 2011).
136. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 66.
137. 825 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
138. 564 U.S. 522 (2011).
139. See id. at 525.
140. See id. at 525, 534.
141. See id. at 542-44.
142. See id. at 544.
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viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
ments on the narrowest grounds.'
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The court observed that after forty years, the courts are still struggling "to
divine what the Supreme Court meant by the 'narrowest grounds.'"" As a result, two approaches have emerged. One is the reasoning-based approach
whereby the court seeks to determine if there is a common reasoning among
the concurring opinions such that one is a logical subset of the other, broader
opinion.'" "In essence, the narrowest opinion must represent a common denominator of the Court's reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment."" The other approach is results-based and defines "narrowest grounds" as "the rule that would
necessarily produce results with which a majority of Justices in the controlling
case would agree.""' Of the two, the Ninth Circuit preferred the reasoningbased approach:
To foster clarity, we explicitly adopt the reasoning-based approach to applying
Malks. This approach is not only consistent with our most recent case law, []
but also makes the most sense. A fractured Supreme Court decision should
only bind the federal courts of appeal when a majority of the Justices agree
upon a single underlying rationale and one opinion can reasonably be described as a logical subset of the other. When no single rationale commands
a majority of the Court, only the specific result is binding on lower federal
courts.'
But this approach to Marks did not help the court define the "narrowest
grounds" in Davis. To the contrary, the court found the concurring opinions
mutually exclusive in most cases; neither the plurality nor the lone concurrence
is a subset of the other."" Therefore, a standard Muiks analysis does not fit.
Although, Marks expressly limits the analysis to concurring opinions, the Ninth
Circuit cited examples where some courts, including the Supreme Court, had
looked to the dissent to find a majority."" Yet the Davis court determined that
even that approach was unavailing in Freemanbecause neither the plurality position nor the lone concurrence is a logical subset of the dissent, or vice versa."
The court acknowledged some overlap among the opinions but no case in
which one opinion would always agree with another."' Accordingly, the court
decided Marks could not be applied: "Simply put, no combination of" Reeinan ' dissenting and concurring opinions yields a binding rule that we must
follow."
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Daris, 825 F.3d at 1020 (alteration in original).
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Daiis, 825 F.3d at 1022.
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In the absence of a controlling opinion, the Ninth Circuit concluded it
could choose the opinion it found most persuasive, limited only by the result in
the case that a defendant relying on a plea agreement is not categorically barred
from taking advantage of a sentence reduction under the Guidelines." In the
end, the court found the plurality the most persuasive and applied that opinion
to the case."
This ruling has implications for determining the controlling opinion in Rapanos, at least within the Ninth Circuit. Under Daus, the court must first determine whether the reasoning of the plurality and the Kennedy opinion is the
logical subset of the other.'" The plurality in Rapanos reasoned that a jurisdictional wetland must have the characteristics of the wetland regulated in Riverside
Bayiew.'" That is, it must be "indistinguishable" from the abutting waterway,
not merely connected."' Justice Kennedy acknowledged that such a wetland is
subject to federal regulation under Riverside Bayview.'" Therefore, the plurality
opinion is a logical subset of the Kennedy opinion. But the converse is not true.
The plurality rejected Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test where the wetland is not "indistinguishable" from the abutting waterway as in Riverside
Bayview. ' The Kennedy test is broader than the plurality test for wetlands
such that the Kennedy test encircles the plurality test in all cases. This is different from Freeman where the reasoning of the concurring opinions was not the
logical subset of another. Therefore, under a straightforward application of
Marks, the plurality opinion in Rapanos is controlling.
If, however, a court were to rule that the plurality in Rapanos is not the
logical subset of the Kennedy opinion, then, under Davs, the court could look
to the dissent to find a majority. It is undisputed that both the plurality and the
Kennedy concurrence are a subset of the broader dissent that would allow federal regulation of all waters to further the objectives of the Clean Water Act.
Combining the sole Kennedy opinion with the four-Justice dissent would yield
five votes. However, combining.the four-Justice plurality with the four-Justice
dissent would yield eight votes. Thus, even under this approach, the plurality
opinion is controlling.
If a court were to rule that Marks does not apply to Rapanos in any form,
as the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits have done, then, under Davis, the court
could simply choose to apply the most persuasive opinion. The only reason
any court has given for choosing the Kennedy test as controlling is because it is
least restrictive of federal authority. This may be enough to persuade some
courts that the Kennedy test is preferable to the more limiting plurality test-at
least until one looks at how the government has abused the Kennedy test since
the Rapanos decision. In reliance on the Kennedy "significant nexus" test, the
government promulgated regulations in 2015 that redefined "waters of the

154. Id.
155. Id. at 1028.
156. Id. at 1016.
157.
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Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742; see Riverside Baywew, 474 U.S. at 134-35.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755.
Id. at 765-67; see Riverside Bayvew, 474 U.S. at 134-35.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 753-56; see Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134-35.
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United Sates" (WOTUS)" subject to federal control under the Clean Water
Act that covers virtually all waters in the Nation and much of the land, such as
the 100-year floodplains. This includes:
1. All waters which are or were or nay be used in interstate or foreign commerce;
2. All interstate waters;
3. The territorial seas;
4. All impoundments of any "waters of the United States;"
5. All tributaries to waters 1-3. A "tributary" means a water that contributes
flow directly or through another water (including any impoundment), to waters
1-3, that has physical indicators of a bed and bank and an ordinary high water
mark. A tributary may be natural or man-made.
6. All waters adjacent to waters 1-5. "Adjacent" means bordering, contiguous,
or neighboring. "Neighboring" means within 100 feet of the ordinary high
water mark of waters 1-5. And, all waters within the 100-year floodplain of
waters 1-5 and not more than 1,500 feet from the ordinary high water
mark. Also, all waters within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of waters 1-3.
7. All of the following waters that have been determined on a case-by-case
basis to have a significant nexus to waters 1-3: prairie potholes, Carolina and
Delmarva bays, pocosins, western vernal pools, and Texas coastal prairie wetlands. "Significant nexus" means that a water, alone or in combination with
similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affects the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of waters 1-3. "Significant" means more than speculative or insubstantial and includes effects on any one of nine factors.
8. And, all waters located within the 100-year floodplain of waters 1-3 and all
waters within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary hi h water mark of
waters 1-5 when they have a significant nexus to waters 1-3.
There are very few exceptions, such as "puddles" which are undefined."'
Imagine a regulatory land-use regime so broad that puddles have to be expressly exempted. This is a long way from the "navigable waters" the Clean
Water Act actually authorizes the federal government to regulate. The
WOTUS rule shows the worst in regulatory overreach and justifies public fears
of an ever-growing administrative state. It defies commonsense; distorts the
plain language of the Clean Water Act; undermines the intent of Congress; subjects millions of landowners to severe permittmg requirements and ruinous civil
and criminal penalties for noncompliance; and purposefully evades Supreme
Court precedent and constitutional constraints on federal power.

161. Clcan Water Rulc: Definition of"Waters of thc UnitedStates," 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 (proposcdJunc 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
162. Id. at 37058-59.
163. Id. at 37099.
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When the rule was published, over thirty-one states and almost sixty agricultural, industrial and private entities filed suit challenging the rule on statutory
and constitutional grounds.'" Two courts issued preliminary injunctions enjoining enforcement of the rule and held the rule was likely invalid and would be
overturned on subsequent review.'" In response to public outcry, the President
of the United States issued an Executive Order on February 28, 2017, calling
for reconsideration of the rule and advising the government to revise the rule
consistent with the Scalia plurality in Rapanos."
In light of these events, a prudent court would choose the plurality as the
controlling opinion in the Rapanosdecision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Circuit Courts are split on application of Marks to the Rapanos decision. Two approaches have emerged. In one, the courts hold the lone Kennedy concurrence is the "narrowest grounds" and controlling under Marks because the Kennedy "significant nexus" test is less restrictive of federal authority
than the Scalia plurality. This is problematic because Marks does not define
"narrowest grounds" as the opinion least restrictive of government authority and
not all split decisions involve government action. In the other, the courts hold
Marks does not fit the Rapanos decision because the "narrowest grounds" cannot be determined. Therefore, federal jurisdiction may be established under
either the Scalia plurality or the Kennedy concurrence. But this too is problematic because it gives equal weight to differing legal standards and overlooks
the fact that the Scalia plurality is a logical subset of the Kennedy opinion. In
every case where the plurality finds a jurisdictional wetland, Justice Kennedy
would agree. This constitutes a Marks majority. The Scalia plurality is therefore the "narrowest grounds" and the controlling opinion under Marks.

164. Sec, e.g., In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 805 (6th Cir. 2015).
165. Id. at 809; North Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1060 (D.N.D. 2015).
166. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12497 (Feb. 28, 2017).
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INTRODUCTION

Water transfers are essential to meet water supply needs across the West
and, indeed, across the nation. Decades of litigation following the 1972 enactrent of the federal Clean Water Act, however, challenged whether water
transfers are subject to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permitting, like municipal wastewater and industrial discharges.'
Responding to the Supreme Court's implicit invitation in South Florida Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004)

1. Mr. Nichols is a Partner at the law firm of Berg Hill Greenleaf Ruscitti LLP in Boulder,
Colorado. He is Lead Counsel for Western Water Providers, and serves as a Special Assistant
Attorney General for Colorado and New Mexico and co-counsel for the Western States.
2. See generally, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians (Miccosukee),
541 U.S. 95 (2004) (citing cases from 1975 forward that have litigated whether NPDES permits
apply to water transfers).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1 3 4 2 (p) (2012).
67
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("Miccosukee"), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") promulgated its Water Transfers Rule, which simply excludes water transfers from
NPDES permitting.' After nearly a decade of challenges to the EPA's 2008
Rule,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York and reinstated the Rule.' Now, several
of the plaintiff/appellee states have filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, as well as some of the New England environmental plaintiffintervenor/appellees." It seems unlikely the Court will grant certioraribecause
two circuits have concluded that EPA's Rule is a reasonable construction of
the Clean Water Act.
Since most western precipitation falls as snow, western water users and
providers ("Providers") "must capture water when and where the snow melts,
far from the West's urban and agricultural centers."' Providers divert and deliver water from other watersheds "through natural rivers and lakes, as well as
through conveyance facilities such as reservoirs, aqueducts, ditches, canals and
pipelines."o This water is used "for municipal, agricultural, industrial, commercial and other beneficial uses" across the West." Without this extensive
infrastructure for water transfers, many of the nation's great cities could not
exist, including Albuquerque, Colorado Springs, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Reno, Salt Lake City, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Fe, and
Seattle." Similarly, many nationally important agricultural regions could not
grow crops, including the Central and Imperial Valleys of California, Weld
and Larimer Counties in Colorado, the Snake River Valley of Idaho, and the
Yakima Valley of Washington.
All told, western transfers-delivering the "'life blood' of the West"-serve
over 76 million people." Representative examples follow.
CALIFORNIA. Federal, state and local water transfers serve metropolitan
and agricultural areas throughout California. For example, the State Water
Project operated by the California Department of Water Resources provides
water supplies for 25 million Californians and 750,000 acres of irrigated farmland in Northern California, the San Francisco Bay Area, the San Joaquin Val-

4.

Sec Miccosukcc, 541 U.S. at 106-07.

5. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (2017).
6. See, e.g., Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1219,
1224 (1ith Cir. 2009), rch'g denied, 605 F.3d 962 (2010), cert. dcnied, 562 U.S. 1082 (2010).
7. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (Catskill III), 846 F.3d
492, 533 (2d Cir. 2017).
8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, New York v. EPA, No. 17-418, 2017 WL 4174955
(U.S. tiled Sept. 15, 2017); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, No. 17446, 2017 WL 4280573 (U.S. filed Sept. 14, 2017).
9. Brief of Intervenor Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees at 2, Catskill III, 846 F.3d
492 (No. 14-1823).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2-3.
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id.
1,
11; UNITED STATES PoPutLATION GROH rH BY REGION,
at
14. Id.
(last visited June 23,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/datatables.php?component-growth
2017).
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ley, the Central Coast, and Southern California as shown below." The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California transfers water from the Colorado River through the Colorado River Aqueduct and from Northern California via the California Aqueduct to serve nearly 19 million customers of its 26member public agencies. San Francisco's Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct supplies
2.7 million residents of the City and twenty-seven suburban agencies in the
Bay area. 7 And the U.S Bureau of Reclamation projects store Sierra Nevada
snowrelt for later urban and agricultural use throughout California, while its
All American Canal and Coachella Canal deliver Colorado River water to irrigate the fertile Imperial Valley."
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state-California (last visited Nov. 27, 2017).
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FREMONT-MADISON IRRIGATION DISTRIC. The Fremont-Madison Irrigation District provides water for farm irrigation in the St. Anthony area of eastern Idaho.' "The Cross-Cut Canal, a critical component of the Fremont-Madison Irrigation
District's system," enables irrigation of nearly 50,000 acres of farmland by transferring
water from the Henry's Fork of the Snake River to the Teton River."'
~t C~n~aI
I ~r~r4e ~~ri,~rI hi, ~
Fre mont-Madison Irrigation District
Dat e: September 14, 2005
Pre pared by. LaDonna Henman
Est mated Acres Served by Cross-Cut Canal: 49,611

s

tosw.M.

by ceneb<:u

or
r

N

±f

Fremont-Madison [Idaho] Irrigation District: Water Supply System'

BLOG: SOLTHERN CAlIFORNIA ENERGY (Apr. 28, 2015), http://sitcs.uci.edu/cnergvohserver/

2015/04/28/california-water-projects-feeding-southern-california/.
OF RECLAMATION, IU.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, PN-FONSI 04-10,
20. Scc BuREA
FINAL

ENVTL.

ASSESSMENT

FREMONT-MADISON

IRRIGATION

DIST.

PROPOSED

TITLE

TRANSFER, 2-3 (2004), https://www.usbr.gov/pn/programs/ca/idaho/FMID/ea-frcc2004.pdf.
21. Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curac in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law at 13, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians

v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 98-6056-CIV (June
Leave"].
22. Id.

5,

2006) [hereinafter "Motion for
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COLORADO. Forty-four major trans-mountain diversions" transfer 500,000
acre-feet per year to serve Colorado's eastern slope." More than four million' residents of Colorado's major cities, from Pueblo and Colorado Springs north to Denver,
Boulder and Fort Collins, and about 700,000 acres on Colorado's eastern plains rely
on water transfers for supplemental water supplies.5
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Transmountain Diversions, Office of the State Engineer, COLO. Div. OF NAT. RES.

(2005),
http://water.state.co.us/SurfaceWater-/SWVPights/WaterDiagramus/Pages/TFranisbasinlDiversions.a
spx.
24. See Where the water goes, THE PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Dec. 20, 2010),
http://wwyw.chieftain.comn/news/local/article_20ccdd82-0be8-11Ie0-8e62-001cc4c002e0.htmlI.
25.

Alan Best, Tapped out: The future of water on the FrontRange, COLO. BIZ MAG., Oct.

1, 2009, at 28, 30, http://WWW.cobizmag.com/Articles/Tapped-out-The-future-of-w ater-on-theFront-Range/; Colorado Population Change 2000-2013, COLO. DEPT. OF LOC. AFFS. (2014),
https://demography.dola.color-ado.gov/demography/inifographics/#infographiics;
Motion
for
Leave, supra note 2 1, at 10.
26. TransmountainDiversions, supra note 23.
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NATURAL WATER QUALITY IS NOT ALWAYS PRISTINE. Water quality naturally
varies between watersheds, and therefore between the source waters and the receiving
waters of water transfers."

Snow in the western states accounts for eighty percent of

the surface water runoff.' Thunderstorms account for much of the rest.' Runoff
from snowmelt and storm events naturally exhibit elevated levels of total suspended

solids (TSS, suspended particles of soil and sediment), total dissolved solids (TDS,
dissolved particles of soil and sediment) and turbidity (muddy water) from erosion, as
well as nutrients." The dramatic topography of the west, which extends from over
14,505 feet above sea level to 280 feet below sea level, is, of course, largely the result
of such natural erosive processes." Water transfers typically employ unlined open
canals, ditches, and tunnels that receive these constituents directly from natural crosion." Furthermore, the source water itself may be naturally high in total dissolved
solids (TDS) and other constituents due to passing through saline geological formations and receiving inflows from brackish hot springs.
WATER TRANSFERS CAUSE FEW WATER QUALITY PROBLEMS. Several Providers
examined their water transfers during the course of the litigation. Using publicly available data and their own monitoring information, Providers in several states were able
to analyze more than twenty-five representative water transfers, including many multiplc transfers." Their analysis revealed:
1.
Many small and large volume transfers move water that is always better than
the quality of the receiving waters for all sampled parameters.
2. Parameters of the water transferred would exceed or contribute to the execedance of one or more of the water quality standards of the receiving waters or downstream waters in many transfers. These situations include:
a.
Transfers where the quality of the transferred water is usually better than
the quality of the receiving waters for all sampled parameters, with the
frequent exception of total suspended solids ("TSS"), a result of crosion
during spring runoff. The same situation probably occurs following major precipitation events.
b. Transfers where the quality of the transferred water contains metals at
higher concentrations than the receiving waters because of natural geological conditions present at the source.
c.
Transfers that deliver nutrients into lakes and reservoirs from nonpoint
source pollution introduced prior to and during transfer.'
Not surprisingly, in view of the naturally high water quality of the western states,
there are few reported water quality problems from water transfers. Colorado, for example, "has never identified a water body impaired by more than 1,700 transfers."'

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Brief of Iitervenor Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellecs, supra note 9, at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.

33.

Brief of Intervenor Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees, supra note 9, at 20.

34. Declaration of Mark T. Pitlier ¶ 11, Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc. v. EPA, 8 F. Supp. 3d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Case Nos. 08-CV-5606 (KMK), 08-CV-8430
(KMK)).
35. Id.
36. Brief of Intervenor )cfendants-Appcllants-Cross Appellecs, supra note 9, at 33.
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There are in fact surprisingly few examples of such impairment on record, a tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of water transfers in the United States.
THE CLEAN WATER ACT: NPDES REQUIREMENTS AND WATER TRANSFER
COMPLIANCE
All NPDES permits must include discharge limitations designed to ensure that
the water quality standards of the receiving waters are consistently met.' Further, all
NPDES permits are also subject to requirements concerning antidegradation review
under the Clean Water Act."
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS. States are primarily responsible for adopting
and periodically revising standards to protect water quality and water uses.' Those
standards must "be established taking into consideration their use and value for public
water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and ... also
taking into consideration their use and value for navigation."' A discharger must not
only ensure the attainment of the numeric and narrative water quality standards, but it
must also protect all underlying beneficial uses as designated by the State."
Under the NPDES program, if a discharge merely has the "potential to cause, or
contribute to an excursion above any State water quality standard," its NPDES permit
must contain conditions to control all such potential contributions.' In other words,
an NPDES permit limits the amount of pollutants delivered to the receiving waters,
regardless of whether the transfer would cause an exceedance of the water quality
standards or be a significant potential cause of an exceedance.
Water quality standards are in place for more than three dozen naturally occurring constituents and physical properties across the United States, including temperature, total dissolved solids (TDS), nutrients and sediment.' Each of the water quality
standards of the receiving waters would apply to a water transfer, as well as the antidegradation requirements discussed below.
ANTIDEGRADATION. Antidegradation is a component of the Act's water quality
standards program." "Where the quality of waters exceeds levels necessary to support
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the water," antidegradation provisions apply so as to maintain and protect existing quality.48 Antidegradation requirements may apply to prevent any change to the quality of the receiving water for every one of a multitude of parameters, even if the overall quality is

37.

Id. at 33-34.

38. National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) NPDES Permit Limits,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-pernit-limits (Nov. 29, 2016).
39. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-823-B-12-002,
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
IIANDBOOK, CHAPTER 4: ANTIDEGRADATION 14 (2012).
40. See 33 U.S.C. S 1313(a), (c)(2)(A) (2012).
41. Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
42. Id. § 1313(c)(2)(B).

43.

40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(i) (2017); see also Conrn. To Save Mokelumne River v. E.

Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1993).
44. 40 C.F.R. S 122.44(d)(1)(i).
45. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.4 (2017) (establishing state water quality standards); see e.g., 5
COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-31.1 to 31.16 (2017) (detailing state water quality standards).
46. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.4; 5 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1002-31.1 to 31.16.
47. 40 C.F.R. S 131.1 2 (a)(2).
48. Id.
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poor." Antidegradation applies even in the absence of any threat to the ultimate beneficial use."
WATER TREATMENT TO MEET NPDES REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE COST
PROHIBITIVE AND TECHNICALLY IMPRACTICAL. Transferred water is typically suitable for subsequent agricultural use without treatment, while the Safe Drinking Water

Act requires treatment of water before domestic and municipal use." Regardless, it
could cost an estimated $7 billion per year to treat just the most significant western
interbasin transfers to avoid the potential of causing or contributing to a violation of
the water quality standards of the receiving waters.3' Costs of such magnitude are nci-

ther feasible nor justified to meet water quality standards and antidegradation provisions, and would pose additional unnecessary or redundant costs on Providers' water
supplies.
If the NPDES progran covered water transfers, a Provider might be compelled
to expend hundreds of millions of dollars to construct one or more water treatment
facilities, surge reservoirs, and pollutant disposal facilities, or reconfigure its water delivery infrastructure to eliminate water transfers. 3 A treatment facility would have to
be capable of treating peak flows of source water (which might. occur just one or two
days a year during spring snowmelt) to avoid the risk of violating the water quality
standards oPreceiving waters.i Further, because fifty percent of mountain stream flow
occurs in Mayjune-july, expensive treatment plants might operate only a few weeks or
months a year during snowmelt run-off when it is legal to divert water pursuant to the
prior appropriation doctrine of the western states.` What is more, many water systems include multiple sequential transfers, i.e., into and out of waters of the United
States multiple times before ultimate use.
While municipal and industrial wastewater dischargers employ conventional
treatment techniques to affordably meet NPDES program requirements, it would be
technically impractical for Providers to treat water transfers because of the variable
quality of the source water, enormous volumes of water, and high transfer flow rates.
Moreover, pollutants removed by a treatment plant require expensive disposal in accord with applicable federal and state law.
Many water transfers, such as the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's Colorado-Big
Thompson and interstate ("Colo.-N.M.") San Juan-Chanma Projects, traverse or abut
federal land, including national forests, national parks, national recreation areas and
wilderness areas.`

To construct a treatment facility, surge reservoir, or pollutant dis-

49.
50.
51.

See id. § 131.12(a)(2)(i).
See id.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(4)(B)(ii), 300g-l(b)(1)(A) (2012).
52. Declaration of Mark T. Pither, supra note 33, at 1 1t1, 13.
53. See Chris Reagen, The Water Transfers Rule: How an EPA Rule Threatens to Inderminc the Clean Water Act, 83 U. CoLO. L. REv. 307, 332 (2011).
54. See id.
55. See id.
.56. See, e.g., Colorado-Big Thompson Pipicct, N. COLO. WATER CONSERVANcY DIsT.,
http://www.northernwater.org/WaterProjects/C-BTProject.aspx (last visited June 23, 2017).
57. Declaration of Mark T. Pifher, supra note 33, at 1 13.
58. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (2017); 5 COLO. COI)EREGS. § 1002-63 (2017) (federal and
state regulations imposed upon treatment plants).
59. See, e.g., Colorado-BgfThompson Priect, supra note 55; San Juan - Chama Proiect,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.usbr.gov/uc/albuq/rm/
mrg/fact/sjctproj.pdf.
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posal site would likely invoke the dredge-and-fill permit provisions of section 404 the
Clean Water Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act, and potentially the Endangered Species Act. Obtaining necessary approvals would be costly, time-consuming, and potentially impossible given site
requirements within or near federal lands in environmentally sensitive locations.
In short, infrastructure investments necessary to comply with NPDES requirements for naturally-occurring constituents would be cost prohibitive and technically
impractical. Yet such controls would be necessary to avoid regulatory agency enforcement action and citizen suits.

LITIGATION HISTORY
In the so-called "dam cases," of the 1980s, the D.C. and Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeal held that dams were not "point sources."'

Therefore, water transferred
through or around the dams was not subject to NPDES permitting."

The First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, subsequently held the discharge of
snowmaking water was subject to NPDES permitting." And the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals later required New York City to obtain an NPDES permit to transfer water
from one watershed to another to provide drinking water to the City.'
It wasn't long after the 2001 New York City decision that the Southern District of
Florida and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that transfers of water into the
Everglades required an NPDES pennit.' When that case-known as Miccosukee af-

ter the plaintiff Tribe-reached the Supreme Court, the Colorado and New Mexico
Attorneys General stepped up to defend federal deference to state water law as amicus
and intervenors, while the National Water Resources Association and Western Urban
Water Coalition rallied western municipal and industrial water providers and users."
The Supreme Court, however, remanded the issue to determine whether the transfer
involved waterbodies that are not meaningfully distinct-in which case an NPDES
permit would not be required-and invited EPA to weigh in."
In response to the Supreme Court's observation that EPA did not have any administrative documentation of its longstanding "view that the process of 'transporting,
impounding, and releasing navigable waters' cannot constitute an 'addition' of pollutants to 'the waters of the United States,'"" the agency adopted its Water Transfers

Rule, which simply excludes water transfers from discharges subject to NPDES permitting." Environmentalists from New England to Florida as well as New York State

60. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 1988); Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
61. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers, 862 F.2d at 590; Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d at 161.
62. Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1296-97 (1st Cir. 1996).
63. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York (Catskill I),
273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001).
64. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23306, at *21-22 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1999); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2002).
65. Brief for the States of Colo. and N.M. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-13,
Brief for Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 23-25, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626).
66. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 108.
67. Id. at 107.
68. National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697, 33,703-04
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(joined by eight states and Manitoba) challenged the Rule, and the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these challenges in the Eleventh Circuit." The
Circuit, however, opted to stay the challenges until it decided an appeal involving Lake
70
Okeechobee in the Everglades, a companion case to Miccosukcc. The Court reversed the Okeechobee trial court, holding that the Clean Water Act is ambiguous
and that EPA's Rule is a reasonable interpretation of the Clean Water Act entitled to
Chevron deference."
The Eleventh Circuit, however, is full of surprises. After repeatedly denyingwithout explanation-the Western States and Western Water Providers' unopposed
motions to intervene in support of the EPA's nationwide Rule, the Circuit dismissed
the consolidated challenges for lack of jurisdiction.
The dismissal of the consolidated challenges by the Eleventh Circuit lifted the
stays on "protective" challenges filed by Trout Unlimited, New York State ct ad.,
Friends of the Everglades and the Miccosukec Tribe inter alia in district courts based
on their reading of the Act's citizen suit provisions." Friends and the Miccosukee
Tribe, however, quickly dismissed their suit in the Southern District of Florida, which
presumably would have been bound to uphold the Rule by the Eleventh Circuit's
Lake Okeechobee precedent."' Forum shopping, Friends and the Tribe then sought
intervention in Trout Unlimited and New York State's challenges in the Southern District of New York ("SDNY"), which most assumed would be bound by the Second
3
Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in Catskills I and II 7' and overturn the Rule.
The Western States, Western Water Providers, New York City, and South Florida
Water Management District also sought to intervene." After summoning all would be
parties to White Plains, New York, the court granted everyone intervention "by consent."a The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the court heard
On March 28, 2014, Judge Karas vacated the
oral arguments December 19, 2013.
Water Transfers Rule to the extent it is inconsistent with the statute-and in particular
the phrase "navigable waters" as interpreted in Rapanos v. U.S."-and remanded the
Water Transfers Rule to the extent that the EPA did not provide a reasoned explanation for its interpretation." The EPA, Western States, Western Water Providers,
New York City and South Florida Water Management District appealed." Briefing
(June 13, 2008) (to be coditied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122); 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (2013).
69. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 8 F. Supp. 3d 500, 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev'd, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017).
70.

Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-80309-Civ-

Altonaga, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89450, at *116 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2006).
71. Fricnds of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1227-28.
72.

Friends of the Everglades v. EPA, 699 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11 th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,

134 S. Ct. 421 (2013).
Ottskill Mountains Clhapterof 7rott Unlimited, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d at 516.
74. Scc Brief of Intervenor Dcfendant-Appellants-Cross-Appellees States of Colo. et al. at
73.

6, Catskill III, 846 F.3d 492 (No. 14-1823).
75. Catskill I, 273 F.3d 481; Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of

New York (Catskill ll), 451 F.3d 97 (2d. Cir. 2006).
76. Catskill Mountains Chapterof Trout Unlimited, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d at 516.
77. Id.
78.

Id.

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 516-17.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 716 (2006).
Catskill Mountains Chapterof Trout Unlimited, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d at 567.
Catskill III, 846 F.3d at 506.
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extended into early 2015," followed by oral argument on December 1, 2015 in New
York City.' A divided panel issued its opinions in early 2017, reversing the SDNY
and reinstating the EPA's Rule.'
At the same time challenges to the Rule unfolded, briefing was underway in an
appeal of 1997-vintage litigation involving water transfers through the Klamath
Straights in Oregon." The Ninth Circuit's environmental bent is well known, and
some initially thought the court might follow its decision in Northern Plains Resources
Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Development Company, which involved the discharge of groundwater, clearly NPDES permissible-and therefore distinguishableactivity." At oral argument, however, the panel probed whether the transfer involved
waterbodies that are "meaningfully distinct."' The Ninth Circuit thus surprised no
one when it decided the case on its facts pursuant to Miccosukee and sidestepped the
EPA's Rule entirely."
THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
CHEVRON DOCTRINE.
Chevron concerns judicial deference to an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute when the agency administers the statute at
issue.' The reviewing court must initially detennine whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue." If Congress' intent is clear, "that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."" If, however, "the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the "question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.""
Challengers to the Rule argued that Congress unambiguously intended NPDES
program requirements to apply to water transfers." Defenders argued it never
occurred to Congress that water transfers might be considered "discharges of
pollutants" subject to the NPDES program, because Congress was focused on public
outcry over notorious municipal and industrial discharges-like the Cuyahoga River
fires-and was unaware of any water quality problems caused by water transfers.
Moreover, Congress did not even discuss water transfers, which are noticeably absent

83. See Reply Brief of Intervenor Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee City of New York,
Catskill III, 846 F.3d at 506 No. 14-1823-cv(L).
84. Argument Calendar, U.S. Ct. App. 2d Cir., http://ww2.ca2.uscourts.gov/calendar/index.
phpeID=809 (last accessed October 9, 2017).
85. Catskill III, 846 F.3d at 493-94.
86. ONRC Action v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, CIV. 97-3090-CL, 2012 WL 3526833
(D. Or. Jan. 17, 2012) reportand recommendation adopted sub nom, ONRC Action v. Bureau
of Reclamation, 1:97-CV-03090-CL, 2012 WL 3526828 (D. Or. Aug. 14, 2012).
87. 325 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003).
88. Oral Argument at 11:55, ONRC Action v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 798 F.3d 933
(9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-35831), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.phpPpkid-000001361
9.
89. ONRC Action v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 798 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir.
2015).
90. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 843.
94. See, e.g., Response Brief for Plaintiffs Trout Unlimited at 15-36, Response Brief for
Plaintiffs States of N.Y. et al. at 23-62, Catskill III, 846 F.3d 492 (No. 14-1823).
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from over 3000 pages of legislative history.' Furthermore, Western parties found it
inconceivable that Congress would knowingly apply NPDES requirements that could
frustrate the "'life blood' of the west" provided by 170 federal Bureau of Reclamation
projects it authorized and funded.'
In reversing the SDNY and reinstating the EPA's Rule, the Second Circuit distinguished its holdings in Caiskills l and II, concluding those decisions did not hold the
Clean Water Act to be unambiguous regarding water transfers.' The majority held:
At step one of the Chevron analysis, we conclude-as did the district courtthat the Clean Water Act does not speak directly to the precise question of
whether NPDES permits are required for water transfers, and that it is therefore necessary to proceed to Chevron's second step. At step two of the
Chevron analysis, we conclude-contrary to the district court-that the Water
Transfers Rule's intcrpretation of the Clean Water Act is reasonable. We
view the EPA's promulgation of the Water Transfers Rule here as precisely
the sort of policymaking decision that the Supreme Court designed the
Chevron framcwork to insulate from judicial second- (or third-) guessing .... The Act does not require that water quality be improved whatever
the cost or means, and the Rule preserves state authority over many aspects
of water regulation [including water allocations], gives regulators flexibility to
balance the need to improve water quality with the potentially high costs of
compliance with an NPDES permitting program, and allows for several altcrnative means for regulating water transfers.'
PLAIN MFANING. Challengers point out that section 301(a) states that "[eixcept as
in compliance with this [Act], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful" and that Congress defined "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."' While there are explicitly
prescribed exemptions in section 502(14) from the CWA's broad prohibition of point
source discharges, challengers point out there is no exemption for water transfers."
The dissenting judge in the Second Circuit, who would uphold the District
Court's decision to vacate and remand the Rule, similarly believed that the plain language of the Act is unambiguous and clearly expresses Congress's intent to prohibit
the transfer of polluted water from one water body to another distinct water body
without a permit-logic that parallels the earlier decisions of the Second Circuit in
Catskills I and II.o'
CLFAR STATEMENT RULE. Land and water uses are traditionally and primarily
state prerogatives, as long understood and applied by the federal and state
governments alike.o' The Supreme Court thus "ordinarily cxpectis a 'clear and

95. Sec S. COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 92D CONG., A LEGISlATIVE HISTORY OF THE
WATER POiuTiON CONTROL ACr AMENDMENTS OF 1972 (Comm. Print 1973); Federal Wa-

-

tcr Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977: HearingBefore the Subcomnim. on Euwtl. Pollution of Conun. on Enyt'l and Pub. Works, 95th Cong. (1977).
96. Brief of Intervenor Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. et al. at 11, Catskill III, 846 F.3d 492 (No. 14-1823).
97. Catskill III, 846 F.3d at 512.
98. Id. at500-01.
99. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1 3 11(a), 1362(12) (2012); sec e.g., Joint Brief for litcrvenor Plaintiffs
Appellecs Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida et al. at 2-3, Catskill III, 846 F.3d 492.
100. Response Brief for Plaintiffs Trout Unlimited et al. at 24, Catskill III, 846 F.3d 492.
101. Catskill I, 846 F.3d at 534 (ChinJ., dissenting).
102. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174
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manifest' statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into
traditional state authority."
Western interests argued that rather than expressing a desire to alter the federalstate balance in the Act, Congress chose to "recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States ... to plan the development and use ...
of land and water resources."" Consistent with this notion, Congress clearly expressed
its intent "that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its
jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired" by the Act, and
that nothing in the Act "shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to
quantities of water which have been established by any State."" Congress further
mandated that nothing in the Act shall "be construed as impairing or in any manner
affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including
boundary waters) of such States."'" The Supreme Court in Miccosukee stated
If we read the [Clean Water] Act to require an NPDES permit for every engineered diversion of one navigable water into another, thousands of new
permits might have to be issued, particularly by western States, whose water
supply networks often rely on engineered transfers among various natural water bodies. Many of those diversions might also require expensive treatment
to meet water quality criteria. It may be that construing the NPDES program
to cover such transfers would therefore raise the costs of water distribution
prohibitively, and violate Congress's specific instruction that "the authority of
each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired" by the Act."o
And, as explained above, water rights established by authority of the states would
be abrogated or impaired, contrary to 33 U.S.C. section 1251(g). Vacating the EPA's
Water Transfers Rule would therefore be contrary to the Court's "clear statement
rule."
The Second Circuit nonetheless rejected western arguments urging the court to
apply the "clear statement rule" of SWANCC and Rapanos to EPA's Rule, concluding "the case at bar presents no question regarding Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause, inasmuch as it is undisputed that Congress has the power to regulate navigable waters and to delegate its authority to do so.""
INTERSTATE ISSUES.
Western states fear NPDES requirements may
impermissibly abrogate interstate compacts, Supreme Court interstate water
apportionments, and Congressional acts if States are not able to use their full legal
entitlement to scarce water due to technically or economically impossible program
requirements that prevent the transfer of legally available water from one basin to
another.
The Second Circuit majority cited several provisions of the CWA, state statutory
and common law, interstate compacts, and international treaties raised that are alternatives to regulate pollution in water transfers in the absence of NPDES permitting. 9
(2001).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738.
33 U.S.C. S 1251(b) (2012).
Id. 1 2 51(g).
Id. § 1370.
Miccosukce, 541 U.S. at 108.
Catskill III, 846 F.3d at 518.
See, e.g., Catskill III, 846 F.3d at 529-31.
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ENFORCEMENT ISSUES.
If water transfers become subject to the NPDES
program, any water quality exceedances-even those resulting from natural processeswould expose Transferors to enforcement action and citizen suits."o Of particular
concern would be the possibility of an injunction prohibiting the operation of a water
transfer without an NPDES permit, which would deprive westerners of essential water

supplies."'
2
In addition, transferors would be exposed to citizen suits over water transfers."
The Northern District of New York, for example, imposed civil penalties of
$5,749,000 on New York City for a water transfer without an NPDES permit, and

calculated the maximum possible penalties at $63,249,000."
CONCLUSION
The EPA's Water Transfers Rule excludes water transfers from prohibitively
expensive NPDES permitting requirements that would supersede, abrogate, or impair
state water law and individual water rights essential to the West. The Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals upheld the Rule in 2009,"' while the Ninth Circuit subsequently
sidestepped the Rule when it opted to apply facts pursuant to Miccosukcc,"' and the
Southern District of New York (SDNY) vacated the Rule in part and remanded it to
EPA in 2014."

The Second Circuit, however, reversed the SDNY and reinstated the

Rule in early 2017."' Now, several of the plaintiff/appellee states have collectively
filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, as well as some of the New England environmental plaintiff-intervcnor/appellees."'
Supreme Court watchers and
prognosticators will look to predict whether the Supreme Court will deny certiorvi
because two circuits have deferred to EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act
and upheld the Rule, or agree with petitioners that there is a real split among the circuits and/or that the Second Circuit misapplied Chevron deference.
If the Supreme Court accepts an appeal, it could adopt one or more of several
lines of reasoning, or surprise everyone, like when it remanded Miccosukcc in 2004.
First, the Court could conclude that the Act is ambiguous and defer to EPA pursuant
to Chevron,"' although perhaps remanding the Rule for further consideration.
Second, the Court could conclude that NPDES permitting would raise the costs of
transfers prohibitively and violate Congress's specific instructions in the Act, consistent
with its dicta in Miccosukec.'" Third, the Court could take a states' rights approach,

building on SWANCC' and Rapanos," and potentially PUD No. 1,'` and S.D.

110. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365 (2012).
111. See id. § 1319(b).
112. Sccid. SS 1319,1365.
113. Scc Catskill I, 451 F.3d at 89 (discussing calculation error and.remanding to district
court to reduce maximum penalty to $62,725,000).
114. Fricnds of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1228.
115. Scc gcnerll' ONRC Action, 798 F.3d 933.
116. CatskillMountains Chapterof Trout Unlimited, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d at 567.
117. Catskill III, 846 F.3d at 533.
118. Petition for Writ of Certiorai, New York v. EPA, No. 17-418, 2017 WL 4174955
(U.S. filed Sept. 15, 2017); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, River Keeper, Inc. v. EPA, No. 17446, 2017 WL 4280573 (U.S. tiled Sept. 14, 2017).
119. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
120. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 108.
121. See generally Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Ct,., 531 U.S. 159.
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Warrenm and defer to the states. Alternatively, the Court could conclude that
NPDES permitting does not infringe on state authority, as lower courts read PUD No.
1 and S.D. Warren, and narrowly decide that the Act is unambiguous through a
technical statutory analysis and subject transfers to NPDES permitting. The Court
could also equally narrowly and technically conclude the Act unambiguously does not
apply the NPDES program to transfers.
The tide seems to have turned against blanket NPDES permitting of water transfers since the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lake Okeechobee. However, with the
Ninth Circuit's recent opinion that followed the Supreme Court's Miccosukec "test"
and the Second Circuit's reversal of the decision below and reinstatement of EPA's
Water Transfers Rule, there is at least an addendum to the story yet to be told.

122.
123.
124.

See generallyRapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
See PUD No. I ofJefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
See S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006).
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BOOK NOTE

Vandana Shiva, Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit, North
Atlantic Books (2016 reprint); 192 pp.; ISBN 978-1623170721.
In Water Wars: Privatization,Pollution and Profit, author Vandana Shiva'
explores the current challenges posed by the global commodification of water.
Shiva contends that the titular triad of causes has created inequitable water access, depriving local communities of control of this vital resource. The result
can often be conflict between local communities, states, and private corporations. Current international standards in water infrastructure and access have
created the crisis, but they prove inadequate to mitigate the growing problem.
Shiva recommends a return to democratic, local, and communal control of water to counter the global water crisis. Her book focuses on international examples illustrating the problems created by water privatization and suggests solutions that will return democratic control to water resources.
In chapter one, "Water Rights: The State, The Market, The Community,"
Shiva explores how water has changed from a common resource to a private
right. Historically, communities have seen water as a common, shared commodity. Individuals developed the idea that water is a natural human right,
arising out of basic human nature, needs, and conditions. This right arises independent from the state, and outside the reach of state control.
The American prior appropriation system, and Garret Hardin's Tragedy
of the Commons, marked a dramatic shift from communal rights. This new
school of thought placed the right to water with the state, which then has the
power to give that right over to private markets for use and administration.
Shiva asserts that globalization of the "lawlessness of the frontier" fails to account for regional hydrological and cultural differences. The results of global
privatization of water have been disastrous for people and the planet. By favoring capitalization of water resources, private markets can promote and incentivize pollution, allowing corporations to apply a monetary cost-benefit analysis i
weighing profits against irreparable damage to life and biodiversity.
Shiva contends privatization fails to account for the vital and usufructuary
nature of water. She calls for a return to the community right approach regarding water access. This means an end to private markets for this essential resource and returning control from the state to local community management.
Local community management recognizes the importance of a communal right
to water. For instance, historically in India, village committees managed water
according to the needs of the people. Committees operated inigation systems
day-to-day and could base compensations more on labor-put-in than by payment or substituted labor. In contrast, the central government had the limited
1. Vandana Shiva holds a doctorate in physics from the University of Punjab and is an internationally recognized environmental scholar and activist. She is a prolific writer who has written over a dozen books on modern environmental concerns.
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role of disaster mitigation, stepping in for local communities only when there
were floods, famines, or other calamities.
The chapter ends by proposing nine principles for returning to a community managed water system, which Shiva calls a "Water Democracy." These
principles recognize the basic underpinnings to a human right to water, protecting rights to clean water for all citizens from the inequalities created by water
sold as a market resource. These principles are: (1) water is nature's gift; (2)
water is essential to life; (3) life is interconnected through water; (4) water must
be free for sustenance needs; (5) water is limited and can be exhausted; (6) water
must be conserved; (7) water is a commons; (8) no one holds a right to destroy;
and (9) water cannot be substituted. Some principles, like 1, 3, and 8, are based
in morality. Others, like 2, 5, and 9, confront hard realities about the limits of
our consumption. Finally, principles 4 and 7 suggest changes to how we manage
water rights to achieve democracy. Together, these nine principles guide
Shiva's discussion on the failures of the current market regime and the benefits
of local community management throughout the book.
In chapter two, "Climate Change and the Water Crisis," Shiva explains how
climate change is unleashing the fury of water in the form of devastating floods,
cyclones, heatwaves and droughts. Shiva points to industrialization and deforestation as man-made causes for climate change. Greenhouse gases intensify
tropical rains, as rising sea level threatens coastal areas, and rising global ocean
temperatures create the perfect conditions for hurricanes and cyclones.
Shiva illustrates the effects of climate change with the increased frequency
and intensity of cyclones and hurricanes. She notes the link between conditions
favoring devastating storms, like warmer oceans, and carbon dioxide-induced
global temperature increases. Global trade also contributes to these events, as
in the case of shoreline mangroves in India. Shrimp farming operations have
destroyed this natural shield in pursuit of ever more profits, which allows cyclones to sweep inland undiminished causing widespread destruction to people
and communities.
Small coastal and island communities, particularly in third world countriesthose with the smallest roles in contributing to these environmental disastersare often the most affected. Shiva calls for immediate action by states and corporations to curb the effects of climate change and global development. This
means a global commitment to responsible and sustainable development in order to decrease the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
In chapter three, "The Colonization of Rivers: Dams and Water Wars,"
Shiva confronts the problems global proliferation of dams causes, and how they
manifest into physical conflict. Organizations like the World Bank often promote dam development, requiring countries to use their loans for dam development. This shifts control of water from local communities to central governments. People often react with violence when they are disenfranchised,
displaced, and facing scarcity and ecological disasters. States are not immune
either, with water increasingly being a point of concern in international disputes
and the rise of terrorist organizations.
The effects of dam projects on local communities are displacement, scarcity, and vulnerability to ecological disasters. First, construction of dams results
in widespread displacement of people unlucky enough to live in the dam's
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path-an occurrence that some activists have likened to genocide. People
fiercely resist displacement and loss of their homes and livelihoods, which often
brings them into violent conflict with the state. For example, eight people died
and thirty were injured protesting the Kariba Dam on the border of Zambia and
Zimbabwe, and the Guatemalan government killed 376 women and children to
make way for the Chixoy Dam.
- Second, dams also create scarcity and ecological impacts that lead to conflict. Although usually promoted as a solution for agricultural needs, flood control, and drought mitigation, Shiva illustrates that dams often have the opposite
effect. They disrupt the normal hydrological cycle, substituting it with poor human control. The author points to the Kabini project in India that submerged
six thousand acres of arable land, displacing locals to a nearby primeval forest.
Clear-cutting the forest led to decreased rainfall and siltation, clogging the dam.
Additionally, poor management of dams is often linked to flooding.
People displaced by dams, facing scarcity, and vulnerable to ecological disasters often become victims of, or retaliate with, violence when divested of a
right to water. They do not reap the supposed benefits of dams. Shiva suggests
that current models accounting only for economic costs for construction and
operations of dams, like those used by the World Bank, are inadequate to understand the true cost. When hidden costs of displacement, ecological destruction, and conflict are weighed, she believes that dams do not seem like such a
good deal.
Shiva reminds us that countries feel the pinch of dam proliferation as well.
Dams worsen existing tensions and can become the focus of international disputes. Demands for industrialization increase demand and lead to conflict For
example, dam development on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has been a consistent source of conflict between national governments in Turkey, Syria, and
Iraq, and ethnic Kurds living in Turkey and Iraq. Development by Turkey
threatens to cut eighty to ninety percent of Iraq's allotment of the Euphrates.
Darns have displaced Kurds, who have threatened to blow up dams in response.
Turkey sees this as an act of terrorism, and it has responded by threatening to
shut off all water to the region. The search for peace and food through dams
and water-intensive irrigation has left violence, hunger, thirst, and centralized
control of an essential resource in its wake.
As Shiva demonstrates, international and domestic water laws fail to adequately account for the political and ecological challenges of conflicts caused by
dams. For instance, they fail to mention the natural law of the water cycle. Projects like the Kabini Dam in India illustrate the danger of ignoring the natural
water cycle. The construction and resulting displacement and deforestation led
to siltation, reduced rainfall, and a loss of arable land for the local people. Players in dam disputes often struggle to see how much one group can take from
another, or how much environmental damages a group may endure to meet the
irrigation and energy needs of another.
Shiva proposes a change in the calculus used in determining the costs of
dams. Traditionally, governments see river diversions like dams as all benefits
and no costs. This assumes water not impounded is water wasted. But dams
are costlier than just construction and upkeep. Countries and international organizations like the World Bank need to acknowledge the hidden costs of the
conflict caused by dams, be they monetary, human, or ecological. Using the
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principle of water as a common right, Shiva emphasizes valuing existing uses,
not viewing them as wasted water. She also argues that requiring an ecological
impact assessment before construction would help expose environmental costs.
Chapter four, "The World Bank, WTO and Corporate Control Over Water," discusses the centralization of control over water. These organizations
promote public-private partnerships for administration of water infrastructure,
attracting private capital and curbing public-sector employment in developing
countries. The World Bank and WTO will often wrap requirements for private influence into aid packages or trade agreements with developing countries,
with loan terms favoring corporations over countries. Agreements typically ensure companies make a profit and insulate them from nationalization. Governments are supposed to save money and benefit from private development.
Theoretically, private companies encourage development and operate
more efficiently than-public municipal services. But Shiva contends pnvatization of infrastructure encourages scarcity. She recounts that these corporations
often focus on ensuring a profit, but do not focus on ensuring delivery of a
quality product. In Johannesburg, water becane unaffordable. Those who
could not pay were disconnected, leading to access issues, and quality tanked,
causing a spike in cholera infections. Despite this, loan conditions force developing countries, desperate for money, to agree to harsh lending conditions.
Shiva then explores the effect of the General Agreement on Trade Services
("GATS") on these issues. GATS promotes free trade and deregulation of industries, but companies can use GATS to challenge unfavorable domestic policies that prevent free market entry. In India, a law gave local tribal communities authority over resources, including the power to approve or reject
development projects and the authority to grant land. Foreign companies can
challenge this law under GATS and claim discrimination if local communities
exclude them from the market. Once allowed in, they can flood the market
and push out local competition. GATS allows foreign companies to subvert
domestic laws like India's under the guise of free trade.
The chapter culminates with the famous Bolivia-Bechtel conflict. There,
the World Bank recommended a private company, Bechtel, to take over municipal management in Cochabama, Bolivia. The company quickly increased
costs to the point where monthly water bills reached a fifth of the minimum
wage. Massive public protests led to clashes with the government and the institution of martial law. The people regained control of the water through expropriation, but the company has sued for lost profits.
Chapter five, "Food and Water," explores how modern agricultural techniques contribute to the water crisis. The move from traditional agriculture
techniques to a monoculture of cash crops led to ecological issues including
salinization and waterlogging. Part of the problem is the metric used to measure
success of a crop: modern agriculture favors more nutrition per unit of labor,
not unit of water. This fails to account for the ecological effects cash crops
bring.
In Shiva's view, both the type of crops and how they are grown contribute
to the problem. Cotton and sugarcane, for example, are huge water consumers
compared to traditional legumes in India. And industrial monoculture does
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not allow for interspersing with complementary crops, which help retain mois-

ture and protect the nutrients in the soil. Monoculture also inhibits the use of
pulse crops that grow in bursts in tandem with local hydrologic cycles. Instead,
modem agriculture leaves topsoil eroded and arable land salinized, while promoting water waste.
Shiva explains that GMOs are often touted as an answer, by breeding crops
resistant to drought or salinization. But this fails to address the root problem:
that industrial monoculture creates these issues. Again, Shiva says there is a
need to change the measurement. Industrial monoculture tries to economize
labor-the most production for the least amount of work. Values must shift,
from economizing labor to economizing water. One way to do this, Shiva suggests, is to trade industrial agriculture for traditional agricultural methods
adapted over centuries. This includes using pulse crops and crops adapted to
specific geographic regions, instead of trying to force monoculture of one crop
to unsuitable circumstances.
Chapter six, "Converting Scarcity into Abundance," lays down the blueprint
for shifting back to community-controlled, equitable, and sustainable water
management. Shiva characterizes this as a return to the basics, abandoning centralized and privatized control for traditionally decentralized, community based
water management schemes. She proposes the latter is more adaptable to the
changing availability of water in specific areas. Local control also gives the peQple most affected by changes in availability of water direct input on resource
management. Shiva points to how such collective decision-making has led to
sustainable choices and prevented conflicts over water in India. A decentralized, democratic approach to water returns power to the people and promotes
abundance with sustainable management.
In India, social organizations within villages traditionally managed water allocation. These systems were region specific: in some, volunteers maintained
irrigation systems. Others required those with more land to give more labor.
Organizations communally distributed water according to need, like the size of
a family, rather than according to the size of one's land. Communities considered water intensive plants like sugarcane irresponsible in drought prone regions. Even after the British had centralized water during colonization, these
localized methods were effective to water control and soil conservation and allowed people to survive droughts.
The final chapter, "The Sacred Waters," stands as an affirmation of the
essential nature of water. The culture of consumption has made it easy to forget
the deep connection people have historically shared with water. Shiva recounts
how every river in India is regarded as sacred, and the Ganges has long been
held as a purifying force, originating from the heavens. There is some truth in
this, as minerals in the Ganges, carried from tributaries high in the Himalayas,
contain antiseptic qualities that kill bacteria like cholera. Shiva wants to incorporate the historical sacredness of water into the modern day, with a plea to
shift our understanding of the value of water. Water needs to be valued not as
a commodity, but as a vital resource. Its value lies not in its price, but in its
sacred connection to the communities around it.
Water Wars is fantastic for getting a grasp on the scale and root causes of
the global water crisis. It provides a multitude of examples, backed up with
well-referenced hard evidence. Shiva puts forth a strong case that current global
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applications of a one size-fits-all privatization scheme for water is not working
as intended. Local hydrology, community needs, and traditional community
customs should also be taken into account.
But the proposed solutions do not always feel well fleshed out. Returning
to a completely community driven water system seems unrealistic. In a global
economy, some centralized control seems necessary for continued development. Shiva's central premise is that water should be a common resource, democratically and locally managed-a sort of small, independent laboratory approach. If that sounds familiar to United States readers, it should. After all,
states are the independent laboratories that created the priority system Shiva
decries. Perhaps there is a middle ground between private, centralized control,
and a universally democratic right to water. Nonetheless, Shiva's book proves
to be an essential read to anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the challenges in international water law and policy today.
Michael Larick

CASE NOTE
GRAND VALLEY WATER USERS Ass'N V. BUSK-IVANHOE, INC., 386 P.3D

452 (COLO. 2016).
I. INTRODUCTION
In the December 5, 2016 decision Grand Valley Water Users Association
v. Busk-Ivanhoe, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the Water Court
for Division 2's holding in a change of water rights case.' The Supreme Court
of Colorado ruled that: (i) a right to store water is not automatic with a direct
flow right; (ii) a right to store on the western slope does not imply a right to store
on the eastern slope; and (iii) water storage cannot occur prior to the water being
put to its beneficial use without an explicit or implied right written into the water
right decree.'
According to the Supreme Court of Colorado, in order to store water on
the eastern slope prior to being put to any beneficial use, diversion projects will
have to acquire storage rights or show an implied storage right within their decrees, regardless of when the decree is issued.' Although western slope and
environmental interests viewed the ruling as a victory,' the decision gave the
impression that it would likely stir up Colorado diversion and reservoir projects.
However, the Colorado Legislature muddied the waters for all interested parties
with the passage of recent bills that allow reservoir storage on the eastern slope.

II. BACKGROUND
A. PRIOR TO THE BUSK-IVANHOE DECISION: THE LAW IN COLORADO
Colorado water law allows water users to change the terms of their decrees.'
A water right holder may change the type, place, or time of beneficial use within
the water right's decree.' However, a water right may only be changed, not enlarged'-a rule which dates back to the nineteenth century.' To change a water

1.
2.

Grand Valley Water Users Assoc. v. Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc., 386 P.3d 452, 457 (Colo. 2016).
Id.

3.

Id.

4. Scc Karen Antonacci, Colo. Supreme Court water decision impact on Windy Gap Finning Projectunclear, TIMES-CALL (Jan. 7, 2017), http://www.timescall.com/longnont-local-news/ci
30710178/colo-supreme-court-water-decision-impact-windy-gap.
5. See H.B. 17-1248, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017); H.B. 17-1291, 71st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017).
6. Busk-Ivanhoe, 386 P.3d at 461; CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(5) (2016); see Strickler
v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 315-17 (Colo. 1891).
7. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(5).
8. Id.; see Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist.,
256 P.3d 645, 656-58 (Colo. 2011).
9. See Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. Southworth, 21 P. 1028, 1028-29
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right, a court must determine the historic consumptive use, a method of quanLifying the water beneficially consumed in an attempt "against rewarding wasteful
practices or recognizing water claims that are not justified by the nature or extent
of the appropriator's actual need.""
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: BUSK-IVANIIOE'S WATER RIGHTS

In the 1928 Garfield County District Court Case No. 2621 ("2621 Decree"
or "Decree"), A.E. and L.G. Carlton (the "Carltons") received an adjudicated
decree to the water rights at issue in Busk-Ivanhoe." The 2621 Decree granted
the Carltons the right to divert and transfer Colorado River Basin water across
the Continental Divide through the Ivanhoe Tunnel to the Arkansas River Basin, which was already over-appropriated." The Carltons put the water to beneficial use for supplemental irrigation. During this time, they stored the water
on the eastern slope in Sugarloaf Reservoir, where they rented, by volume, the
storage space from CF&I Steel Company and leased the water to High Line
Canal Company for supplemental irrigation." The 2621 Decree did not adjudicate storage on the eastern slope, though." In 1950, the Carltons sold the
Busk-Ivanhoe Water System water rights to High Line Canal Company, and
the company continued to store water in the Sugarloaf Reservoir and, later, in
Turquoise Reservoir." In 1972, it sold an undivided one-half interest in the
rights to the Board of Water Works of Pueblo ("Pueblo"), and in 1984, the
entity Busk-Ivanhoe incorporated and gained the remaining one-half interest in
the system water rights. The City of Aurora ("Aurora") purchased and now
owns the capital stock of Busk-Ivanhoe, acquiring the entity's one-half interest
in the water rights."
The Busk-Ivanhoe System involves the Lyle Ditch, the -Pan Ditch, the Hidden Lake Creek Ditch, the Ivanhoe Reservoir, and the Ivanhoe Tunnel. The
Decree granted absolute direct flow rights for waters from Ivanhoe Creek and
Lyle Ditch and conditional direct flow rights for waters from Pan Ditch and
Hidden Lake Creek Ditch." The Decree also granted an absolute right for
(Colo. 1889).
10. Busk-Ivanhoe, 386 P.3d at 462 (citing to Santa Fe Ranches Prop. Owners Assoc. v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54-55 (Colo. 1999)).
11. Id. at 457.
12. Id.; see Hal Simpson, Water Administration in Colorado, in ARKANSAS RIW'ER BASIN
WATER FORUM: A RIVFR OF DRI1\Ms AND REALITIES, INFORMATION SERIES No. 82 1, 69-70

(Colo. Water Res. Research Inst. ed., 1995).
13. Busk-Ivanhoc, 386 P.3d at 458.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The change in reservoir occurred during construction of the Frvingpan-Arkansas Project, where I ugh Line Canal Company contracted the arrangement with the Bureau of Reclamation. Sec gencraliv G. Moss DRISCOLL, FRONT RANGE WATER SUPPLY PIANNING UPDATE:
INCREASED STORAGE, INCREASED DEMANDS, INCREASEI) TRANSMOUNTAIN DIVERSION 6-12

(2011).
17.
18.
19.
20.

Busk-Ivanhoc, 386 P.3d at 458.
Id.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 458.
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storage of 1,200 acre-feet of water in the Ivanhoe Reservoir." The Ivanhoe
Tunnel carries both the direct flow water and the storage water to the eastern
slope, where it discharges the water in Lake Fork Creek." It is then diverted

and23used for 80,000 acres of supplemental irrigation in the Arkansas River Basin
In 1987, Busk-Ivanhoe began putting the water rights to municipal use in
Aurora." This changed the decreed supplemental irrigation rights in the Arkansas River Basin to an undecreed municipal use in the South Platte River
Basin.' At Aurora's request, Busk-Ivanhoe diverted the water rights through
the Ivanhoe Tunnel, stored it in the former Sugarloaf Reservoir, and then transferred the water through the Mount Elbert Conduit to Twin Lakes Reservoir."
The water then traveled through the Otero Pipeline to the Otero Pump Station,
leaving Water Division 2 and entering Aurora storage in Water Division 1."
Busk-Ivanhoe did not apply for a change in the place of use and the type of use
until 2009.28 Between 1987 and 2009, Busk-Ivanhoe used the water for its decreed supplemental irrigation use only once in the Arkansas River Basin."
C. CASE HISTORY
On December 30, 2009, the Engineer for Division 2 requested that BuskIvanhoe file the application to change the place of use and type of use of the
water rights.' The Engineer filed the application in the following divisions: (i)
Water Division 5, where Busk-Ivanhoe exported the water since its 2621 Decree; (ii) Water Division 2, where Busk-Ivanhoe imported the water to be put
it to its supplemental irrigation use; and (iii) Water Division 1, where BuskIvanhoe then stored the water and put it to municipal use from 1987 to 2009."
The courts consolidated the cases to Water Division 2, and in July 2013, the
water court held a five-day trial."
In May 2014, the Water Court for Water Division 2 outlined the historical
decreed supplemental irrigation use from 1928 to 1986.' It excluded the undecreed uses of the water from 1987 to 2009.' The water court concluded that
the 2621 Decree did allow lawful storage on the eastern slope because the Decree's reference to "supplemental supply" showed an intent to use the water for
supplemental irrigation when Arkansas River flows could not provide that use.`
21.
22.
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35.
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It concluded that storage was necessary "for the effective and beneficial use of
the water rights."' The water court viewed the instances within the Decree
where "direct irrigation" had been stricken and replaced with "direct flow" as
evidence that the water may not be immediately used for irrigation but may be
stored on the eastern slope. 7
The water court relied on extrinsic evidence of "a map and statement filed
with the State Engineer's Office that described a reservoir on the eastern slope
that the Carltons had proposed but never built and certain meeting minutes
marketing the water as 'reservoir water.'"" However, the court in 1928 that
adjudicated the Decree never saw this evidence.' The 2014 water court also
relied on the volumes of water used to pay for storage in the Sugarloaf and
Turquoise Reservoirs when it determined the historic consumptive use quantification. 0 Because it accepted that storage was necessary to beneficial use of the
water and relied on expert testimony that fees paid in volumes of water were
akin to evaporation or transit losses, the water court quantified the water rights
as 2,416 acre-feet per year."

m. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT RULING
"The right to change a water right is limited to that amount actually used
beneficially pursuant to the decree at the appropriator's place of use."" This
requires a water court to quantify the historic consumptive use of the decreed
water right." When Busk-Ivanhoe filed its application for the change in both
place and type of water right in 2009, the Court performed this analysis.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado looked at: (i) "whether storage
of the water on the eastern slope prior to use was lawful and therefore could be
included in the water court's historic use quantification"; (ii) "whether the volumes of water paid to rent such storage could be included in the quantification";
and (iii) "whether the water court properly excluded the twenty-two years of
undecreed municipal use from the representative study period used to quantify
the rights.""
A. TIE RIGHT TO STORE WATER IS NOT AN AUTOMATIC INCIDENT OF A
DIRECT FLOW RIGHT
The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the water court's holding that
Busk-Ivanhoe's storage rights on the eastern slope were lawful." The Court
stated that transmountain diversion has no effect on whether storage can occur."
36.
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A storage right does not come with a direct flow right." A right to store must be
"reflected, or at least implied, in the decree."' The Court relied on the 2621
Decree, which expressly included storage on the western slope prior to its journey across the Continental Divide, but did not include any language that would
allow storage on the eastern slope." This decimated the lower court's rationale,
which found an implied right to store on the eastern slope from the Decree's
language "supplemental." The Supreme Court determined the water court
erred when it concluded that storage of Busk-Ivanhoe rights on the eastern
slope prior to use for their decreed purpose was lawful."'
B. THIS RULING TIIEN SKEWED THE LOWER WATER COURT'S HISTORIC
CONSUMPTIVE USE QUANTIFICATION

A historic consumptive use quantification requires that the consumptive use
be lawful under its decree." When the water court incorrectly determined that
the eastern slope storage from 1928 to 1986 was lawful, it skewed the quantification." The water court included the rental fees paid to store the water rights
in Sugarloaf and Turquoise Reservoirs, which allowed for quantification of unlawful use."
C. THE WATER COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE UNJUSTIFIED
NON-USE OF THE WATER RIGI ITS BETWEEN THE YEARS 1987 AND 2009
The Supreme Court concluded the water court should have considered the
twenty-two year period when Aurora stored and used the water rights for undecreed municipal use in its historic consumptive use analysis. It determined this
was not an expansion of the water rights, but a replacement of the decreed rights
for undecreed rights.: The undecreed municipal use of water occurred instead
of its decreed purpose for supplemental irrigation." The Supreme Court remanded the case to the water court to determine if Aurora's non-use of the
supplemental irrigation use is unjustified. If it is determined to be unjustified
non-use, then it must be included in the historic consumptive use quantification
as zero-use.
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IV. DISCUSSION
Colorado's western slope water users have feuded with eastern slope users
for years.' In 1990, western slope interests challenged Pueblo's application for
a change of use for Pueblo's half of the Busk-Ivanhoe System." When Pueblo
sought the change of water rights from irrigation to municipal and industrial use,
the Water Court for Division 5 forced seasonal and volumetric limits on
Pueblo's half of the Busk-Ivanhoe System water." However, without similar
limitations, Aurora had been putting its half of the Busk-Ivanhoe System to municipal and industrial uses without first obtaining a change of use decree affirming that type of use.' In Busk-Ivanhoe, the ruling from the water court essentially allowed transmountain water to be stored without authorization and
muddled the legal distinction between direct flow rights and storage rights.'
However, the Supreme Court of Colorado clarified that the right to use is not a
right to store.
As a result, current and future Colorado water projects may be subject to
more contention as water users attempt to quench the thirst of the increasingly
populated eastern slope." One of these projects is the Windy Gap Firming
Project. When the Firming Project's owners received the 404(b) Clean Water
Act pernmit from the U.S. Arny Corps of Engineers in May 2017, western slope
interests and environmental groups filed a Petition for Review in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. 7 The Firming Project aims to build a
reservoir on the eastern slope to firn the yield of the existing Windy Gap Project."
The existing Windy Gap Project is a completed project involving the western slope Windy Gap Reservoir with conveyance of Colorado River water
through the Colorado-Big Thompson pipeline." The Bureau of Reclamation
("BOR") filed its Final Environmental Impact Statement for the existing Windy
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Gap Project in April 1981." Since its completion, it has not met its anticipated
firn yield due to junior water rights and a limited storage capacity." In December of 2011, BOR filed a Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Windy
Gap Firming Project." The Firming Project's goal is to firm the yield of the
original Windy Gap Project by building the eastern slope Chimney Hollow Reservoir for storage."
However, BOR acknowledged the lack of prepositioning storage rights in
its 2014 Contract." This lack of eastern slope storage rights mirrors the issue of
the recent Busk-Ivanhoe decision, where a transmountain direct flow right does
not grant a water user the right to store that water on the eastern slope before
putting it to its beneficial use. One significant difference between the BuskIvanhoe System and this new Firming Project is the amount of water subjected
to transmountain diversions.7 While Busk-Ivanhoe's average annual yield is
5,209 acre-feet, the new Firming Project purports to "deliver a firm annual yield
of about 30,000 acre-feet of water from the existing Windy Gap Project to meet
a portion of the water deliveries anticipated from the original Windy Gap Project and to provide up to 3,000 acre-feet of storage" on the eastern slope by
building the Chimney Hollow Reservoir." Since the original Windy Gap Project utilized mostly junior rights and could not transport the water effectively,
this amounts to more diversions from the already-depleted Colorado River."
Western slope interests, particularly in Grand County, have voiced opposition
to the Firming Project throughout its planning process."
The Municipal Subdistrict of Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Northern") is in charge of the Firming Project." While its general manager Erik Wilkinson stated in a news article that staff members are researching
to determine if the Busk-Ivanhoe decision poses a water rights issue for the
Finning Project, Northern's Spokesman Brian Werner said in the week following the Supreme Court decision that it should not significantly impact the Firming Project.' The Firming Project's 2014 Contract, however, states:
1

IS] hould a court conclude that Prepositioning is not consistent with applicable
law, future Windy Gap Firming Project operations shall not include Preposi-

70. Id. at 5.
71. WINDY GAP FIRMING PROJECT FEIS, supra note 68, at 6.
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74. 2014 CONTRACT, supra note 69, at 4.
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77. Id.
78. See DAVID OWEN, WHERE THE WATER GoEs: LIFE AND DEATH ALONG THE
COLORADO RIVER 52-64 (2017); Press Release, Save the Colorado, Climate Change Be
Dammed, Army Corps Decides to Further Drain Colorado River (May17, 2017), http://savethe
colorado.org/press-release-climate-change-be-damned-amy-corps-decides-to-further-drain-colorado-river/.
79. See generallyWINDY GAP FIRMING PROJECT FEIS, supra note 68, at 14-18.
80. Id. at 5.
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tioning unless the appropriate authority is obtained by the [Municipal Subdistrict of Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District]. The Secretary shall
have no obligation to obtain any such authorizations."

This language suggests that in the event the Finning Project violates Colorado water law, Northern must acquire the rights to store on the eastern slope
because it owns the Firming Project." This also protects the BOR from any
responsibility to obtain those water rights."
After Busk-Ivanhoe, and despite Northern's assertion that the Firming Project's water way is crystal clear, one can only conclude that construction of the
Chimney Hollow Reservoir on the eastern slope would violate Colorado water
law.' After Busk-Ivanhoe, Northern is required to first obtain the right to store
the water from a water court prior to the construction of the Chimney Hollow
Reservoir." Werner stated the Finning Project's intent to store the water always
7
existed, whether on the eastern or western slope.1 But the original Windy Gap
Project never intended to not meet its finn yield, so an implied intention to
store on the eastern slope seems unlikely-unless Northern knew all along that
it would not meet its finn yield, which raises ethical and feasibility questions
about the purpose in the original Windy Gap Project altogether.' Under this
new Supreme Court ruling, Northern will have to prove its implied intention to
store on the eastern slope or apply for a change of water right."
However, a new crinkle emerged in the 2017 Colorado Legislative session.
The House of Representatives pushed through two house bills that support the
Firming Project." House Bill 17-1248 authorized the Colorado Water Conservancy Board to "make loans in the amount of up to $90,000,000" from the
fund for the Firming ProjecL The House passed House Bill 17-1248 on April
27, with the Senate following suit on May 9." Then, the House passed House

Bill 17-1291, which:
allows a water right for which the historical consumptive use was previously
quantified to be stored in any reservoir, without the necessity of adjudicating
an additional change of water right, if: the water will be diverted from a point
of diversion that has already been decreed for that water right; previous notice
is given to the division engineer; transit and ditch losses are assessed from the
decreed point of diversion to the alternate place of storage; and the division

82. 2014 CONTRACT, supra note 69, at 32.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Busk-Iinhoc, 386 P.3d at 470.
87. Antonacci, supra note 4.
88. Sec id.; sec generall WINDY GAP FIRMING PROJEcr FEIS, supra note 68, at 7-8.
89. Sec Busk-Iannhoc, 386 P.3d at 470.
90. H1.B. 17-1248, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017); II.B. 17-1291, 71st Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017).
I.B. 17-1248.
91.
92. Coloi'ado Water Conservation Board Construction Fund Pifect - IIB 17-1248, THE
DENVER POST, http://extras.denverpost.conVapp/bill-trackei/Ibills/2017a/hb 17-1248/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2018).
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engineer approves the proposed accounting of the storage."

Passed in the House on April 24, 2017, and the Senate on May 3, 2017,
this Bill essentially demolishes the Supreme Court ruling in Busk-Ivanhoe." It
allows a water right holder to store water in any reservoir without needing to
apply for a change of water right." So long as a water right holder had a historical
consumptive use to store water in a reservoir, it can store it elsewhere if it fits
the above stipulations."
As these bills become law, the Firming Project will steadily flow its way to
constructing the new eastern slope reservoir. As the Firming Project has already
received approval from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers through the issuance
of the 404(b) Clean Water Act penit, construction is anticipated to begin
sometime in the near future." However, while the fate of Busk-Ivanhoe is still
unclear, the western slope interests suffered a small defeat in their battle to
maintain, what they perceived to be, the health of Colorado's river systems.
Kelsey Holder
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LEGISLATIVE REPORTS
ARIZONA

S.B. 1412,53rd Leg. IstReg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017) (requiring small water rights
claims to be adjudicated last in the adjudication of the Gila River system).
This report addresses the origin and effect of Arizona Senate Bill 1412 ("SB
1412"). Passed in 2017, the bill rehabilitates invalidated legislation pertaining
to the conditions for small water use claims and the established order for decreeing all Gila Adjudication water claims. The Gila Adjudication determines
thousands of water rights claims and the determination of those rights must be
in accordance with SB 1412.
In 1995, the Arizona legislature attempted to streamline its water claims
adjudication process with the enactment of Arizona Revised Statute section 45258 and the intention for a Superior Court to issue a comprehensive decree of
water rights for both the Gila River system and Little Colorado River system.
The general adjudication process determines the extent, nature, and relative
priority of decreed water rights to thousands of users and right holders in the
Gila and Colorado River systems.
The need for streamlined adjudication arose from the fact that "[tihe Gila
River and Little Colorado River Adjudications comprise of more than 75,000
claims on nine subwater sheds, including sixteen Indian reservations, numerous
national forests, parks and wilderness areas, and the metropolitan areas of Pheoenix, Tucson, and Flagstaff."' The Gila Adjudication proceedings commenced with a 1974 petition to the Arizona State Land Department, which resulted in 960,000 summonses served on all landowners in the Gila Basin
between 1979 and 1986.' Arizona Revised Statutes section 45-258 provided a
summary adjudication process for de minimis water use claims intending to free
up judicial resources for larger water use claim proceedings. The court summarily adjudicated all de minimis uses of a river system or source and removed
them from further participation in the adjudication process. Objections to
those determinations were only available after the final grant of a decreed right.
The United States and several Native American tribes argued that provisions of section 45-258 violated due process and separation of powers. The
Superior Court of Arizona reasoned that the summary adjudication of de mmimis water use claims infringed on the judiciary's power to hear and decide water
rights based on the evidentiary presentation of a water right holder's beneficial
use and therefore violated separation of powers. The court further held that the

1. See Richard M. Morrison, State and Federal Law in Conflict Over Indian and Other
FederalReserved Water Rights, 2 DRAKEJ. OF AGRI. L. 1, 6-8 (1997) (discussing the history of
the Gila Adjudication).
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de minimis provisions violated due process because they "delayed the deterimination of the cumulative impact of de minumnis uses in a watershed until after a
final decree," which effectively robbed the water users of a fair hearing and opportunity to be heard.' However, the court upheld the section 45-258 provision
that allows the director of the Arizona Department of Water Resources to "propose to the court or Special Master water right attributes for each individual
water right claim or use investigated in the director's report"
. In the spirit of the invalidated provisions within Arizona Revised Statute
section 45-258, Senator Griffin (Republican, Majority Whip, District 14) sponsored SB 1412 to reduce litigation costs associated with the adjudication process
and expedite the general stream adjudication. SB 1412 repeals the de minimis
summary adjudication provisions of Arizona Revised Statute section 45-258,
and provides a sequential process for hearing all water rights claims. Under the
bill, small water use claims are decreed only after the determination of all other
water use claims.
The bill defines small water use claims as those for stockponds smaller than
fifteen acre feet, groundwater wells with maximum pumping capacities of thirtyfive gallons per minute, and stock watering uses either from naturally occurring
bodies of water or developed facilities that are not stockponds or reservoirs.
The original bill put federal water claims-including those of several tribesfirst in the sequential adjudication order. It put state water claims that do not
qualify as small water use claims second. Finally, it put small water use claims
last. Senator Griffin asserted that the bill allows those with multiple water use
claims to have their small water use claims decided in conjunction with their
other water use claims, which results in a system that determines larger claims
before all other claims. It also allows parties to submit settlements reached
during the adjudication to the court or the master for approval. Accordingly,
SB 1412 provides claimants with options for efficiency on a claim-by-claim basis
because if a settlement can be reached, or multiple claims determined at once,
the general adjudication proceedings can move forward to another one of the
thousands of claims that must yet be determined.
In the Senate committee hearing, Bass Aja, a lobbyist for the Arizona Cattleman's Association, opined that the deferral of small water claims in any one
sub-watershed would help alleviate the claimant's legal fees and determine the
actual quantity of water that remained. Aja noted that larger claims usually require information gathering over months or even years, which means that any
court proceedings for small water use claims during the same period of time
cannot even accurately decree rights. This forces claimants to waste both time
and money. A main.opponent to the bill, the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona,
which represents all twenty-one tribes in Arizona, argued that the small water
use claim deferrals would cause delay in the long run because of the many unresolved constitutional questions as to the legislature's ability to direct the court
on the order of hearing claims.
The success of a streamlined small water uses claim adjudication process
can potentially improve the judicial and economic efficiency of adjudications
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that are meant to create a comprehensive system of decreed water claims in the
Gila River system and Little Colorado River system. These adjudications have
a history of contention between claimants and this new bill encourages claimants
to reach settlements that the courts would recognize and to resolve multiple
claims at once. This could result in a significant reduction in the expenditure
of time, money, and resources in the Gila Adjudication.
Camille Agnello
COLORADO

H.B. 17-1233, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (expanding
the application of current state law that prevents water saved in a governmentsponsored water conservation program from reducing historical consumptive
use).
House Bill 17-1233 ("HB 1233"), tided Protect Water Historical Consumptive Use Analysis, accomplishes three objectives: (1) to expand application
of a preexisting law to water Divisions 1, 2, and 3; (2) to clarify that participation
in a government-sponsored program includes water conservation pilot programs; and (3) to limit state agencies that can approve a water conservation program to only those with explicit statutory jurisdiction over water conservation or
water rights. Democratic House Representative Jeni Arndt of District 53, located in water Division 1, and Republican Senator Larry Crowder of District
35, located in water Division 2, introduced HB 1233 in the House on March 7,
2017. The House approved the bill on March 24, the Senate approved an
amended version on April 17, and Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper
signed HB 1233 on May 3.
A historical consumptive use analysis is part of a proceeding to change a
water right. A water right owner may only change that right up to the amount
of water historically consumed for a beneficial use. Prior to HB 1233, Colorado
law provided that in water Divisions 4, 5, and 6, historical consumptive use analyses were not to consider reduction in water usage resulting from participation
in a government-sponsored water conservation program. In the initial draft of
HB 1233, the sponsors sought to apply this rule to all seven of Colorado's water
divisions. However, at the Senate second reading, the Senate passed Senator
Crowder's proposed amendment to remove water Division 7 of southwestern
Colorado from the bill. Senator Crowder explained that feedback from the
representative from that water division led him to propose the amendment
Sponsors introduced HB 1233 with the same legislative intent as the sponsors of Senate Bill 13-019, 69th Gen. Assemb.,1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013), the
bill that established this protection for water right owners in Divisions 4, 5, and
6. Both bills sought to grant water right owners some relief from the "use it or
lose it" system. The sponsors brought HB 1233 not as an environmental initiative but as an agricultural one, aimed at providing Colorado farmers wanting
to participate in voluntary pilot programs with peace of mind that their water
rights would not be diminished. At the hearing before the House Agricultural,
Livestock, and Natural Resources Committee, Representative Arndt summarized HB 1233's objectives to "protect private property rights and agriculture,"
"add certainty," and "consolidate other legislation" so farmers could feel confident pointing to this bill to protect their rights. An example that came up several
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times throughout the hearing process involved a conservation pilot program in
the town of Gilcrest, located in water Division 2. The pilot program encourages
farmers to pump their well water to help combat flooding caused by high ground
water levels. However, testimonials explained that farmers would pump water
but were still hesitant to reduce use of surface water rights. The sponsors asserted HB 1233 could help instill confidence in farners to participate in this
program and use well water rights instead of their surface water rights.
Opposers on the House Committee expressed concerns that the bill was
"overkill" and that it would be better to wait on more complete feedback from
pilot programs like the one in Gilcrest to see if expanding the bill to the other
divisions was appropriate. The sponsor and witnesses conceded the protections
offered in HB 1233 are arguably provided in other legislation, but they defended the bill as a "belt and suspenders" measure and as "another tool in the
toolbox" to provide peace of mind to farmers. Testimonials in support of the
bill included the Nature Conservancy, Special Advisor for Water Policy to the
Governor, Colorado Water Trust, Colorado Water Congress, and an Arkansas
Valley farmer. HB 1233 passed this committee with eight votes in favor and
five opposed.
Opposers on the Senate Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Energy Committee expressed concern that the bill harmed water users on Colorado's eastern plains by "not being able to quantify [their] historic use" and asserted that
water divisions would have come forward if they wanted to be included in the
law. A representative from the Colorado River Water Conservation District,
which covers Divisions 4, 5, and 6 where the law is in effect, spoke in support
of the measure, explaining that the system has worked in these divisions and
could work in others areas. HB 1233 passed this committee with six votes in
favor and five opposed.
The passing of HB 1233 provides a clear legislative reference to help assure
water right owners that participating in government-sponsored water conservation programs will not jeopardize their property rights. While it does have an
environmental element to protect conservation, it does not guarantee that water
will not be used. If one user conserves water, the next-priority user can still take
it out of the river. The bill's protections even have the potential to result in
more depletion of the river when a change does occur than without the bill.
Upon a change, if an owner's historical consumptive use includes water saved
in a conservation program, the formerly conserved water that had not left the
river because of the conservation could then be removed from the river and
used consumptively after the change. However, regardless of this bill, owners
of conserved water can always stop conserving and use the full extent of their
water. Without the bill, this risk exists until the water rights are changed, because the actual historical consumptive use limits future use, but because the
bill does not count conserved water against the historical consumptive use analysis, the risk remains even after a change. But, in exchange for this risk, the bill
encourages conservation. Nevertheless, the bill does have the potential to be a
useful tool for entities that work to manage water conservation and water rights
in Colorado to help influence and balance water use in the best interest of water
right owners and the public.
Elaine Nolen
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HB 17-1219, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (concerning a
pilot program to temporarily lease agricultural water rights by fallowing irrigated
land for use by municipalities, other agriculture, environmental purposes, industry, or recreational interests).
House Bill 17-1219 ("HB 1219") came before the 2017 Regular Session of
the General Assembly to extend the number of pilot projects and the timeline
established by House Bill 13-1248. This 2013 bill was enacted to meet the
Colorado Water Plan's goal of securing 50,000 acre feet in Alternative Transfer
Methods ("ATMs") in a way that provides certainty for agricultural water rights
holders while allowing flexibility in water uses.
HB 13-1248, passed in May of 2013, created a pilot program controlled by
the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") to establish up to ten
lease-fallow pilot projects temporarily transferring agricultural water rights to
municipal water users for up to ten years. A maximum of three of these pilot
projects could be in each of the four major river basins-the South Platte, Arkansas, Rio Grande, and Colorado river basins. Those wishing to sponsor a
pilot project must also pay a $500 application fee to CWCB, spaced out over
five years, alongside annual participation fees.
The CWCB produced criterion and procedures for the Lease-Fallowing
Tool. Lease-fallowing is a voluntary ATM tool which allows several agricultural
water rights holders to lease a portion of their water and dry-up a part of their
land on a rotational basis. By leasing, rather than selling their water right, farmers retain ownership of their water right and can rest a portion of their land to
improve soil quality or make improvements. In 2015, Senate Bill 198 expanded HB 12-1248 to allow for other end uses, such as other agricultural uses
or environmental and recreational uses. The application deadline was set for
December 31, 2018, and the pilot program was scheduled for completion by
2029. At the end of pilot, the CWCB and state engineer would issue a report
on the results to the water resources review committee. As of July 2017, only
one pilot project, the Cadin Project in the Arkansas river basin, had been approved.
Representative Jeni Arndt (Democrat, Assistant Majority Caucus Chair,
District 53) and Representative Barbara McLachlan (Democrat, District 59) cosponsored the bill and introduced it in the House Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock, and Natural Resources on March 20, 2017. When it reached the
Senate, the bill received bipartisan support from Senator Kerry Donovan
(Democrat, District 5) and Senator Larry W. Crowder (Republican, District

35). The Senators presented HB 1219 in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Energy on April 6, 2017, where it passed unanimously without amendments. Governor Hickenlooper signed the bill into law
on May 3, 2017, and it took effect on August 9, 2017.
The bill extended the Lease-Fallow pilot program by authorizing the
CWCB in conjunction with the state engineer to approve as many as fifteen
pilot projects, with no more than five projects in any of the four major river
basins listed above. The bill extended the deadline for applications from 2018
to December 31, 2023, requiring any projects to finish by 2034. The goal of
HB 13-1248, and by extension, HB 1219, was to make it easier for agricultural
water rights holders to realize value from their water rights when fallowing their
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land, and to preserve their historical consumptive use. The Lease-Fallow Program was intended to be an alternative to "buy-and-dry," where municipalities
purchase agricultural water rights permanently. This voluntary pilot program is
flexible by design, acknowledging that Colorado is a local control state with differing factual scenarios and circumstances in every water basin.
Even though the deadline of HB 13-1248 was still another year out, the
sponsors of HB 1219 reasoned that this is necessary because while only one
project is currently underway, the time it took to establish the project, get approval, and get it off the ground was considerably lengthier than originally supposed. They felt that many agricultural producers would not want to go through
such a great effort in such a brief duration. Additionally, because this program
was untested, many producers and end users alike took a "wait-and-see" approach to the program, carefully watching how the Catlin Project worked out.
Further, the expansion of end uses created by SB 198 was only introduced two
years ago, which did not give new end users much time to explore utilizing the
Lease-Fallow Program. The success of the Catlin Project over the past two
years, along with the expansion of potential end uses, has increased interest in
participating in the Lease-Fallow Program, and the sponsors of HB 1219 felt
that extending the deadlines and number of allowed projects could generate
more projects.
HB 1219 received support from many stakeholders, including the Lower
Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District, area farmers, current participants
in the Catlin Pilot Project, the Colorado Farn Bureau, the Colorado Water
Congress, the Nature Conservancy, and the Colorado Audubon Society. Supporters understood that farmers, who own eighty-six percent of Colorado's water, are being targeted by growing municipalities to meet increasing water demands. Cities, however, do not want to continue to buy-and-dry agricultural
water rights, and are willing to pay fanriners $500 an acre foot to lease water
available from those faners fallowing portions of their land. One supporter
noted that while cities could buy the sane water outright for $2,000, they want
to preserve fanning in Colorado. This trend towards leasing is likely to gain
momentum as more cities recognize that it is politically incorrect to "buy-anddry" farmland.
Advocates of the bill pointed out that while there have been other unsuccessful attempts at lease-fallowing, those programs put the municipalities in control. This program, however, keeps the water firmly in the control of the farnmers. Doing so helps protect local agricultural economies, and the money
farmers receive from lease-fallowing can be used to improve their land and
ditches, and to purchase machinery for new methods of irrigation implementation. Essentially, lease-fallowing can be seen as another crop for farmers. The
Lease-Fallow Program simply provides fanners with a new option for realizing
value from their water rights. It also protects downstream water rights owners
from injury and assists farners by providing flexibility in ways they can use their
water.
There was concern expressed by a handful of people in the House and
Senate Committees about extending a pilot program that had yet to run its
course and had only generated a single pilot project. There was also concern
about the "first-come-first-serve" application process unduly favoring older,
more established water rights holders.
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In response to those concerns, farmers currently involved with the Catlin
Project testified that when HB 13-1248 was passed, they thought there would
be sufficient time to get the project approved and underway, but they were met
with considerable opposition. This opposition required additional engineering
and legal work to address the issues brought up regarding the project. Two
additional municipalities have expressed interest for other projects, but it takes
time to get through all the necessary engineering and paperwork. If the deadline
had not been extended, those projects would be unlikely to get final approval
before the 2018 application deadline.
The Lease-Fallowing Program protects agricultural communities. As Colorado cities continue to grow, they will meet their water demands by buying
water rights unless an alternative, like the Lease-Fallowing Program, is available.
Leasing the water, rather than selling it, allows farmers to maintain ownership of their water. By treating the lease as a crop on the fallowed land, the
farmer continues to make money, and the fallowed land requires less input
(such as fertilizer) both during the fallowing and into the future. One farmer
testified that Lease-Fallowing is a "win-win situation."
The success of the Catlin Pilot Project over the past two years has created
increased interest from those who would like to become involved in a LeaseFallow project. However, due to the lengthy approval and negotiation process,
more time and space was required. The passage of HB 1219 allowed that additional time and space. Cities recognize the value of agriculture and want to
establish a cooperative relationship that benefits farmers while still obtaining the
water these growing municipalities require. HB 1219 did not change the permissive nature of the Lease-Fallowing Pilot Program, but merely granted more
time and space for this creative approach to. produce results.
Alexandra Tressler
HB 17-1190, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (concerning
the limited applicability of the Colorado Supreme Court decision in St Jude's

Co. v. RoaringFork Club, LLC, 351 P.3d 442 (Colo. 2015)).
House Bill 17-1190 ("HB 1190") came before the First Regular Session of
the Seventy-First Colorado General Assembly as a bipartisan effort to clarify
lingering uncertainty regarding the validity of water decrees for aesthetic, recreational, or piscatorial purposes in effect before the Colorado Supreme Court
announced its decision in St Jude's Co. v. RoaringFork Club in 2015.
In St. Jude's, the Court held that the Roaring Fork Club's diversion of water
for aesthetic, recreational, and piscatorial uses did not qualify as "beneficial
uses" under Colorado water law. Consequently, the legitimacy of hundreds of
previously decreed water rights for recreational, aesthetic, or piscatoral purposes were brought into question.
HB 1190 was proposed to answer this question. Although the bill went
through several iterations before passage, it was generally hailed as a consensus
effort, even including the perspectives of both the prevailing and the losing attorneys from the St Jude's decision. The bill's sponsors asserted that it was
designed to protect decreed water rights in Colorado by limiting the Court's
interpretation of "beneficial use" to only apply to decrees made after the court
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announced its decision in St. Jude's, and thus protecting decrees that were already established before that decision. In doing so, the bill does not create any
new rights or alter the Court's ruling in SI. Jude's. It merely declares that all
recreational water rights decreed before the St. Jude's ruling are valid and may
be relied upon. This allows water users to proceed with the clarity and the
certainty that they will not lose their already existing water rights.
Representative KC Becker (Democrat, Majority Leader, District 13) initially sponsored the bill when she introduced it into the House Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Natural Resources in March of 2017. When the bill
made its way into the Senate it had bipartisan sponsorship from Senator Jerry
Sonnenberg (Republican, President Pro Tempore, District 1). Both the House
and the Senate passed the bill and Governor Hickerlooper signed it into law
on May 25, 2017.
The final bill looks significantly different than it did upon introduction. Its
first draft contained three subsections. Subsection (a)-essentially what remains
of the bill-addressed those recreational uses which were already decreed, or
for which a claim was pending, prior to the Court's ruling in St.Jude's. Subsection (b) announced that the bill applied to direct-flow appropriations, without
storage, made after July 15, 2015 for "water diverted from a surface stream into
a private ditch on private property for aesthetic, recreational, and piscatorial
purposes." Subsection (c) declared that nothing in the bill was intended to affect
existing statutory authority regarding in-stream flow water rights and recreational
in-channel diversion rights. On second reading in the House, subsection (c)
was amended to state that nothing in the bill was intended to create any new
water rights, and a fourth subsection, (d), was added to declare the bill was not
intended to affect existing statutory authority for appropriation of water rights
for parks and wildlife purposes.
The bill's supporters stated that subsections (b) through (d) were intended
to allay any suspicions that the bill had nefarious purposes, or that it was trying
to expand or create new water rights in Colorado. Eventually, these subsections
were removed, with the Senate amendments favoring a much more simplistic
bill. Opposing committee members and groups expressed great concern over
the wording in subsection (b), noting that the bill may be construed to only apply
to "water diverted ... into a private ditch on private property." A representative
for the Water Rights Association of the South Platte, a group that primarily
represents irrigation districts along the South Platte, expressed concern about
the "unintended consequences" of this language because by specifically addressing private ditches on private property, it appeared to create new rights for public entities. The representative said this language could potentially allow new
water rights with aesthetic, recreational, and piscatorial uses for certain municipal or other public entities. Despite the following subsection (c) stating the bill
did not create any new water rights for beneficial uses for private or public entities, the Association (and others opposing the bill) found this language deeply
troubling.
The Senate removed this "ambiguous language" and made a few other
changes, which also limited subsection (a). These amendments removed language that sheltered "pending applications" from the St. Jude's ruling. The
Senate removed this wording, as both supporters and those opposing the bill
agreed that the purpose of paragraph (a) was to protect decreed water rights,
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and pending applications that had not been previously adjudicated by the water
court should therefore not receive the same protection as existing decreed water
rights.
After these changes, what remained of the bill was (what was originally) subsection (a). It provided a clear legislative assurance of the validity and preservation of those previously decreed existing water rights that were for aesthetic,
recreational, and piscatorial uses. The final bill also protects conditional water
rights-rights that have been filed with and decreed by the water court prior to
actual use while securing an earlier priority. This bill ensures that owners of
conditional water rights for aesthetic, recreational, and piscatorial uses will not
face objections based on the St.Jude's ruling when they return to the water court
for diligence or perfection.
The final bill was designed to preclude an overly broad application of the
St. Judes Co. ruling and to protect recognized rights. While the parties involved did not agree on everything-as reflected in the multiple amendmentsin the end, HB 1190 was a bipartisan consensus effort to address an area of law
that had been left unsettled'by the Court's St. Jude's ruling.
Megan McCulloch
H.B. 17-1291, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (allowing
water users to store water in a place of storage not listed on the decree if the
historical consumptive use of the water right has been quantified in a previous
change).
House Bill 17-1291 ("HB 1291") has also been called the "Another Reservoir on the Ditch" bill. Co-sponsored by House Representatives J. Arndt
(Democrat, Assistant Majority Caucus Chair, District 53), J. Becker (Republican, District 65), and Senator D. Coram (Republican, District 6), the bill was
introduced to the House on March 24, 2017, and signed into law by Governor
Hickenlooper on June 5, 2017. Without any lobbyists or other organizations
involved in its preparation, the bill was recognized by legislators and the public
alike as a "common-sense" piece of legislation. The bill allows water users to
store previously quantified water in an alternate place of storage not listed on
their decree without going through water court in certain circumstances.
The benefits of HB 1291 are only available to water users who want to store
their decreed water in alternate storage on the same ditch or diversion system
(including in nontributary aquifers). The water that qualifies under the bill is
limited. It must be attributable to a water right that: (i) has gone through a judicially approved change; (ii) has been decreed for storage; and (iii) has a quantified historical consumptive use. Additionally, the water must be diverted at a
point of diversion already decreed for that water right-it cannot be imported
from another division-and any applicable transit and ditch losses must be assessed against the water right.
This alternate place of storage is approved administratively, but if someone
claims injury, the process returns to water court. The water user must notify
the division engineer of the water right, the alternate place of storage, the decreed point of diversion, and the accounting of the storage in the alternative
place of storage. The division engineer must then approve the change. Other
than the changed place of storage, all other terms and conditions of the previous
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water right decree apply to the water right. If any person who is entitled to claim
injury from the changed place of storage does so, the application will be brought
in water court for a de novo hearing, thus preserving the rights of other users
along the ditch or diversion system while otherwise streamlining the change process.

The bill grew from a recognition that applying for new storage rights on
decreed water within the same ditch or diversion system is unnecessarily costly,
rigid, and risky for water users. The ability to store water is essential for water
users to control augmentation, recharge, and application. Before the bill's passage, the law allowed water "to be stored only at a location specifically identified
in a decree" and required people to make a change to their water right in water
court. Yet many users could not independently develop storage because of the
associated water court costs. Users who could not afford water court could either depend on auxiliary storage provided by other entities or not always fully
utilize their decree. Users such as the Arkansas Groundwater Users Association
("AGUA") depended on space in existing reservoirs for year-to-year storage,
running the risk that their water would simply run downstream when flows exceed storage capacity.
During the legislative process, Chris Treese of the Colorado River Water
Conservation District ("CRWCD") and others recognized HB 1291 as "that
mythical, short, two-page, common-sense water bill that deserves support," and
accordingly, it was passed without any "No" votes. In the House Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock, & Natural Resources hearing, witnesses supporting the
bill represented the City of Fort Collins, AGUA, the CRWCD, and various
other organizations. The original bill text lacked the specific language that preserved the rights of injured users, limited the water to the same ditch or diversion system and water division, and specified that all other terms and conditions
remained the same. Those shortcomings were addressed by amendment L.001
which clarified that the new or changed reservoir is along the same ditch or
diversion system, preserved due process for water users claiming injury, and
prevented the bill from being used for water imported from another division.
Trout Unlimited, a conservation organization, supported the amendment and
proposed additional language to assure that all other terns and conditions other
than the change in storage continue to apply. The House adopted this language
on Second Reading through amendment L.005.
In addition to making the lives of Colorado water users easier, HB 1291
also has some potential to help Colorado reach its water storage capacity goals
as outlined in the Colorado Water Plan. The Water Plan aims to develop
400,000 acre-feet of storage by 2050. While the future storage that will be developed through HB 1291 will likely be relatively small, it will contribute to

Colorado's ongoing commitment to develop more water storage statewide. This
additional storage in traditional reservoirs and nontributary aquifers will help
water users and managers be more flexible and adaptable as the changing climate alters snowmelt regimes, flooding, and drought.
HB 1291 will- have a niche impact specific to water users who change or

add storage to their decree along the same ditch without injuring other users.
The bill offers those users long-term, reliable water storage security that will
enable them to fully utilize their decreed right through application, recharge,
and augmentation-no longer must they allow water that lacks adequate storage
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to just run downstream. By streamlining the process of developing or changing
storage opportunities while protecting other users from injury, HB 1291 is a
small, simple bill with real benefits for Colorado's water users.
Julia Bowman
S.B. 17-117, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (confirming
that a water right decreed for agricultural use can be used to cultivate industrial
hemp).
Colorado Senate Bill 17-177 ("SB 117") steps directly into the tension between Colorado law and federal law regarding cannabis and hemp. On the
Colorado side, statute recognizes industrial hemp as an agricultural product,
and Colorado water law states that a holder of a valid water right can put that
right to its decreed beneficial use.' Thus, Colorado farmers with agricultural
water rights can use their water to cultivate hemp under Colorado law. On the
federal side, there is the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, which classifies cannabis and hemp as Schedule 1 drugs.' Because of the federal prohibition, the
Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") has issued notices warning water districts
and users against using water from federal facilities in the cultivation of any federally illegal product.'
SB 117 was put forth to confirm industrial hemp as a recognized agricultural product in Colorado, with attendant water right use. Senator Don Coran,
Representative Marc Catlin, and Representative Donald Valdez sponsored the
bill. It passed the Senate with a vote of thirty-four to one, and passed the House
with a vote of sixty-four to zero. Governor Hickenlooper signed the bill into
law on May 21, 2017.
While a state law cannot impose a barrier on the enforcement of federal
regulations, the bill's sponsors hoped that it would level the playing field across
the state when it comes to water use involving the Bureau. Some farmers are
having their water rights restricted by the Bureau for growing hemp, while farmers in other parts of the state are not. Confirming hemp as a legitimate agricul-

tural product, and pointing out the relevant inconsistencies, is meant to reinforce that the Bureau does not have legal control over water with decreed
Colorado rights even if it moves through the Bureau's infrastructure. Passing
the bill has the added benefit of putting the federal government on notice regarding both Colorado's commitment to protecting its citizens' water rights and
the issues caused by the continued federal prohibition of a legitimate agricultural product.
There were two arguments against SB 117: first, the naming of a specific
agricultural product in a statute; and second, the tension between federal and
Colorado state laws. The naming issue was resolved by an amendment that replaced the specific industrial hemp recognition to recognition of any agricultural
product under Tide 35 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which includes industrial hemp. This change allayed the Colorado Farm Bureau's worry of setting
1. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 35-61-101, etseq.; § 37-92-102.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012).
3. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, PEC TRMR-63, Use ofReclamation Water or Facilities
for Activities Prohibitedby the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (2017), https://www.usbr.gov
/recman/temporary-releases/pectrmr-63.pdf.
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precedent that could require permission from the state for the crops farmers
can grow.
The federal problem was not so easily resolved. Speaking in opposition to
the bill, representatives from the Colorado Water Congress, the Colorado Farm
Bureau, and the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District argued
that this problem requires a statutory solution at the federal level. Barring a
federal change, the Bureau must report any use of federal water in the cultivation of a federally illegal crop to the Department of Justice, and any person, at
any level, facilitating such water use could be held criminally liable (this issue
has been avoided in the recreational cannabis market because most of those
grow operations use municipal water provided by a careful balance of co-mingled water in federal facilities and other priority water).
Sponsors and supporters of the bill (including Diamond A Farms, the
Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District, the Hoban Law Group,
and the National Hemp Association) argue that the law is on their side. The
Tenth Amendment allows Colorado to decide on water use in the state, and the
law of the land is prior appropriation. Because a water right in Colorado does
not mean ownership of the water itself, but ownership of the right to use that
water, a farmer's water being co-mingled with federal water (or being stored in
or passing through a federal facility) should have no effect on that farmer's water
right. From this point of view, the Bureau's restricting of that water violates
Colorado's sovereignty.
Additionally, some federal statutes favor hemp. The U.S. Farm Bill allows
the use of industrial hemp for agricultural research purposes.' The Omnibus
Appropriations Bill states that "[n]one of the funds made available by this Act
or any other Act may be used .

.

. to prohibit the transportation, processing,

sale, or use of industrial hemp."' SB 117 quotes both of these bills as evidence
of industrial hemp's legitimacy as an agricultural product.
There are practical considerations that mitigate the federal state tension, as
well. While the Bureau must report any use of federal water to grow illegal
products to the Department of Justice, the Department still has prosecutorial
discretion to decide whether to prosecute those activities. While the scale of
these grow operations would allow the department to file serious charges, hemp
is a very low priority for criminal prosecution. Given that low priority, and the
statutory support for hemp discussed above, supporters of SB 117 argued that
the federal government has little to gain (and much political capital to lose) by
prosecuting farmers growing a legal product with legal water.
SB 117 does not resolve the tension between Colorado and the federal goveminent on the issue of hemp. What it does is combat inconsistencies in Colorado water use created by federal policy, puts Congress on notice that a timely
federal resolution to this problem is necessary, and announces to Colorado
farmers that the state is committed to protecting their land, their livelihood, and
their water.
Joseph Chase

4. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 7606, 128 Stat. 649, 912-14 (2014).
5. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 763, 129 Stat. 2242,
2285 (2015).
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H.B. 360, 65th Ieg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017) (establishing: (i) a surface
water assessment and monitoring program aimed to collect and compile information regarding surface water availability and use; and (ii) a steering committee
composed of members from various state and federal agencies, local governments, and other groups with interests in surface water use in Montana).
Montana House Bill 360 ("HB 360") establishes a surface water assessment
and monitoring program. The program, which will be a part of the Montana
Bureau of Mines and Geology, will collect and compile surface water information at the direction of a steering committee. HB 360 provides that the steering comuttee should comprise members from various state and federal agencies, local governments, and other interested parties and organizations. For
example, the bill requires the steering committee to include members from
Montana's Department of Natural Resources, Department of Enviromnental
Quality, Department of Agriculture, the Montana State Library's Natural Resource Information System, and a representative of tribal governments in Montana. Furthermore, the bill suggests that the steering committee should also
include members from organizations such as Montana's Board of Oil and Gas
Conservation, a soil and water conservation district, and representatives from
the agricultural, ecological protection, and development communities.
Like many areas in the mountain west, Montana is experiencing increased
growth and development; thus, the Montana legislature developed this surface
water assessment program in order to collect data and information regarding
the availability and usage of its surface water. The State implemented a groundwater assessment program, which has provided relevant information regarding
the availability and use of groundwater in the state. Proponents of HB 360
contend that implementing the surface water assessment program will produce
data similar to the information gathered by the groundwater assessment program and lead to more informed policies regarding the use of surface water in
the state.
HB 360 is a relatively short, straightforward bill. The bill does not attempt
to pass broad, sweeping legislation. Instead, HB 360 merely establishes a surface water monitoring program. By incorporating the monitoring program into
the Bureau of Mines and Geology, the bill does not require a fiscal note to
establish funding sources. As such, there were not many changes or challenges
to the bill throughout the legislative process.
At the committee hearings, there were no opponents to the bill. Many of
the questions brought up in the House and Senate committee hearings concerned. how Montana would pay for the program. While HB 360 neither allocates specific funding, nor establishes a concrete plan for securing future funding, sponsors and proponents of the bill did not seem concerned about the cost
of implementing the program. Housing the program within the Bureau of
Mines and Geology allows the bureau to use its funds to get the program off the
ground while the committee works to secure federal grants and donations to
continue the monitoring program while looking for future state funding. The
only proposed changes to HB 360 came from the Governor's desk and required appointing a member of the tribal government as part of the steering
committee. Unsurprisingly, the House and Senate passed HB 360 with minimal
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opposition and Governor Steve Bullock signed the bill into law on May 8, 2017.
Supporters of the bill were reluctant to conmnit to any future policy or implications associated with HB 360. At this point, the bill's program remains
limited to gathering and compiling information on the availability and use of
surface water in Montana. HB 360 is supported by numerous organizations
and industries within Montana that rely on surface water, such as the cattle and
ranching industry, the agriculture and farming industry, conservation organizations, fishing and recreational organizations, and even a realtor and development organization. These organizations understand the importance of having
thorough and accurate information regarding the availability and supply of surface water. In the future, the program could help these industries employ more
efficient water uses and shape policies regarding surface water in Montana.
HB 360 could be Montana's first step in establishing sensible surface water
policies. The legislation sets up a monitoring program charged with gathering
and compiling accurate information regarding surface water systems. This information will provide more accurate and thorough information to the people
and industries in Montana that rely on the use and availability of surface water.
In turn, this program could lead to more sustainable water policies and practices
in the state.
ChristopherMcMichael
S.B. 28, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017) (allowing parties aggrieved by
Department of Natural Resources and Conversation decisions about new water
right permits and changes to water right permits the option to have the decision
reviewed by either the Water Court or the appropriate district court).
Montana Senate Bill 28 ("SB 28") expanded the jurisdiction of Montana's
Water Court. This bill allows water users aggrieved by the final written decision
of the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation ("DNRC") regarding new water right pennits or changes to water right permits a choice of the
venue in which to bring their appeal. Before the passing of SB 28, aggrieved
water users could only bring their complaints before the district court presiding
over the location of the water right. SB 28 allows the plaintiff to choose between
either the Water Court or the appropriate district court. The sponsors of the
bill aimed to provide an option for aggrieved parties to have a court with more
experience in the subject matter hear their cases.
The first iteration of SB 28 only provided this choice without further instruction. An opponent speaking in the Senate hearing noted that many of these
cases involve multiple aggrieved parties who believe the DNRC has harmed
their water rights by extending rights to others. Following this, the Senate
amended the bill to allow the district court presiding over the location of the
water right to choose the ultimate venue when multiple aggrieved parties choose
conflicting venues. This amended version of the bill passed in the Senate thirtyfive to eleven and went to the House for consideration.
Chas Vincent, a Republican representing the Water Policy Interim Committee, served as the primary sponsor for SB 28. While drafting the bill, the
committee considered a University of Montana study that reviewed the water
policies of several neighboring states and a Supreme Court of Montana survey
of district judges regarding water rights issues. The study advised the expansion
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of the Water Court's jurisdiction as proposed in SB 28. The survey of district
court judges found that a majority had no experience in water law, a super majority wanted the ability to refer cases to the Water Court, and another super
majority favored the Water Court, rather than the district courts, hearing appeals of the DNRC. Water users, landowners, realtors, and attorneys specializing in water law widely supported SB 28. Most of the bill's proponents saw
the option in venue as a means to faster and cheaper resolutions to grievances
regarding the DNRC's permit decisions. However, some landowners and water

users expressed concerns regarding the Water Court's prime directive, judicial
appointment of Water Court judges, and the funding of the DNRC appeals
cases in the Water Court.
The Montana Legislature created the Water Court in 1979 to deal with the
immense backlog of un-adjudicated water rights claims. Because Montana did
not require reporting of water rights until 1973, many water rights claims still
have not been adjudicated; however, full adjudication is still not expected until
2028. Prior to the introduction of SB 28, the Water Court existed only to adjudicate pre-1973 state water rights and Indian and federal reserved water rights.
Opponents argued that increasing the Water Court's jurisdiction would distract
it from its ultimate goal of completely adjudicating water rights in Montana. The
proponents countered that the likely case load would not exceed five to six additional cases per year. The proponents agreed that the Water Court should
primarily focus on water right adjudication and administration of decrees. However, proponents also asserted that the additional option for aggrieved water
users will not impair the Water Court from meeting its primary adjudication
goal, especially considering that the current Water Court has increased efficiency in adjudicating water rights beyond that of previous courts.
Many opponents also expressed concerns that Water Court judges are appointed rather than elected. The opponents believed that the judges presiding
over these cases should be elected, as are district courtjudges in Montana. Proponents asserted that the bill does not limit access to an elected judge, it merely
provides a choice. Additionally, if a conflict on choice of venue arises, the
elected judge makes the ultimate venue decision.
Opponents questioned the funding for the Water Court. Prior legislation
that funded the Water Court specifically designated the funds for adjudication
of claimed water rights. Proponents explained that the funding for the appeals
cases will come from the general fund that already partially funds the Water
Court. The bill, however, does not address this issue.
Moreover, proponents claimed that enforcement of water rights will soon
become a major issue as Montana becomes a completely adjudicated state. This
small-scale expansion of jurisdiction will allow for an assessment of the Water
Court's ability to handle an increased caseload involving a variety of water law
issues. Opponents stressed that a decision about the future of the water court
should receive greater scrutiny, involve in depth studies, and require prolonged
deliberation.
After much deliberation, Montana's House of Representatives also passed
SB 28, with a vote of seventy-eight to twenty-two. The President of the Senate
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and the Speaker of the House signed the bill on March 20th, and Governor
Steve Bullock signed it into law on March 31, 2017. Aggrieved water users in
Montana now have the option to petition either the Water Court or the presiding district court to hear appeals of final written decisions from the DNRC.
Sydney Donovan

CONFERENCE REPORTS
TRIBAL WATER LAW: CITITING EDGE INSIGHTS FROM PRACTITIONERS IN
INDIAN COUNTRY

Las Vegas, Nevada

October 12-13, 2017

Conference Sponsor: CLE International
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT

Presented by: Heather White Man Runs Him, Esq., Native American
Rights Fund.
Dressed in the business attire of many varied cultures, a group of western
tribal leaders, attorneys, and government officials came together to discuss tribal
access to clean water. An examination through the lenses of legal-minded objectivity and humanitarian efforts for change revealed a clear and undeniable
conclusion: tribal water law is an uphill battle. Most U.S. Representatives and
practicing attorneys would be far from proclaiming that tribes have less right to
water than other users and their right to water is legally established by the Winters doctrine. This doctrine, established in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908), makes clear that Native American reservations are accompanied
with the necessary water rights sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the reservation.
Heather White Man Runs Him, an attorney for the Native American Rights
Fund in Boulder, Colorado, presented her concerns over issues of legal ethics
in the multi-faceted practice of tribal water rights settlement.
Federal Indian law is founded in international law. As such, the underpinnings of Heather White Man Runs Him's presentation came from modern,
international human rights declarations. In 1999, the United Nations General
Assembly ("UNGA") affirmed that "the rights to food and clean water are fundamental human rights" and declared their promotion a "moral imperative."
In 2010, the UNGA formally recognized the fundamental right to water and
that "clean drinking water and sanitation are essential to the realization of all
human rights." In the same year, President Obama changed the position of the
United States to support the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-

ple ("UNDRIP").
The UNDRIP recognized that indigenous peoples and individuals have the
right to: (1) the full enjoyment of all officially-recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms; (2) the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health; and (3) the continued enjoyment of their strong,
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally used or occupied lands,
territories, and waters. This last item is expanded in Article 26 of UNDRIP,
which recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to own, use, and develop the
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lands, territories, and resources that they have traditionally occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
As illustrated by these legal precedents, the federal government has twice
recognized that indigenous people have the right to own and use water. This
recognition represents both a right in and of itself and a necessary means by
which indigenous people can enjoy other guaranteed human rights. Only 0.6
percent of the United States population lacks access to safe drinking water and
wastewater disposal. However, in 2011, a grossly disproportionate thirteen percent of Native Americans lacked access to drinking water and wastewater disposal. Meanwhile, between 2008 and 2010, the U.S. Government spent more
money on foreign water projects than it has on Native American water projects
in the last twenty years.
Recent case law has cast doubt on the government's commitment to these
promises as well. In StandingRock Sioux Tribe v. Anny Corps of Engineers,
205 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016), the plaintiff tribe asserted the right to spiritually pure water. The facts of the case recognized the historical and contemporary use of waterways, artifacts, and landmarks in spiritual practices, and how
the construction of a pipeline will irrevocably damage the usability of water for
spiritual purposes. However, the court held that there was no right to "spiritually pure" water. In Hopi Tribe v. UnitedStates, 782 F.3d 662 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
the tribe claimed that past executive orders and the Winters Doctrine created a
fiduciary duty on the part of the government to ensure the quality of tribal waters. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissed the case, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. The ongoing litigation of the Agua Calientecase in California
further justifies the doubts many people harbor regarding the government's
commitment to tribal water rights. In Agua Caliente, the tribe is litigating for its
right to groundwater, as well as surface water, under the Winters doctrine. Water is of paramount significance to the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indiansthey live in a desert.
Heather White Man Runs Him included a discussion of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in her panel presentation. These rules make no
explicit references to human rights. However, human rights issues are a driving
force for many people in their decision to attend law school. Simultaneously,
legal ethics do recognize inherent human dignity as a component of the attorney-client relationship. Further, while Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct only allows for moral counsel to clients, comment 2 states that
"it is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in
giving advice." Comiment 2 goes on to explain the close relationship between
moral and ethical considerations and their influence on the application of the
law.
Another presenter brought pictures drawn by Native American children to
show what they thought was the true source of water: trucks. A generation of
children believe that pick-up trucks loaded with water jugs is the most reliable
source of water-they are being taught that they cannot rely on the land. Evidence of such skewed perceptions created by a lack of clean water further emphasizes the necessity for efficient litigation and settlement of water disputes
involving indigenous people.
Heather White Man Runs Him's presentation brought to mind questions
of how one can ethically represent clients responsible for projects that damage
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water quality or limit peoples' access to water. The ABA recognition of contemporary principles of ethical considerations has oscillated between being slow
to change and progressing rapidly. In 2012, the ABA adopted UN guiding
principles on human rights. Practitioners like Heather White Man Runs Him
are at the forefront of questioning exactly how these ethical principles will be
implemented.
.1. GarrettKizer
TRIBAL WATER LAW: CUTTING EDGE INSIGHTS FROM PRACmTIONERS IN

INDIAN COUNTRY
Las Vegas, Nevada

October 12-13, 2017

Conference Sponsor: CLE International
THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE: A PANEL DISCUSSION
Presented by: Bret Birdsong, Esq., Professor of Law at the University of
Las Vegas, Nevada (UNLV) William S. Boyd School of Law; Constantinos
(Dean) DePountis,Esq., In-House Counsel for the StandingRock Sioux Tribe.
A multiplicity of scholars, academics, and attorneys convened in Las Vegas
for the annual Tribal Water Law Conference to discuss the major failures and
successes in the field. Bret Birdsong, Professor of Law at the University of Las
Vegas, Nevada (UNLV) William S. Boyd School of Law, and Dean DePountis,
in-house counsel for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, led a meaningful panel
discussion on the Dakota Access Pipeline. Through fascinating lectures, they
explored the weaknesses of the legal system in dealing with this situation and
assessing the relevant environmental and cultural implications. Although the
pipeline stands as a tragic defeat in the eyes of tribes all across the country, the
struggle can be viewed as a learning experience in many ways.
Perhaps one of most contentious and recognized disputes in Native American history, the Dakota Access Pipeline, also known as the "black snake," has
exposed the complex nature of tribal water law beyond the periphery of the
public eye. While disputes over Native American land and water rights often
go unnoticed, the pipeline has certainly brought attention to issues that are often
hidden in plain sight: constant undermining of tribal sovereignty, lack of consultation, and a disregard to environmental and human safety on the part of
both the U.S. government and private corporations.
The Dakota Access Pipeline is a $3.8 billion project developed by Energy
Transfer Partners and Dakota Access, LLC. The pipeline is approximately
1,100 miles in length, transporting crude oil from northwestern North Dakota
through South Dakota, Iowa, and ending in Patoka, Illinois. The most contentious segment of the pipeline, which has become the focus of media attention,
is in fact a very small portion of the entire project. This segment burrows under
the Missouri River at Lake Oahe a half-mile north of the Standing Rock Sioux
Reservation in North Dakota. Lake Oahe is federally-owned land managed by
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps"), but it has significant
spiritual value to the Tribe's culture and history.
Dean DePountis explained that the issue with the pipeline's proximity to
the reservation is twofold. First, the pipeline trespasses through culturally and
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historically significant lands. Second, a leakage or rupture in the pipe would
have disastrous effects on the Tribe's water supply. Under the Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act of 1986, Congress authorized the construction of
a rural water system to serve the Tribe. This includes several water intakes on
Lake Oahe, which the Tribe uses for drinking water and irrigation purposes. In
addition, the Act protects tribal treaty rights to hunt and fish. The effects of a
pipeline spill into a waterway with treaty-protected hunting, fishing, and water
rights would be disastrous.
The Corps had initially planned to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") on the pipeline that would allow for "robust tribal and public engagement." The EIS would have included a catastrophic spill analysis prepared
by an independent expert with the task of evaluating the risk of a rupture in the
underground portion of the pipeline. However, in early 2017, the Corps issued
a memo stating that it intended to withdraw its notice of intent to prepare an
EIS and thereby terminated the public comment period. Instead of making
legitimate, comprehensive assessments of the environmental impacts by the
pipeline, the White House ordered immediate completion of the remainder of
the pipeline, with oil flowing through it as soon as possible.
It is important to note that the pipeline does not technically cross tribal
lands. If the pipeline did cross tribal lands, tribal consent would be required
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 324. In that case, tribes could negotiate for financial
or alternative compensation. However, the pipeline slithers through land less
than a mile outside the reservation. Even though the pipeline falls so close, the
Corps and the United States government have used this distance to sidestep the
most important issue: cultural and historical ties to the land outside the borders

of the reservation. In response, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe has relied on
the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"), the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") as
legal tools to object to the construction of the pipeline. This is why the Dakota
Access Pipeline. is such a complex debate-"the laws don't have teeth," DePountis said.
Over the last couple of years, the Tribe has experienced a series of disappointing decisions in the courtroom. In August 2016, the Tribe filed for a motion for a preliminary injunction against the Corps in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia based on NHPA § 106 claims. The Tribe noted that
the pipe crosses ancestrally sacred lands, many of which have not been fully
evaluated by Tribal archaeologists to determine the lands' cultural and ancestral
significance; they argued that there would be irreversible harm if the court did
not grant the injunction. In September 2016, the court denied the motion and
ruled that the Tribe failed to demonstrate that an injunction was warranted. In
March 2017, the court again denied a preliminary injunction on the RFRA
claims, holding that, though members of the Tribe may feel unable to use Lake
Oahe's water in religious ceremonies, the pipeline poses no specific ban on
their religious practices.
DePountis made it clear that the court is evading the issue that the pipeline's
presence still violates cultural and spiritual tribal identity and undermines tribal
sovereignty. Since the pipeline does not technically cross through tribal lands,
the court concluded that the Tribe lacks a persuading religious or cultural legal
argument. DePountis stated that it is extremely difficult to be successful on
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religious freedom claims.
Massive infrastructure projects such as the Dakota Access Pipeline have
become such a stimulating case study for historians, scientists, economists, and
a variety of other academics because of the complexity and nature of the affair.
The legal debate over Dakota Access is multifaceted because it is, at its core, a
water rights issue, but one that is encircled by a multitude of religious and cultural concerns. However, the most powerful laws the Tribe had on their side
were the NHPA and RFRA, otherwise known by DePountis as the "look before
you leap" laws.
At the end of the panel discussion I asked, "Even if the pipeline had
planned to cross tribal land, would it have been possible to reroute the pipeline,
or would it have been too late?" Professor Birdsong answered by saying, "If
our country can extract buildings from the dust in the middle of a desert to
develop a city [Las Vegas], then we can certainly re-route a pipeline at the expense of human justice." This answer emphasized the fact that nothing is set in
stone, and the government undoubtedly had the power to re-route the pipeline
so that it could have avoided critical sites of historical significance. While the
story of the "black snake" highlights significant failures in the United States legal
system, the fight is not over. In many ways, the Dakota Access Pipeline has
influenced attorneys and other legal academics to find new ways to litigate an
issue like this so that Native Americans and other silenced minorities in the
United States receive a fair opportunity to be represented in the legal system,
Haley McCullough
WESTERN STATES WATER CONFERENCE AND NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS
FUND 15TH BIENNIAL. SYMPOSIUM ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INDIAN
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS CIAIMS

Great Falls, Montana

August 8-10, 2017

Every other year since 1991, the Western States Water Conference
("WSWC") and the Native American Rights Fund ("NARF") hold a symposium to discuss the complexities of settling tribal water claims and to celebrate
successes from the recent years. During the three-day symposium, various panels discussed the specific details of recent settlements and the logistics of negotiating and passing Indian reserved settlements in the contemporary political
climate.
The location of the WSWC-NARF Symposium changes each year to coincide with a recent settlement.' This year, the Symposium highlighted the passage of the Blackfeet Water Rights Settlement ("Blackfeet Settlement").' Congress passed the Blackfeet Settlement as part of the Water Infrastructure

1. This year's §ymposium was held in Great Falls, Montana, about two hours southeast of
the Blackfeet tribal headquarters of Browning, Montana. The early August symposium coincided
with peak tourist season in Glacier National Park, which is adjacent to the Blackfeet Reservation
in northwest Montana. The busy tourist season precluded available hotel and conference space
on the reservation.
2. Water Infrastructure Improvement for the Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, §§ 370124, 130 Stat. 1628, 1814-45 (2016) ("WIIN Act").
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Improvements for the Nation Act ("WIIN Act")' as their last action of the session in December 2016. In addition to the Blackfeet Settlement, the WIIN
Act approved the settlements of three other tribal water rights: the Pechanga
Band of Luisefio Mission Indians, five tribes from San Diego County, California, and the Choctaw and Chickasaw settlements.' Representatives from the
tribal, state, and/or federal negotiating teams of each of these settlements presented in Great Falls, Montana. Despite passage in the same bill, the Symposium presenters stressed the unique historical contexts, negotiation histories,
and impacts of the four settlements. While each Indian water rights settlement
is unlike any other settlement, mutual respect and cooperation by the parties
are the key ingredients to any successful negotiation. In that spirit, this note will
highlight the four settlements of the WIIN Act, presenting the individuality of
these four historic deals and the cooperative successes of the negotiating teams
from each settlement.
BLACKFEET SETTLEMENT

Attorneys from Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, the Montana Office of
the Attorney General, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of
Justice discussed the process of their negotiations and the logistics of the Blackfeet Settlement, while tribal leaders presented the Blackfeet historical and cultural perspectives leading up to and throughout the negotiations.
The Blackfeet Settlement represents over thirty years of litigation, discussion, and compromise in a complicated legal context. The Blackfeet initially
resisted the compacting process beginning in the 1970s over concerns of tribal
sovereignty and state intrusion, but after years of stilted litigation, the Tribe
agreed to negotiate in the 1980s. The Blackfeet-Montana Water Rights Compact established tribal rights on all surface and groundwater within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation, subject only to previously established state rights
on a few rivers that support irrigation in highly profitable agricultural lands,
which are protected from calls by the Tribe. There were previous decrees and
even international treaties the negotiating teams had to account for in the compact as well.' Although overall nearly ninety-five percent of the water friom six
basins is now under tribal jurisdiction, it is important to give the tribe opportunities to bring drinking water to reservation communities and market water offreservation for revenue. These future projects, however, are not strictly delineated in the compact: the parties worked hard to create sufficient flexibility for
forthcoming tribal governments to meet the needs of the tribe in the future,
rather than tying funding to predetermined plans.

3. Id.
4. SccgencrallyWIIN Act §§ 3401-13, 3605-08, 130 Stat. at 1755-71, 1793-14; Because
of the federal oversight of tribes' limited sovereignty and tribal interests, Indian reserved water
rights settlements must le approved by congressional legislation, per Congress's plcnary power
over Indian affairs. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
5. Birch Creek, which is the southern boundary of the reservation, is subject to a 1908 decree contemporaneous with Wi'nters, but it failed to recognize the Blackfeets' reserved rights.
Conrad Investment v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); The St. Mary River and the Milk
River are subject to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, Treaty between the United States and
Great Britain relating to boundary waters between the United States and Canada. U.K.-U.S.,Jan.
It, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
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Another unique aspect of the compact is the recognition of tribal water
rights in the Lewis and Clark National Forest and Glacier National Park: the
Blackfeet ceded the lands in 1895 but did not cede their reserved water rights,
which are now formally protected. At $422 million in federal funds, the Blackfeet Settlement represents the largest federal allocation in an Indian reserved
water rights settlement to date.'
The presenters again and again expressed gratitude, respect, and admiration for the hard work and dedication of the negotiating parties over the years.
The negotiations were born out of contentious litigation and required deliberate
cultivation of trusting relationships between the Montana Compacting Commission, tribal leaders, and federal stakeholders from various agencies. It took
nearly nine years after the conclusion of negotiations between the parties in
2007 to get federal recognition in 2016.

CHOCTAW-CHICKASAW-OKLAHOMA CITY-OKLAHOMA SETTLEMENT
Senior Counsel for the Chickasaw Nation discussed the particularly unique
agreement-both in terms of process and outcome-between the Choctaw Nation, the Chickasaw Nation, Oklahoma City, and the state of Oklahoma that
resolved long-standing questions over water rights and regulatory authority in
the historic treaty areas of the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations. This settlement7-the first Indian water rights settlement in the state that is home to thirtynine federally recognized tribes-came together in lightning speed compared to
the usual course of Indian reserved water rights negotiations, which, in many
cases, can take decades to finalize. Tribal and state officials worked through
five years of state and federal litigation and negotiation to develop the plan,
which allows Oklahoma City to draw water from nearby Lake Sardis for municipal use with limits to protect valuable tourist attractions and ecological resources. In return, the tribes renounced any reserved rights to the water, but
gained a seat at the table for future decisions about the use of the water at the
state level.
The agreement created a five-person commission, comprised of representatives from the city, state, and both tribal governments, to oversee future out-ofstate transfers of water in the settlement area as approved by the state legislature,
which covers twenty-two counties of southeast Oklahoma-the most water-rich
region of the state. These resources are the backbone of vibrant tourism and
recreation markets that generate significant economic activity in the area. Thus,
this commission was also charged with ensuring that future consumptive use
does not unduly compromise the recreational value of the waters. This mutual
desire to protect cultural, recreational, and ecological resources formed the
foundation for successful negotiation and mutual respect between the tribes and
the state and city governments, who, prior to negotiations, had strained relationships.

6. The Blackfeet Settlement allocates $420.2 million from the federal government. The
Confederated Salish-Kootenai Compact, approved by the Montana state legislature in 2015 and
currently pending before Congress, asks the federal government to invest $2.3 billion dollars. See
Corin Cates-Carney, InteriorBalks at Cost of CSKT Water Compact MONT. PUB. RADIO (lune
29, 2016), http://mtpr.org/post/interior-balks-cost-cskt-water-compact.
7. WIIN Act S 3608, 130 Stat. at 1796-14.
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By renouncing claims to reserved rights, the settlement came to Congress
without the need for any federal appropriations. Because of this lack of financial input, the congressional review process was very quick: the negotiation team
announced their settlement in August 2016 and it was approved in the WIIN
Act only four months later. Counsel for the Chickasaw Nation noted that, while
this settlement was particularly unique in its speed and lack of federal reserved
rights, it demonstrates what parties can accomplish if they approach a common
interest with creativity and a desire to negotiate a solution.
SAN LuIs REY SETTLEMENT
The last two Indian reserved water rights settlements included in the WIIN
Act both hail from southern California. In a series of cases from the 1960s,
7
0s, and 80s, the La Jolla Band of Luisefio Mission Indians, Pauma Band of
Luisefio Mission Indians, Rincon Band of Luisefio Mission Indians, and San
Pasqual Band of Mission Indians (collectively, the "California Tribes") challenged diversions of water from San Luis Rey River to profitable agricultural
areas in Escondido and Vista. These diversions left the reservations, once abundant in water, wildlife, and vegetation, high and dry since the late 1890s. Tenet
Aguilar, chairman of Pauma Band of Luisefio Mission Indians, remarked on a
panel focused on identification of stakeholders for successful negotiation
groups, that his people watched the explosion of exceedingly prosperous agriculture and residential areas in southern California from their parched and
deeply economically depressed missions. Without reliable access to water since
the diversions began nearly 130 years ago, the California Tribes lacked drinking
water for their peoples, water for agriculture, and water for economic development.
The California Tribes, federal government, city governments, and irrigation
districts involved in litigation reached a partial settlement in 1988, which earmarked federal funds to create and operate the San Luis Rey Water Authority
to regulate the river. However, questions still existed about how to allocate an
already fully used river: the California Tribes received paper rights, but no wet
water came to the reservations.! The parties persisted and eventually lined an
already existing canal to prevent seepage, creating an additional 100,000 acre
feet per year-more than enough to satisfy the California Tribes' reserved
rights-which now allows the California Tribes to sell excess water back to the
municipalities, generating a much needed source of additional revenue. In
2014, when the parties presented this settlement to Congress hoping to access
the millions of federal funds set aside in the 1988 settlement, new budgetary
constraints and considerations forced the parties to comply with new requirements by amending the 1988 settlement, which ultimately passed in the WIIN
Act." Because the amendments made it possible to access the already allocated
money, no new or additional federal funding was necessary. The 1988 fund
with interest now amounts to $60 million available to the California Tribes for
infrastructure.
For Aguilar and his tribal counterparts, this fight for water spanned generations. He expressed deep sadness that many of the tribal leaders who initiated
8.
9.

WUIN Act S 3605, 130 Stat. at 1793-94.
Id.
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the process so long ago have passed away and were not able to see the culmination of their hard work. According to Aguilar, the conclusion of their efforts
reinforced his peoples' rightful place in 21st century Southern California for
generations to come. "We're not going anywhere," Aguilar said.
PECIHANGA SETTLEMENT

The final Indian reserved water rights settlement passed in the 2016 WIIN
Act resolved the oldest civil lawsuit in the country. In 1951, the federal government sued thousands of landowners and several Indian tribes in the Temecula
Valley of Southern California to secure its exclusive use of the Santa Margarita
River for the Camp Pendleton military base. In 1963, a federal court issued a
decree affirming-but not quantifying-many rights including tribal reserved
rights. In 2007, the Cahuilla Band of Indians, the Ramona Band of Cahuilla
Indians, and the Pechanga Band of Luisefio Indians all filed motions to quantify
their reserved rights in the watershed. Being a particularly complicated lawsuit,
a technical consultant addressed the Pechanga settlement on a panel dedicated
to the importance of technical information in legal negotiations.
The Cahuilla and Ramona are still negotiating, but the Pechanga received
nearly 5,000 acre feet of quantified reserved rights and $28 million in federal
appropriations to build necessary infrastructure to bring that water to the people
as part of their settlement approved in the WIIN Act."o The parties reached
their settlement in 2008, just one year after the Pechanga moved for quantification, but the arduous process of federal approval took another eight years. The
agreement is a unique collaboration between the sovereign Tribe and local state
water providers to manage water in the basin: the Tribe agreed that water allocated to them by the eastern water district outside this settlement would count
towards its reserved rights. Individual allotees are also protected and may access
the high-quality groundwater for drinking or agricultural uses.
Overall, the WIIN Act put the cherry on top of the Indian water rights
.sundae of the Obama Administration: under the policy directives of President
Barack Obama, twelve Indian water rights settlements were completed during
his tenure, more than any other administration to date. While the quantity is
impressive, the quality of each settlement is what really matters: water is a vital
component to public health and economic development that is at the heart of
many tribes' quest for recognition of their reserved rights, and negotiations serve
as a means for tribes to access necessary resources while developing positive
relationships with state and federal counterparts.
Aubrey Ryan Bertram

10.

Id. §§ 3401-13, 130 Stat. at 1755-71.

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TIHE NINTH CIRCUIT

United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 859 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding that: (i) appellate court lacked jurisdiction regarding voluntary withdrawal applications in a water rights dispute because there was no actual controversy nor was there a finding of no further delay under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b);
(ii) an applicant failed to meet its prima facie burden to establish that changing
the location and type of diversion would result in no injury to other parties to
an existing consent decree; (iii) a request to amend applications under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(b)(1) during closing arguments was properly rejected as prejudicial;
and (iv) building a road and canal, coupled with lengthy nonuse of water rights,
supported an abandonment finding under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-188(B)).
The issues presented in this consolidated appeal were: (1) the Global Equity Decree of 1935 and (2) whether landowners can transfer their rights to divert water from the Gila River that flows through southern Arizona. Specifically,
whether Freeport Minerals Corporation ("Freeport") successfully presented a
prima facie case of no injury to other Decree parties, which the court held was
necessary in order to sever and transfer water rights.
Litigation began regarding these water rights in 1925, when the U.S. brought
suit on behalf of the Gila River Indian Community ("Community") and the San
Carlo Apache Tribe ("Tribe") seeking to adjudicate the water rights from the
Gila River. In 1935, the Global Equity Decree ("the Decree") was entered into
to govern the distribution of water among the Community, the Tribe, and various other landowners. Specifically, under the Decree, parties are entitled to
divert water from the River for the beneficial use and irrigation of land in accordance with the specified priorities. Additionally, parties to the decree are
pennitted "to change the point of diversion and the places, means, manner or
purpose of the use of the waters" to which they are entitled to, as long as they
do not injure the rights of other parties.
In 1996, the District Court entered a Water Quality Injunction to protect
the water rights of the Tribe. Specifically, the injunction provided that "if the
water quality reaching the Tribe deteriorates below certain thresholds, the Water Commissioner is directed to take measures limiting the diversion of water
rights holders." However, in 2001, the Community, the Tribe, the United
States, and the San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District ("SCIDD") jointly
filed a post judgment complaint ("Pumping Complaint") to enforce the Decree
against thousands of upper valley landowners who were allegedly using the wells
in excess of their rights.
Following the filing of the complaint, the parties (not including the Tribe or
the United States) entered into the Upper Valley Forbearance Agreement
125
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("UVFA"), dismissing the Pumping Complaint in exchange for the upper valley
landowner's agreement to permanently cut back the acres they were able to irrigate by 1000 acres. Additionally, the UVFA allowed the upper valley landowners to "sever and transfer water rights from decreed lands to lands that had
been irrigated but were not covered by the Decree."
In 2008, following the UCFA, over 400 sever and transfer applications were
filed - fifty-nine belonging to Freeport. Freeport began purchasing farms in
1997 for the sole purpose of acquiring water rights. Freeport paid all water
related fees and specifically required its tenants to maintain the water rights. In
response, the United States, the Tribe, and the Community filed objections to
these sever and transfer applications.
Regarding Freeport's applications, the District Court held an evidentiary
hearing and denied them all on the grounds finding that: (1) Freeport had failed
to present a prima facie case of no injury to the other decreed parties; (2) Arizona's statutory forfeiture law did not apply to Freeport's water rights; and (3)
Freeport had partially abandoned the water rights on one of its proposed sever
parcels. Further, the court declined to amend Freeport's applications to conform its revised maps. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ("the Court") revisited the District Court's holding to determine
whether the District Court erred in granting judgment to the plaintiffs as a matter
of law.
First, the Court looked to Freeport's contention that the District Court
erred in holding that it failed to present a prima facie case of no injury to the
other Decree parties. The Court observed Article XI of the Decree and the
Change in Use Rule, each of which state that any parties who have decreed
water rights are entitled to change the point of diversion as long as it is done
without injury to other decreed parties and in accordance with applicable law
and principles. The applicant for the change in the point of diversion has the
burden of proof.
Freeport argued that all that would change as a result of their application is
the location of the decreed rights and the associated point of diversion-there
would be no increase or decrease in decreed rights as a result of the proposed
severance. However, Freeport failed to present any evidence regarding the absence of injury. Applying the rule that "possible injury should be analyzed by
comparing the impact of a proposed change against a baseline of existing conditions," the Court addressed points of injury that Freeport failed to rebut.
The Court first addressed the portion of the Gila River, "Cosper's Crossing," which frequently runs dry above ground. Under a prior arrangement,
when Cosper's Crossing runs dry, upstream water-users are permitted to disregard senior downstream users, such as the Tribe, and divert the entire flow of
the river before it reaches Cosper's Crossing. The Court found that at least one
of Freeport's pending applications requesting transferring water from downstream to a location above Cosper's Crossing could cause Cosper's Crossing to
run dry at an earlier point in time, which would trigger the previous arrangement
and thus exacerbate the injury to the Tribe, whose water rights are already insufficient to meet their needs. Despite Freeport's argument that if such a situation occurs the Tribe can request that all diversions above Cosper's Crossing
cease, the Court held that this does not prevent injury-it only operates as a
remedy for injury that has already occurred.
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As another point of injury, the Court pointed to the potential effect on return flows caused by changing the location of diversions. Although impact may
be minimal, the burden was on Freeport to demonstrate a lack of injury. However, Freeport failed to present such evidence. Further, the Court noted the
negative impact on water quality caused by changing the type of diversion. At
least one of Freeport's applications requested change from a ground level diversion to a pumping diversion which has higher salinity levels. This would
have increased the overall salinity levels in the Gila River thus negatively affecting the Tribe which requires fresh water in order to irrigate and grow crops.
After evaluating the injury, the Court next assessed the District Court's ruling that a "prolonged period on non-use coupled with improvements to the
property (the construction of a road and canal) were incompatible with irrigation," thus providing sufficient evidence that Freeport intended to abandon its
water rights. Freeport argued that there is no intent to abandon because:. (1) it
bought the farmlands for the purpose of acquiring water rights; (2) it required
lessees to maintain its water rights; and (3) it paid all water right related taxes
and fees. The Court held that purchasing land with the intention of acquiring
the water rights, as well as requiring lessees to maintain water rights, is irrelevant
if those rights are not acted upon after purchase by removing developments that
are inconsistent with water usage (canals and road).
The Court affirmed the district court's decision denying Freeport's applications. However, it reversed the district court's decision that Arizona's statutory
forfeiture law did not apply to Freeport's water rights. The Court remanded
the remaining objections filed by the United States, the Tribe, and the Community to the district court.
Alicia Garcia
STATE COURTS

COLORADO
Gallegos Family Props., v. Colo. Groundwater Comm'n, 398 P.3d 599
(Colo. 2017) (holding that: (i) evidence that groundwater and a creek had been
connected at the time of designation of the groundwater was not a condition
newly discovered or occurring after the original basin designation date, and
therefore was insufficient to modify a basin boundary under Colo. Rev. Stat.
section 37-90-106(1)(a); (ii) claim preclusion applied because the issue of connectivity was not litigated at the time of the designation proceeding; and (iii)
costs recovered by the prevailing well owners were reasonable and necessary).
Gallegos Family Properties, LLC ("Gallegos") appealed, for a second time,
to the Supreme Court of Colorado in hopes of de-designating a portion of the
Upper Crow Creek Designated Ground Water Basin ("the Basin"). Specifically, Gallegos petitioned to re-draw the Basin boundaries to exclude twentyfive wells on Crow Creek, thus curtailing the junior water rights of the well owners ("Well-Owners") in favor of Gallegos's senior water rights.
Gallegos owns what is known as the "Larson Rights," which consist of surface rights to a combined flow of 413 cubic feet per second in Consolidated
Larson Ditch and 59.5 acre-feet of storage rights in Larson Reservoir #1. Decreed in 1914, these rights divert from a headgate on Crow Creek that originates
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in Wyoming and flows into Colorado. Gallegos purchased the rights in 1999.

Prior to the 1950's, Crow Creek maintained a reliable base surface flow in
Colorado. However, as surface pumping in Wyoming continued to increase,
surface water rights in Colorado became increasingly unreliable and could no
longer meet the needs of surface rights owners.
Thus, in 1983, a group that included the Well-Owners and Gallegos's predecessors in interest petitioned to the Colorado Groundwater Commission (the
"Commission") to designate the Basin to allow for pumping from the aquifers
underlying Crow Creek. There was only one objection to the designation, and
the hearing officers designated the basin based on the designation standards set
forth in C.R.S. section 37-90-103(a). Under the statute, "designation is proper
for groundwater in areas not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream
wherein groundwater withdraws have constituted the principal water usage for
at least fifteen years preceding the date of the first hearing on the proposed
designation of the basin." The 1987 Commission affirmed.
Gallegos purchased the rights in 1999, and leased the water rights and the
associated land rights until 2002. At that time, Gallegos's tenant farmers were
unable to irrigate the crops due to insufficient surface water. In response,
Gallegos petitioned for the curtailment of the Well-Owners junior water rights
on the grounds that their pumping had injured its senior water rights.
Gallegos brought this appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court appealing the
order denying re-designation of a portion of the Basin to exclude twenty-five
wells owned by the Well-Owners. As established in Gallegos v. Colo. Groundwater Commn'n, 147 P.3d 20 (Colo. 2006) (Gallegos 1) and under the requirements of C.R.S section 37-90-106(1)(a), in order to justify a partial de-designation of the Basin, Gallegos must: (1) "show by new evidence not before the 1987
commission (2) that the well owner's pumping has a greater than de minimis
impact to its senior surface rights (3) such that future conditions and factual data
justify de-designation a portion of the Basin."
In order to show that the Well-Owner's pumping had a greater than de
minimis impact, Gallegos needed prove both connectivity and injury. The
Court defined connectivity "as the linkage between groundwater and surface
water such that augmenting or depleting groundwater impacts the availability of
surface flow." In forming this definition, the Court relied on the hydrological
connection between groundwater and surface water and the influence that the
former has on the latter. Thus, the primary issue was whether Gallegos could
show connectivity, by new evidence, not before the 1987 Commission at the
time of the Basin's original designation.
In applying these standards, the Court held that Gallegos's showings fail
under both requirements of section 37-90-106(1)(a) and Gallegos L Specifically, the evidence failed under the designation statute because it did not show
either a new condition that had arisen since 1987 or an existing condition that
had been newly discovered since 1987-either of which would be necessary to
justify the modification of a basin boundary.
Although Gallegos's experts may have been able to establish a connection
between the groundwater in the Basin and Crow Creek, this merely confirmed
what was already shown to the 1987 Commission. In proving a connection,
Gallegos's experts pointed to the increased stream flow of Crow Creek at the
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point where the alluvial aquifer necks down at the Larson headgate. However,
the Court noted that this is not novel information. Rather, it is merely a repackaging of information that was presented at the 1987 hearing.
Further, the Court held that Gallegos's showings fail under Gallegos I. Specifically, the Court emphasized that under GallegosI, claim preclusion prevents
relitigation of issues that could have been litigated in a prior proceeding. Here,
the connectivity claim could have, and should have, been litigated during the
original designation proceedings, and Gallegos relied on the same evidence that
the 1987 Commission relied on when originally designating the Basin.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the designated groundwater
court.
Alicia Garcia

Select Energy Servs., LLC v. K-LOW, LLC, 394 P.3d 695 (Colo. 2017)
(affirming the water court's finding that a decree defining a right to divert water
only from a headgate located downstream from a disputed ditch did not include
the right to divert water from that ditch).
This case came before the Colorado Supreme Court on appeal from the
water court's definition of a water right stemming from a 1914 decree and a
recent change to that right.
The original 1914 decree granted twenty-eight cubic feet of water per second absolute, for irrigation of 300 acres, with an appropriation date of December 8, 1893. The legal description of the diversion point was a certain headgate
on the South Platte River, where the water then travelled via the Sterling Drain
and Seepage Ditch ("SD&SD"). Additionally, the decree noted that, as a source
of supply, the SD&SD right "takes its supply of water . . . from seepage and
waste waters coming . .. from the Plumb drain ditch and other accretions along
its course."
Faith Tabernacle Church ("Faith") later obtained the SD&SD right, and, in
2014, Faith applied to move the right's diversion point pursuant to Colorado's
recently enacted simple change statute. The statute creates a simpler process
for moving a surface point of diversion but prohibits combining that change
with any other change to the right.'
The water court approved the application and entered the 2014 decree,
which changed the diversion point from the headgate to a downriver pump on
Faith's property, downstream from both the original diversion point and the
terminus of the ditch. Rights to usage remained unchanged, as did the original
appropriation date. The decree named the South Platte River as the source,
while noting that the 1914 decree also adjudicated the Plumb Drain ditch and
other accretions as sources of supply for the SD&SD. After changing the diversion point, Faith quitclaimed what remaining property interests it may have retained in the ditch to K-LOW, while retaining ownership of the SD&SD itself.
Select Energy Services ("Select"), laid a pipeline across this ditch, and KLOW filed a trespass claim against Select, relying on its quitclaim deed and
claiming an easement to the ditch associated with the historic water right. Select
filed suit in Water Court Division 1 seeking a declaratory judgment as to

1.
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whether the recent change to the historic decree extinguished any right to divert
water from the ditch. The status of the easement also depended upon this detenriination, as its existence hinged on the scope of the underlying water right.
While the parties to this case disagreed as to whether the 2014 decree eliminated any right to divert water from the old ditch, both parties agreed that the
viability of K-LOW's trespass claim turned upon whether it retained a water
right to the ditch after the 2014 change.
The water court looked to the plain language of the 2014 decree and held
that the water right allowed its holder to divert water only at the pump downriver
from the headgate and disputed ditch. The court further held that the decree
did not include a right to divert water from that ditch, thus granting Select's
partial motion for summary judgment. K-LOW appealed.
The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the water court's findings. The
Court explained that a water decree does not confer a water right: it merely
confirms its existence, recogizes its scope, and governs its administration. Any
asserted right, to include any claimed alternate diversion points, must appear
on the face of the decree or result from the proper construction of its provisions.
The Court thereby looked to the plain language of the 2014 decree and found
that whether there was a right to divert the water was unambiguous: the decree
did not grant a right to divert from the SD&SD.
K-LOW argued that the court should recognize alternate points of diversion and, therefore, a right to divert from the ditch, based on the 1914 adjudication of the "Plumb Drain ditch and other accretions" as additional sources of
supply. Looking again to the plain language of the decree, the Court found that
though the decree identifies these additional sources, it does not identify alternate points of diversion for them. Instead, the decree clearly recognizes a single
point of diversion-that of the downstream pump-as well as the sources of supply available to that point of diversion. The Court agreed with the water court's
deternination that, assuming all of the sources of supply returned to the South
Platte River above the new diversion point, then all original sources of the
SD&SD would be available at the new location. Thus, no independent right
remained to divert seepage, waste waters, or accretions from anywhere besides
the new diversion point, and accordingly no right existed to divert water from
the SD&SD.
Accordingly, the Court affinned the water court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of Select Energy Services.
Megan McCuloch
MONTANA

City of Helena v. Cmty. of Rimini, 397 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2017) (holding that,
despite a period of non-use, a presumption of nonabandonment of a water right
that comported with the great and growing cities doctrine, applied to a municipality when the city proved intent to use its entire water right in the future by
constructing a conveyance with the capacity to utilize the city's water right completely).
junior water right holder Andy R. Skinner and the Community of Rimini
objected to the City of Helena's (the "City") claim to 13.75 cubic feet per second
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of water from Tenmile Creek in Helena, Montana. The City's water right decree dates back to 1903. In 2011, the Water Master found that the City abandoned 7.35 cfs of its water right and imposed a specific place of use restriction
on the City's water rights. The City filed objections and in 2013, the water court
restored the City's water rights in full, but adopted the Water Master's specific
place of use restriction. Skinner appealed. The Montana Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the water court ruled that the
City had abandoned 0.60 cfs of its water rights. Once again, Skinner appealed.
The legislature amended M.C.A. section 85-2-227 in 2005 to create a presumption of nonabandonment for water rights claimed for municipal use by a
city when the city meets any of four criteria, one being the construction and
maintenance of a diversion or conveyance structure. Skinner argued that, under
M.C.A. section 1-2-109, the statute could not be applied retroactively because
the statute does not expressly declare so. The Court upheld the water court's
finding that the 2005 amendment to M.C.A. section 85-2-227 was a change in
the burden of proof, which was a procedural change in law rather than a substantive one. Therefore, the presumption of nonabandonment of a water right
applied to the City, so long as the City met the requirements of the statute.
Abandonment of a water right typically requires both non-use and intent to
abandon. However, under M.C.A. section 85-2-227, the City would benefit
from a presumption that it did not abandon its water right, despite any period
of non-use, if the City used any part of its water right while showing an intention
to plan for future growth. Constructing a diversion or conveyance structure,
conducting a formal study, or maintaining a facility connected to the municipal
water supply system for emergency purposes evidenced intent to plan for future
growth. The Montana statute comports with the purpose of the great and growing cities doctrine, a doctrine that originated from the Colorado Supreme
Court. The doctrine arose in response to growing urban populations to ensure
an adequate water supply to the public. The policy behind the great and growing cities doctrine is that cities cannot survive without acquiring more water and
should therefore receive different treatment than private individuals. The Colorado Supreme Court emphasized the importance of cities' ability to obtain
appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs of the city, especially resulting
from a normal increase in population within a reasonable amount of time.
The Court upheld the water court's finding that the City showed intent to
use its water right in the future. The City created a presumption of nonabandonment by constructing a concrete diversion pipeline with a capacity of 13.15
cfs in 1921, commissioning an engineering report in 1929, and maintaining an
open channel ditch for emergency municipal water supply. Although the 1921
conveyance, called the Rimini Pipeline, did not have the capacity to transport
the City's entire water right (13.75 cfs), the Court held that the City did not
intend to abandon the unused 0.60 cfs. The 1929 engineering report revealed
that friction, leakage, waste, and other factors were restricting the capacity of the
City's two smaller transmission pipelines. The report qualified as a formal study
evidencing the City's intention to accommodate for its future needs. In 1948,
the City constructed a new pipeline with the capacity to convey the City's entire
water right of 13.75 cfs.
Skinner contended that the City's period of non-use between 1948 and
2011 was sufficient to rebut the presumption of nonabandonment. The water
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court agreed with the Water Master's finding that the City did not present evidence that it intended to increase the Rimini Pipeline's capacity from 13.15 cfs
to the full water right capacity of 13.75 cfs. Although the 1948 conveyance had
the capacity of 13.75 cfs, the Rimini Pipeline was restricting the new pipeline's
water flow to 13.15 cfs. Skinner argued that the beneficial use requirement
limits the City's water right to the amount of water actually used for a beneficial
use. The water court held that the City did not present sufficient evidence to
show intention to increase its diversion capacity to the full extent of the water
right. The Court held the water court erred in upholding the Water Master's
determination because the City took affirmative steps towards planning for the
City's future water needs. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting
a city's efforts to substantially utilize its water rights. The City met the statutory
criteria for the presumption of nonabandonment of its water right as applied to
the City's entire system of conveyances, including all pipelines. The Court held
that despite the period of non-use, the City's construction of the 13.75 cfs capacity pipeline permitted an inference that the City sought to make use of its
entire water right.
Montana law requires a final water right decree to include a place of use
restriction. The statute for this place of use element is constitutionally protected. The City challenged the restriction, but failed procedurally to comply
with the notice requirement when challenging a constitutionally protected statute.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's opinion that the presumption of nonabandonment applied to the City, reversed the water court's
detenination that the City abandoned 0.60 cfs of its water right, and remanded
for the entry of an amended judgment awarding the City its entire 13.75 cfs
water right in Tenmile Creek.
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting.
Justice Rice did not agree with the Court's finding that M.C.A. section 852-227 could be applied retroactively because the 2005 amendment to the statute
was procedural. He argued the amendment was in fact substantive because the
statute, as applied, produced a different legal result from the result that would
have followed had the presumption of nonabandonment not been applied. He
found the sixty year period of non-use by the City unfair to Skinner's claim,
especially considering Skinner's four water rights dating back to 1865.
Kate Mailliard
NEBRASKA

Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 2017) (holding that: (i) an interstate
compact is federal law and supersedes water appropriators' property interests;
(ii) regulatory actions that limit water rights to ensure compliance with an interstate compact do not represent a physical permanent invasion; (iii) regulatory
actions that limited water rights did not deprive farmers of all economically beneficial use of their property; and (iv) a state agency department's failure to curtail
groundwater pumping does not result in a taking when the department has no
jurisdiction to regulate groundwater).
The Republican River Compact ("the Compact") apportions Colorado,
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Nebraska, and Kansas a supply of "virgin water" that is undepleted by human
activity from the Republican River Basin ("the Basin"). Much of the water from
the Basin passes through Nebraska before entering Kansas via the Republican
River, and Nebraska must limit water consumption to comply with the state's
obligations to Kansas under the Compact.
To ensure that Nebraska remains in compliance, the Nebraska Ground
Water Management and Protection Act ("the Act") requires that the Nebraska
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"), in conjunction with the State's
three natural resource districts, develop an integrated water management plan.
As part of this statutory scheme, DNR must make an annual forecast of the
maximum amount of water available from streamflow as limited by Nebraska's
obligations under the Compact.
In.2013, and again in 2014, DNR forecasted that Nebraska's water consumption would exceed its allocation under the Compact. In both years, DNR
issued an order called a "Compact Call" and issued closing notices on all surface
water permits for natural flow and storage in the Basin. As a result, farmers
who held those permits did not receive their full water allocation supply and
suffered diminished crop yields. Even though the affected farmers owned appropriations allowing for diversions of surface water from the Basin, all water in
the Basin was simultaneously subject to Nebraska's obligations under the Compact.
Affected farmers who irrigated with water delivered from Frenchman-Canbridge Irrigation District-water that is subject to Nebraska's allocation under
the Compact-filed a class action suit in the District Court in Furnas County
alleging two inverse condemnation claims for both 2013 and 2014. The district
court later consolidated these claims. The claim first alleged that, in both 2013
and 2014, surface water was available for the farmers within Nebraska's allocated share under the Compact, yet DNR gave that available water to Kansas in
excess of the state's Compact requirements. The farmers argued that DNR's
actions constituted a regulatory taking under the Nebraska Constitution that
gave rise to an inverse condemnation claim. The claim further alleged that
DNR's failure to reduce excessive groundwater pumping led to a depletion of
the Basin's surface water supply and thereby constituted a taking under Nebraska's Constitution that also gave rise to a claim for inverse condemnation.
The district court dismissed the claim, holding that: (i) DNR's administration of streamflow under the Compact did not interfere with a property right
under the Nebraska Constitution and was therefore not a taking; and (ii) DNR
did not have a duty to regulate groundwater so its failure to curtail excessive
groundwater pumping did not constitute a taking.
On appeal, the farmers asserted that the district court erred in its legal conclusions, and the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the farmers' claims de
novo. First, the Court addressed whether the district court erred in determining
that DNR's streamflow administration did not result in a taking under the Nebraska Constitution. The Court recognized that the Compact is federal law and
allocations under the Compact are the supreme law in Nebraska. Accordingly,
the Court held that appropriators' rights to use water in the Basin were subject
to the superior obligation of Nebraska's compliance with the Compact. Because the appropriators' rights were subject to the Compact, the rights did not
constitute a compensable property interest when they were limited to ensure
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compliance, and thus the Court held that DNR's administration did not result
in a permanent physical invasion. The Court also held that there was no deprivation of all economically beneficial use of property, as the farmers did not
allege facts showing such deprivation from water shortages. A taking requires
either a permanent physical invasion or the deprivation of all economically beneficial use, and the Court found neither to be present. Therefore, the Court
concluded that DNR's actions were not a taking that could give rise to an inverse
condemnation claim.
Second, the Court turned to whether the district court erred in finding that
DNR's failure to act to curtail excessive groundwater pumping did not constitute
a taking. The Court first recognized that Nebraska has two separate systems for
the distribution of groundwater and surface water. Under the Act, DNR must
ensure compliance with the Compact, but the Act specifically limits DNR's jurisdiction to surface water while granting jurisdiction over groundwater to Nebraska's natural resource districts. Because DNR did not have jurisdiction to
regulate groundwater, the Court held that DNR had no duty or power to administer the Basin's groundwater for the benefit of surface water appropriators.
The Court held that failing to curtail excessive groundwater pumping was a failure to exercise a power that DNR did not actually have, and therefore could
not give rise to a regulatory taking.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the rulings of the district court.
Jeremy Frankel
SOUTH DAKOTA

Rumpza v. Zubke, 900 N.W.2d 601 (S.D. 2017) (holding that: (i) Zubke's
installation of drainage systems changed the natural flow characteristics of the
water draining from the dominant landowner's property to the subservient landowner's property; and (ii) the relative-hardship test was irrelevant because
Zubke willfully installed the drainage systems and Rumpza had no duty to clear
naturally occurring obstructions in the watercourse).
On July 24, 2013, Robert and Nancy Rumpza ("Rumpza") and Zubke
Brothers LLC ("Brothers") sued David and Marilyn Zubke ("Zubke") seeking
an injunction and damages. The Zubke's property is dominant, draining onto
the Rumpza's property in two areas and flowing further onto the Brothers' property. In 2012 and 2013, Zubke installed drainage systems that modified the
established flow characteristics of the drainage areas. The modifications affected the amount of water discharged onto the Rumpza property and extended
the time the properties stayed wet. Consequently, Rumpza and Brothers
claimed they were unable to plant and harvest crops in previously usable areas.
Zubke argued in response that they were compensating for an obstruction located on the Rumpza property that caused water to collect.
At trial, the court returned judgment in favor of Rumpza and Brothers and
entered an injunction against Zubke, requiring them to stop the use of the drainage systems. Zubke appealed, arguing that the court erred in finding Zubke
caused the damage and that the injunction created undue hardship for Zubke
that outweighed any benefits received by Rumpza and Brothers.
First, Zubke contended that the modifications were necessary to overcome
the obstruction on the Rumpza property. The Court rejected the argument
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because a dominant landowner cannot drain water onto a servient property in
a way that unnaturally changes the watercourse, and a servient landowner has
no duty to clear natural obstructions for the benefit of the dominant landowner.
The Court held the drainage systems changed the timing and amount of water
drained onto the servient properties, making them perpetually wet. Additionally, Zubke did not establish that they had a right to overcome the obstruction
on the Rumpza property with modifications or establish that Rumpza had a duty
to remove the obstruction. Therefore, the trial court was not clearly erroneous
in concluding that Zubke caused the alleged damages.
Second, Zubke argued that the injunction created a disproportionate hardship. Zubke asserted that Rumpza and Brothers would have been unable to
farm the land regardless of the drainage modifications. The Court regarded
this argument to be lacking. In any event, the Court held the relative-hardship
test to be irrelevant in this case because Zubke willfully and knowingly made
the modifications and was aware that the modifications would alter the amount
of water discharged into the watercourse.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the injunction and found the trial court was
not clearly erroneous in determining that Zubke caused the damages to the
Rumpza and Brothers' properties.
Andrea Hagler
Surat Farms, LLC v. Brule Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 901 N.W.2d 365 (S.D.
2017) (holding that: (i) the court would hear downstream landowner's appeal in
spite of his failure to name upstream landowner as interested party; (ii) the trial
court was required to review the county board of commissioner's decision de
novo because it was a quasi-judicial matter; (iii) civil law rule applied to the dispute, under which a lower property owner cannot interfere with the natural flow
of surface water to the detriment of an upper property owner; (iv) the downstream landowner impermissibly altered the watercourse with a drain system;
and (v) upstream flooding harmed upstream landowner's property).
Surat Farms, LLC ("Surat") and Albert Delaney ("Delaney") owned adjacent farmland with a natural stream flowing through both properties. Surat, the
lower property owner, installed a drainage system in 2013. Subsequently,
Delaney filed a complaint with the Brule County Board of Commissioners (the
"Board") alleging that in 2014, underground water began entering his basement
as a result of Surat's drainage system. The Board held a hearing and found
Surat impermissibly "altered the natural flow of the water." Surat appealed to
the Brule County Circuit Court, which conducted a de novo review and affirmed the Board's decision.
After the trial court affirmed the decision, Surat appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court raising two issues. First, Surat asserted the trial court erred
in finding its drainage system impermissibly altered the watercourse. Alternatively, Surat contended that if the watercourse was altered, the trial court erred
in finding Delaney suffered causally-related damages.
The Court considered Surat's first argument that the "reasonable use" rule
should apply, under which a downstream landowner can legally alter a watercourse and cause some harm as long as the intended use is reasonable. How-
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ever, the Court agreed with the Board's argument that the "civil law rule" applied, which states that a lower property owner cannot interfere with a watercourse to the detriment of an upper property owner. The Court explained that
South Dakota follows civil law rule for rural surface water drainage. Therefore,
Surat's claim of privilege to construct a drain system that dammed surface water
and flooded an upstream property was without menit.
The Court applied a "clearly erroneous" standard to review factual findings.
The Court considered a site map, commissioned by Delaney, which reflected a
fifteen-inch rise in elevation at the drain location disrupting the natural drainage.
The Court also considered a contour map, prepared by Surat's drain installer,
which could be interpreted to show this elevation difference preexisted the
drainage system. However, evidence indicated the watercourse only started
damming after the drain's installation. Accordingly, the Court found evidence
supported the trial court's ruling that Surat's drainage system impermissibly altered the watercourse.
In considering Surat's second argument that Delaney did not suffer causally-related damages, the Court considered conflicting evidence from both parties regarding whether Delaney's land was in the conservation reserve program
and whether Delaney used the land in question for haying and calving. The
Court resolved that, in light of the conflicting evidence as to how the water affected Delaney's cropland, the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous.
The Court also pointed out that Surat misconstrued the relief, as Delaney was
not awarded damages. The Board and trial court only ordered Surat to take
appropriate action to correct the natural watercourse.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's award of injunctive relief.
Elaine Nolen

